


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
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PRÉCIS OF GREAT CAMPAIGNS

1796-1815


BY

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VIII, 142

WITH MAPS AND PLANS



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P R E F A C E

THIS Précis is based mainly on French accounts. It does not include Naval operations and is confined to Great Campaigns, and therefore excludes the fighting in Denmark, in S. Domingo, the Russo-Persian operations, the fighting in the Tyrol, in Switzerland, in Ireland, in India, in South America, and the Russo-Swedish struggle. The Peninsular War is dealt with partly in detail and partly in outline, and in some of the Battle-plans more places than necessary are given in order to suit other accounts. Readers will find it useful to study the references in the Index.

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PRÉCIS OF GREAT CAMPAIGNS

1796-97

FIRST COALITION

CAMPAIGNS OF 1796 AND 1797.

THE First Coalition (1792-97) against France included by 1793 Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Russia, England, Holland, Spain, the Germanic Empire (the Holy Roman Empire), Portugal, Tuscany, Naples (the two Sicilies), the Holy See; all Europe in fact, except Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Venice (which included Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia). By this Coalition were waged the campaigns of 1792-97 and the campaign in La Vendée. I propose to deal with those of 1796 and 1797, by which date the Coalition had dwindled to Austria, England, Portugal, Sardinia (Piedmont).

The operations of 1795 had not been uniformly successful for France, whose main object was to attain her natural frontiers. To do this it was requisite still to obtain the formal cession of Belgium, of Luxemburg, of the Ecclesiastical electorates (Mayence, Trèves, Cologne, whose Archbishops, together with the Electors of Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, the Palatinate, Bavaria, and Hanover, elected the German Emperor), of the Duchy of Deux-Ponts (Zweibrücken), of Savoy, and of Nice. This was the object of the 1796 and 1797 campaigns.

The Armies: At the close of 1795 the French forces, though deficient in supplies, in transport, and remounts for the Cavalry, were full of ardour, and comprised:—Army of the Sambre and Meuse (75,000) under Jourdan; Army of the Rhine (78,000) under Moreau;

Army of the North (40,000) under Beurnonville; Army of the Alps (20,000) under Kellermann; Army of Italy (36,000) under Bonaparte, then 27 years old.

The Allies had 200,000 Austrians on the Rhine under the Archduke Charles and Würmser, and in Italy 70,000 Austro-Sardinians under Beaulieu.

Plans of Campaign: Carnot, one of the ruling Directory, intended Moreau and Jourdan to operate in Germany, with Vienna as their ultimate objective, whilst Bonaparte would subdue Piedmont, try to wrest Lombardy from Austria, and then make for Vienna. The Austrian plans were not less comprehensive, on the Rhine the salvation of Belgium, and in Italy the most vigorous offensive.

The Theatre included North Italy, Friuli, Carinthia, and South Germany.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY 1796-97.

On March 27 Bonaparte found his troops (36,000) destitute in every respect, posted along the Maritime Alps from the Col di Tenda to Savona in four divisions—Laharpe, Masséna, Augereau, Sérurier—and with 4,000 Cavalry under Stengel. In addition 8,000 men north of the Col di Tenda connected with Kellermann's Army of the Alps. The new general at once suppressed pillage and organised supply, and by April was ready to operate.

The enemy (25,000 Piedmontese under Colli and 45,000 Austrians under Beaulieu) were thus posted: on the right, along the Stura and the Tanaro, Colli; in the centre and on the left, from the Bormida to Genoa, Beaulieu. The Allied generals differed in their plans, Colli wishing to cover Turin, Beaulieu to maintain connection with Genoa and the English fleet in its gulf. This dissension favoured Bonaparte's plan of separating the Allies and beating them in detail.

Period I.—Passage of the Apennines and operations on the right bank of the Po up to the armistice of Cherasco, April 1796.

Bonaparte placed (April 5) Sérurier between Ormea and Garessio to contain the Piedmontese, and echeloned the other divisions between Loano and Savona, with advanced guard at Voltri. Beaulieu fearing

for his Left massed it towards Voltri on April 11, but that night the French general concentrated 13,000 against the enemy's Centre (6,000) which, beaten April 12 at Montenotte, fell back on Dego. Whilst Masséna and Laharpe pursued towards Dego, Augereau, turning on Millesimo, beat and captured there the Austrian Right April 14, and next day the Austrian Centre was driven from Dego on Acqui. The Allied Armies were thus separated.

Leaving Laharpe to hold the Austrian Left and Centre collecting at Acqui, Bonaparte with Augereau and Masséna called up Sérurier and, driving Colli through Ceva, beat him at Mondovi April 21. The Sardinian retired on Fossano to cover Turin. The French reached Cherasco, to which place was summoned the right wing of Kellermann's Army of the Alps. On April 28 Piedmont agreed to the Armistice of Cherasco handing to the victors the fortresses of Alessandria, etc., opening to them the passes of the Alps, and by a secret article yielding to Bonaparte the passage over the Po at Valenza. Though secret, the French general hoped that this article would be disclosed to the Austrians. This convention was of immense value to Bonaparte, as giving him a base for his further operations.

Period II.—Operations in Lombardy up to the investment of Mantua, May 1796. After the Armistice, Beaulieu crossed to the left bank of the Po near Valenza, cutting the bridge, on which passage Bonaparte demonstrated. The latter then collected all the boats he could, and during May 7-9 crossed the river at Piacenza (Plaisance or Placentia). Beaulieu, learning on May 6 of this movement, and fearing for his base in the Mantua Quadrilateral, moved east on Lodi, where Bonaparte routed him May 10, and drove him on Brescia; the Austrian had indeed escaped Bonaparte's intercepting blow, but his "moral" was sadly shaken, and he retired behind the Mincio. The French drove him out of this position behind the Adige, and thence he fled into the Tyrol. Masséna's division then occupied Legnago, whilst the rest of the Army invested Mantua (June 4).

Period III.—Operations against Austrian Armies sent to relieve Mantua:


(a) Against Würmser and Quasdanowitch, July to August 1796 ; Austria sent 30,000 men under Würmser from her Army of the Upper Rhine to join the débris of Beaulieu's force, and to succour Mantua. The Austrian reached Trent about July 15, having in hand 60,000 men, whereas Bonaparte had only 40,000 thus disposed :—Augereau 8,000 at Legnago, Masséna 17,000 from Ronco to Rivoli, Sauret 4,000 at Salo, Kilmaine 3,000 Cavalry at Peschiera, Sérurier 10,000 besieging Mantua.


Würmser advanced in two columns :—(1) Würmser with 35,000 down the Adige, (2) Quasdanowitch with 25,000 down the Chiese. On July 29 Würmser drove in Masséna's extreme flank, and Quasdanowitch forced Sauret towards Lonato and occupied Brescia, the French line of retreat. Bonaparte, however, spiked his guns round Mantua, raised the siege, and concentrated between the Mincio and the Chiese with a view of separately defeating the divided enemy. He dealt first with Quasdanowitch, against whom he moved Sérurier, Masséna, and Augereau, who beat the Austrian at Lonato, August 3.

Instead of helping his lieutenant, Würmser entered Mantua August 2, whilst Bonaparte drove Quasdanowitch west of the Lake di Garda, as far as Riva. He then turned on Würmser, and beat him at Castiglione (31,000 French v. 25,000 Austrians), August 5, whence the Austrian recoiled east of the Lake di Garda on Trent. By mid-August the French occupied their old positions, and Mantua was again blockaded ;

(b) Against Würmser and Davidowitch, September 1796 ; to assist the French offensive in Germany Bonaparte took the initiative, and on September 1, moved on Roveredo—Masséna and Augereau up the Adige, Vaubois (vice Sauret) up the Chiese. Würmser, however, had also moved, and leaving Davidowitch with 20,000 to guard the Tyrol, had, with 35,000, marched down the Brenta on Bassano.

In spite of Davidowitch's desperate resistance the two French columns united at Roveredo September 4, and forced an entry into Trent. Hearing of this Würmser hastened in order to relieve Mantua, but Bonaparte, leaving Vaubois at Lavis to hold Davidowitch,





witch, covered twenty-two leagues in two days in pursuit, caught Würmser at Bassano, and beat him there September 8. Würmser retired across the Adige and reached Mantua, compelling Sérurier to raise the blockade. Masséna and Augereau reinforcing Sérurier shut up the Austrian general in Mantua, which was at once blockaded October 1. Vaubois then held Lavis and Trent; Masséna, Bassano; Augereau, Verona;

(c) Against Alvinzi and Davidowitch, November 1796; the Archduke Charles' success in Germany allowed Austria to organise 50,000 men for Italy, whereas Bonaparte had no more than 20,000 field-troops. This number does not include 9,000 blockading Mantua, 4,000 holding the strong places in the rear, and 16,000 sick. On November 1 Alvinzi with 30,000 moved over the Piave on Verona, where Davidowitch with 20,000 was to join him by the Adige valley. Davidowitch drove Vaubois out of Trent, Alvinzi drove Masséna on Vicenza, where Augereau came up, but Bonaparte, knowing that Vaubois had been forced by Davidowitch back on Rivoli, moved in person with some troops to support his lieutenant. He then returned to Verona, and with Masséna and Augereau attacked Alvinzi at Caldiero, November 11 and 12; he was beaten and forced back on Verona. The numbers at Caldiero were 16,000 French, 17,000 Austrians.

Desperate was Bonaparte's position: Augereau and Masséna mustered only 11,000; Vaubois numbered only 7,000; Sérurier round Mantua only 9,000. A frontal attack on Alvinzi at Caldiero was hopeless, a turning movement by the Austrian Left seemed more hopeful, and Bonaparte, leaving only 1,500 men in Verona, passed down the west bank of the Adige and crossed near Arcola, where he fought Alvinzi for three days, November 15-17, and, defeating him, drove him on Vicenza.

BATTLE OF ARCOLA, NOVEMBER 15-17, 1796.

Bonaparte crossed the Adige at Ronco and debouched into the marsh of the Alpone. Masséna then held the Porcil road, Augereau moved on Arcola bridge. *See*

November 15, two Austrian divisions attacked by the two roads and were repulsed, but Augereau could not secure the Arcola bridge. At night the French recrossed the Adige, in order to be nearer Vaubois, hard pressed by Davidowitch at Rivoli.

November 16, the fruitless struggle was renewed on the two roads, and again the French repassed the Adige.

November 17, the French were successful and, with the help of a turning force, *viâ* Albaredo, mastered the Arcola bridge. The Austrians retired on Vicenza.

Tactical Comments: (1) Effect of a turning force; (2) Along narrow causeways inferior numbers can combat with fair hope of success; (3) Alvinzi was paralysed by the instructions of the Aulic Council not to attempt anything hazardous for fear of wrecking the peace negotiations.

The French general then carried part of his force *viâ* Verona to the help of Vaubois, and in consequence Davidowitch retired north into the Tyrol. At the close of November the exhausted French were reinforced to 45,000; Joubert (vice Vaubois) at Rivoli, Masséna at Verona, Augereau at Legnago, Rey at Lonato, Sérurier round Mantua;

(d) Against Alvinzi and Provera, January 1797; Alvinzi having reorganised moved in January 1797, he himself with 29,000 from Trent on Verona, Provera with 10,000 from Padua on Legnago, a detachment of 6,000 from Bassano on Verona; to oppose these converging forces Bonaparte had only 35,000 field-troops. Provera crossed the Adige, north of Legnago, whilst Alvinzi pressed Joubert at Rivoli. Bonaparte supported the latter with Masséna and Rey, and on January 14 won the glorious victory of Rivoli, hurling Alvinzi back into the Tyrol.


BATTLE OF RIVOLI, JANUARY 14, 1797.

Alvinzi, confident he had to deal only with Joubert, decided on enveloping tactics. His extreme Right, *viâ* Lumini and Affi, would cut the French retreat, his Right would move *viâ* Caprino, his Centre along the right bank of the Adige *viâ* the Incanale defile,

BATTLE OF RIVOLI

14 JANUARY 1797

Scale of Miles



POSITIONS

On the 13th At the close of battle

FRENCH AUSTRIANS FRENCH AUSTRIANS

BAGGAGE IN RED

Stanford's Geog^y Estab^t, London.

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his Left along the left bank *viâ* Dolce. The battle opened at dawn, and the French at first appeared beaten, when the arrival of Masséna checked the Austrian Right, and their Centre, torn by shot from two batteries placed by Bonaparte in person at Incanale, and assailed by Joubert, was thrown into disorder by Lasalle's cavalry charge. At that moment the extreme Austrian Right appeared on the French rear; it was crushed between a reserve brigade from Rivoli and Rey, who came up *viâ* Orsa. The retreat, urged on by Joubert and Rey, soon degenerated into a flight on the appearance in the Austrian rear of Murat and a small force despatched by Bonaparte over the Lake di Garda from Salo. Numbers in the battle were 30,000 French, and 40,000 Austrians.

Tactical Comments: (1) Excellent use of the French Cavalry and Artillery; (2) A mountainous terrain advantageous to the defender; (3) Pursuit well arranged; (4) Austrian columns not well connected; (5) Rash turning movement by the Austrian extreme Right; (6) Austrians attacked without Artillery.

Bonaparte, with the indefatigable Masséna, hurried to Mantua to assist in defeating Provera, who meantime, pursued by Augereau, had approached Mantua, but being defeated, had to surrender. Finally, February 2, Würmser in Mantua agreed to capitulate with 16,000 men and 350 guns.

Period IV.—Operations against the Archduke Charles, and March on Vienna, March and April 1797. Austria now called in the Archduke fresh from his German triumphs, and that prince at once repaired to Italy to reorganise, and to await a reinforcement of 40,000; in addition 15,000 Austrians guarded the Tyrol.

Bonaparte, reinforced by Bernadotte and Delmas, who had crossed the Alps in deep winter, but compelled to leave troops on his communications, disposed of only 50,000 field-troops. He decided to assail the Archduke at Göriz, before the arrival of Austrian troops from Germany. He placed Joubert to watch the Tyrol, and himself, with divisions Masséna, Sérurier, Guieu (vice Augereau), and Bernadotte, proposed to cross the Piave and the Tagliamento upon Tarvis, where Masséna, having passed those streams higher

up, would rejoin him, then to drive the enemy through the Tarvis pass, and having rallied to him Joubert (who would have come from the Tyrol) to march in full strength upon Vienna, where he counted on Moreau arriving by the Danube valley.

On March 10 the French quitted Bassano, and on the 16th arrived before Codroipo in presence of the Austrian prince entrenched on the left bank of the Tagliamento. The latter, defeated, fell back on Palmanova. Meantime Masséna, moving high up the Piave, reached Osoppo, March 17, whence he made for Pontebba.

The Archduke, foiled in his efforts to secure time for the arrival of his reinforcements, directed two divisions under Bayadisch with all his parks upon Tarvis, *viâ* Udine and Caporetto; he then retired his main body on Gradisca. But, learning that Guieu was on the heels of Bayadisch, who besides was menaced in front by Masséna, he hurried in person to Klagenfurt, reunited there 5,000 grenadiers, and directed them on Tarvis, of which Masséna had just taken possession. On March 22 a fierce combat ensued in the pass itself between the prince and Masséna, which terminated in the former's retreat through Villach. Soon after, Bayadisch arrived, and, caught between Guieu and Masséna, had to surrender.

Meantine, Bernadotte and Sérurier occupied Göritz and Trieste; Bernadotte then halted at Göritz whilst Sérurier joined Masséna and Guieu at Villach. On March 29 Bonaparte had his headquarters at Klagenfurt, which then became his centre of operations.

Joubert meanwhile had started, March 20, and on April 2 arrived at Toblach after a series of engagements, and then, *viâ* Spittal, reached Villach; Bonaparte from Klagenfurt defeated the Archduke on April 2 at Neumarkt, and pursued *viâ* Leoben as far as Semmering, whence could be seen the towers of Vienna. As Moreau was not in a position to co-operate, Bonaparte on April 7 agreed to the armistice of Leoben, which on October 17, 1797, became the Treaty of Campo Formio between Austria and France.

FRENCH EXPEDITION TO ROME.

After beating Beaulieu, Bonaparte sent an expedition against the Pope. Augereau entered Bologna, in the Papal Legations (Romagna), June 19, 1796, whilst Vaubois moved *via* Parma. The Pope was then granted an armistice, which his Holiness broke during Bonaparte's difficulties round Arcola. As soon as he was able, the French leader despatched Victor, February 1797, into Romagna and the Papal Marches, and this had the effect of wringing from the Pope the Treaty of Tolentino, February 19, 1797. During these campaigns Venice also was the object of French operations.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) Bonaparte's youthful energy disconcerted the old-fashioned Austrian generals, hampered as they were by the constant interference of the Aulic Council; (2) Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera formed the famous Italian quadrilateral; compare the French Pentagon round Vesoul, the Russian quadrilateral of Brest-Litovski, the Turkish quadrilateral of Shumla, and the quadrilateral in the Pyrenees, so useful to Soult in 1813; (3) Bonaparte often acted in defiance of the Directory—*e.g.* his arrangement with Piedmont and his Treaty of Tolentino; he organised the Cisalpine Republic (Milan, Modena, Bologna), and the Ligurian Republic (Genoa), he applied the armistice of Leoben to the whole theatre, and thus arrested Hoche's victorious march in Germany, and under the pretext of avenging the massacre of French troops at Verona ("the Veronese Easter," April 17) overturned the old Republic of Venice, which he then treacherously handed over to Austria; (4) the Treaty of Campo-Formio gave France Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and the Ionian Isles, and the suzerainty of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics; and it also assigned Venice to Austria; (5) Bonaparte studied topography, "He knew the Apennines," says Clausewitz, "like his own pocket"; (6) on April 19, 1796, Bonaparte changed his line of communications from Savona to Ormea (compare his action in Russia, 1812); (7) Bonaparte had some time before

thoroughly considered and decided on a plan of operations for Italy ; (8) during the French march on Piacenza could not Beaulieu have thrown himself on their line of communications ? Improbable from that general's character, and besides Bonaparte had secured his magazines in the fortresses of Cherasco and Tortona, whilst the rich city of Piacenza would be a temporary centre of supply ; (9) this Campaign displayed all Bonaparte's capacities ; he acted on two principles, (a) if superior to the enemy he acted on his rear, (b) if not, he occupied a central position and interposed. Inferior to Austrians and Sardinians he interposed and defeated them in detail ; then superior to the Austrians he struck at their rear at Lodi ; again inferior to the Austrian forces moving to relieve Mantua, he occupied a central position, interposed, and beat them in detail. These two strategic manœuvres marked the whole of Napoléon's operations ; (10) the French success was due to the individual intelligence of the soldiers, recruited as they were from all classes, and to the great genius of their chief ; (11) the great error of the Austrians was in acting on double lines without sufficient connexion between their divided Armies, and without each Army being strong enough by itself—note the opposite case at Leipzig, 1813 ; (12) great importance of Mantua in checking French advance ; (13) on both sides statesmen hampered the generals—in the last period the Directory would not heavily reinforce Bonaparte, it still believed in moving two large Armies over the Rhine into Germany on double lines ; the Aulic Council should have permitted the Archduke to move into the Tyrol, where he would have flanked any movement against Vienna, and where he would have easily received his reinforcements from the Rhine.

1796-97.

FIRST COALITION (*continued*)

OPERATIONS IN GERMANY.

EARLY in the year the French were deficient in supplies and in horses, but Austria did not denounce the armistice (signed January 1, 1796) till June 1, 1796; that is, at the moment when Würmser was starting for Italy.

The Forces: Jourdan had the Army of the Sambre and Meuse (75,000), Moreau commanded the Army of the Rhine (78,000), Beurnonville led the Army of the North (40,000), and on the other side the Archduke Charles controlled over 150,000 men.

The plan of Carnot was for Moreau by the Neckar and Jourdan by the Main to move through Southern Germany on Vienna; the Archduke's main object was the salvation of Belgium, though the operations took place in South Germany, a theatre which was the scene of constant struggles.

Positions of the Combatants on June 1: On the Lower Rhine, the mass of the Archduke Charles was in front of Mayence and upon the River Nahe, with its right between the Lahn and the Sieg. Jourdan with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse faced him from the Nahe to Cologne and Düsseldorf. On the Upper Rhine, Würmser stretched from Kaiserslautern through Mannheim to Basle; Moreau faced him. As to numbers they were about 150,000, after Würmser led 30,000 away to Italy.

Operations of Jourdan, June 1796: Jourdan's left under Kléber crossing at Düsseldorf and beating the Archduke's right at Altenkirchen June 4, moved on the Lahn, where Jourdan with his centre

having crossed at Neuwied came into line. Marceau with Jourdan's right (30,000) remained before Mayence. Hearing of these events the Austrian prince with part of his force crossed to the right bank of the Rhine and moved down on the River Lahn. On June 7 at Wetzlar he defeated Jourdan's left and compelled that general's retreat; the French centre recrossed at Neuwied, Kléber with the left retired on Düsseldorf, defeating the pursuing Austrians at Uckerath June 19.

Operations of Moreau, June to August 1796: Moreau wanted to cross at Kehl, and the Austrians being occupied with Jourdan he feinted on Mannheim and then massed near Strasburg. On June 25 he crossed at Kehl, beating an Austrian corps on the River Rench. He might then have crushed the Austrian right under Latour before the arrival of the Archduke. That prince had left Wartensleben on the Lahn and at Mayence to hold Jourdan and Marceau, and was himself hurrying to Latour's aid. Instead, the French general moved his centre under St. Cyr to Kniebis, and himself leisurely attacked and beat Latour at Rastadt, July 5. He then halted for four days, waiting for St. Cyr, which delay gave the Archduke time to arrive. Moreau attacked him and drove him on Pforzheim. The prince, indeed, was bent on reaching the Danube, so as to cover Austria—he would proceed by the Neckar Valley, Wartensleben by the Main Valley.

Moreau made for Pforzheim, his right sweeping the Brisgau, and finally he occupied a front from Pforzheim along the Black Forest to Lauffenburg. On July 18 Moreau cleared Stuttgart, and on the 21st Cannstadt, forcing the Archduke eastwards till the latter stood for battle at Neresheim August 11. After an indecisive combat the Austrian crossed the Danube between Dillingen and Donauwerth. Moreau also crossed on the 19th and lined up on the Zusam.

Operations of Jourdan, end of June to September 1796: On Moreau's advance Jourdan left Marceau with 30,000 to blockade Mayence, and moved against Wartensleben June 27, crossing the Rhine at Düsseldorf and Neuwied, and on July 9 passing the River

Lahn. He beat the Austrians at Friedberg, drove them over the Main, and reached that river on July 16. He moved up it, capturing Würzburg and Bamberg, whilst the Austrians, beaten by Kléber at Forchheim, August 7, recoiled on Amberg. Jourdan followed and drove Wartensleben eastward behind the River Naab, August 18.

Meantime the Archduke had decided to contain Moreau, to concentrate against Jourdan and then to return against Moreau. He left Latour with 38,000 to hold Moreau, and himself moved August 16 *viâ* Ingolstadt on Neumarkt, which he reached the 21st, expelling Jourdan's covering force. The latter general in alarm retired on Amberg, where on August 24 he was beaten, and whence he reached Schweinfurt on the 31st. He then desired to base himself on Würzburg, but the Archduke arrived there first. Jourdan attacked him there September 3, and being repulsed recoiled on Arnstein and *viâ* Schlüchtern reached the Lahn, where Marceau, having raised the blockade of Mayence, rejoined him.

On September 17 the violent combat of Giessen resulted in Jourdan recrossing the Rhine, covered by Marceau, who was on September 19 killed in the last engagement, that of Altenkirchen. This was the close of operations on the Lower Rhine, and Jourdan was replaced by Beurnonville.

Operations of Moreau, end of August 1796 to January 1797: August 21 on the Zusam Moreau learnt of the Archduke's northern march, and as the Directory's orders did not allow him to join Jourdan, he decided to move into Bavaria as a diversion in favour of his colleague. On August 24 he crossed the Lech at Augsburg, beat Latour at Friedberg, forcing him on to the Isar River. After various manœuvres Moreau, disquieted by the Archduke's successes against Jourdan, retrograded on the River Iller, September 24. His leisurely retreat was close pressed by Latour, upon whom therefore he inflicted a severe defeat at Biberach, October 2. The French then crossed the Danube at Rietlingen, aiming for Strasbourg, but learning that the Archduke was hastening to Latour's

aid they turned south *viâ* the Valley of Hell (Höllenthal) on Friburg, October 12, and there closed this celebrated retreat.

Meantime the Archduke with part of his force moving up the right of the Rhine had joined Latour; he beat Moreau at Emmendingen, October 19, and consequently the French leader passed the Rhine at Brisach and Hüningen. The Austrian prince, in obedience to the orders of the Aulic Council, then reduced Kehl, January 9, 1797, and Hüningen, February 1, 1797.

Operations of Hoche and Moreau, April 17-22, 1797: After reorganisation, the Army of the Sambre and Meuse (80,000) was entrusted to Hoche, who was faced by Werneck with only 40,000—the Archduke had carried a large force into Italy against Bonaparte. Moreau numbered 60,000 field troops.

On April 18, Hoche crossing at Neuwied and Düsseldorf, beat Werneck at Heddersdorf and drove him on the R. Lahn. Moreau had moved on April 17, Desaix crossing the Rhine at Diersheim on the 20th. The Armistice of Leoben then put an end to all these operations.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) Results of the war against the First Coalition: England alone remained in arms, France had gained her natural frontiers on the Rhine and in the Alps, and had girdled herself with allied republics—Batavian (Holland), Cisalpine (Lombardy, the Valteline, Bologna, *i.e.* Romagna or Papal Legations, Modena, and part of Venetian territory), Ligurian (Genoa). The treaties which secured these results were:—1795, Treaty of Basle with Prussia ceded the Prussian territory left of the Rhine; Treaty of the Hague with Holland gave to France practical control over Holland; Treaty of Basle with Spain ceded the Spanish part of St. Domingo; 1796, Treaty of Paris with Piedmont ceded Savoy and Nice; 1797, Treaty of Tolentino with the Pope ceded Avignon and Venaissin; Treaty of Campo Formio with Austria ceded Belgium and the Ionian Isles; (2) Jourdan and Moreau acted on double lines and were too far apart, the Archduke, interposed between them, held the one and concentrated against the other. Bonaparte in Italy and the Archduke in Germany applied the same principles—a

central position, interior line of communication, rapid massing against an isolated force. In Germany the French should have converged their two Armies on Ulm; (3) In strategy the possession of the plains is more important than the control of the mountains, not so in tactics, as was seen at Emendingen; (4) Both in Italy and in Germany the French levied immense requisitions—war had to support war.


1798—1801

FRENCH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT AND SYRIA


Causes: Immediately on the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio, the Directory formed an Army of England under Bonaparte; and in 1798 the Pope was brought to France and the Papal States became the Roman Republic; Switzerland also was invaded and became the Helvetian Republic—this step, indeed, gave France a double re-entrant in case the Austrians operated in South Germany and in Italy, but it laid bare a portion of French territory. As to England there was a rebellion in Ireland, and in India Tippoo Sultan declared war, and the Directory aimed at Egypt with a view to ruin the English commerce in the East, and to secure for France the domination of the Mediterranean.

Preparations: It was not a moment favourable for such an enterprise, the peace being uncertain and the Continental Powers alarmed. The Directory, however, made several feints as if to invade the British Isles, with the result that England recalled her cruisers from the Mediterranean to protect the Channel. Admiral Brueys then assembled his squadron at Toulon, 13 vessels of the line, 14 frigates, 72 brigs and cutters, 400 transports, and 10,000 sailors. The Army numbered 36,000 veterans under Bonaparte, with Berthier as Chief of Staff, and with other celebrated officers (Lannes, Murat, etc.).

Operations: On May 19, 1798, the armament quitted Toulon, and on June 10 Malta was occupied and left in charge of General Vaubois and 3,000 men. Bonaparte started again June 19. Meantime, Nelson detached from the English fleet before Cadiz proceeded to Egypt, hugging the African coast and thus missing the expedition. Nelson reached Alexandria on June 29, then sailed for the Dardanelles, passing close to Bonaparte during the night. He then



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made for Crete, and thence for Syracuse to take in supplies, after which he returned to Alexandria.

CONQUEST OF EGYPT, JULY 1798 TO JANUARY 1799.

On July 2 the French landed at Alexandria, and took the city, which acted as their base. Bonaparte then moved to Ramanieh, where he met the flotilla which he had despatched *viâ* Rosetta, and on July 13 defeated Mourad Bey's Mamelukes at Chebreiss, where for the first time the French Army adopted the square formation. Cairo was the objective, and on July 21 Mourad was again worsted in the battle of the Pyramids, the square formation being again resorted to. Cairo opened its gates, and Lower Egypt passed under Bonaparte's control.

Meantime, on August 1, in the battle of the Nile (or Abukir) Nelson had destroyed Brueys' fleet, excepting four vessels which fled to Malta. Bonaparte was thus isolated, and Turkey encouraged to declare war on France. In spite of this, the French commander proceeded with all vigour to organise the government and the resources of the country.

EXPEDITION INTO SYRIA, FEBRUARY TO JUNE 1799.

This expedition was resolved upon in order to forestall a Turkish attack. Leaving Desaix with 5,000 in Egypt, Bonaparte formed the rest of his Army—13,900 men—in four divisions, and Murat's 900 Cavalry. He also called back the four vessels at Malta, and sent three frigates with his siege train to cruise off Acre. On February 20 El Arish capitulated, Reynier's division was left there, and Bonaparte reached Gaza and Jaffa; supplies were found at the latter place, but the soldiers became infected with the plague. It was at this town that Bonaparte reluctantly put his prisoners to death.

Arrived at Acre March 20, the French assaults were vigorously resisted by the Turks under Djezzar Pasha and Commodore Sidney Smith, who captured the three vessels with the siege train. As

the Pasha of Damascus was collecting troops, Bonaparte moved against them and on April 16 routed him at Mount Tabor, capturing vast supplies. The siege was resumed, but the plague then fell on the French, and news arrived of a Turkish force sailing against Egypt; in consequence the Army retreated May 20, and at Jaffa 400 sick were poisoned to prevent them from falling into the hands of the barbarous Turks; on June 14 the troops re-entered Cairo—it was Bonaparte's first retreat, and the effect of his failure to capture Acre can hardly be exaggerated.

OPERATIONS IN EGYPT UP TO BONAPARTE'S DEPARTURE, JUNE TO AUGUST 1799.

During Bonaparte's absence in Syria, Desaix, called the "Just Sultan," chased Mourad Bey from Upper Egypt which he governed with remarkable equity. After Bonaparte's return a large Turkish force (18,000) disembarked at Abukir July 14. The French concentrated and on July 24 totally defeated the Sultan's troops at Abukir. The news received from Europe and the fact that the English conquest of Malta (1799—1800) prevented any reinforcements reaching him decided Bonaparte to return to France. He embarked on August 23, leaving the command to Kléber, and on October 9 landed in France.

OPERATIONS UNDER KLÉBER, AUGUST 1799 TO JUNE 1800.

The new commander, a man of immense capacity, concluded, in January 1800, with Turkey the Treaty of El Arish, which however came to nothing owing to the opposition of England. On March 20 the French, 12,000 strong, routed 50,000 Turks at Heliopolis and again controlled all Egypt, but on June 14, 1800, their celebrated commander was assassinated by a fanatic.

OPERATIONS UNDER MENOÜ, JUNE 1800 TO SEPTEMBER 1801.

Menoü, an inferior leader, had to meet in 1801 Abercrombie's British expedition 17,000 strong, which landed at Abukir March 1,

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and which on March 21 defeated the French general in the Battle of Alexandria or Canope, shutting him up in the city. In this battle the numbers on each side were but 12,000, but Bonaparte felt the serious nature of the first break in the long spell of French success. A Turkish force *viâ* Syria next entered Egypt, whilst 7,000 English under Baird from India appeared at Suez. In Alexandria Menou held out till August 31 when he signed a convention by which the French evacuated Egypt and were transported to France. Thus terminated an expedition of great promise, but undertaken at an unfortunate moment. Various efforts were made by Bonaparte, then First Consul, to succour during 1801 the French Army in Egypt—*e.g.* Gantheaume, once from Brest, and twice from Toulon, attempted to reach Alexandria, but was always forestalled by the English naval supremacy.

General Remarks: (1) Bonaparte's tactics against the Cavalry of the Mamelukes have been adopted by the British against savage foes and were similar to the Russian tactics against the Turks (see Russo-Turkish War 1808–12). The French divisions were all drawn up in hollow squares six deep, the Artillery at the angles; when they were in mass, the two sides advanced in column, those in front and rear moved forward in their ranks, but the moment they were charged, the whole were to halt and face outwards. When they were themselves to charge, the three front ranks were to break off and form the column of attack, those in rear remaining behind, still in square, but three deep only, to constitute the reserve; (2) Alison remarks the vast importance of Egypt's central position. The object of Bonaparte probably was to penetrate to India through Persia, and ultimately to seize Constantinople; (3) The cause of the failure was the fact that France did not control the sea.

1798—1801

SECOND COALITION

CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

THE Battle of the Nile revived the hopes of England, who induced Russia, hitherto a passive foe of France, to enter upon active hostilities. Prussia remained steadily neutral; Naples (the Two Sicilies) was hostile, and despatched at the close of 1798 40,000 men into the Roman Republic, but Championnet, commanding 20,000 French troops, not only repulsed them, but overran Naples and converted it into the Parthenopeian Republic, 1799. The King of Piedmont also was so hostile that at the close of 1798 the Directory practically annexed the province, the King retiring to his island of Sardinia.

In 1799 the Directory prepared for war, and its natural demand that Austria should not permit a Russian force to traverse her territories brought that power into the lists. Thus the Second Coalition, 1799—1801, included England, Russia, Naples, Portugal, Piedmont, Austria, and Turkey. The causes of this European combination were the encroachments of the French Directory—*e.g.* the formation of the Batavian (Holland), Cisalpine, Ligurian, Roman, Helvetian, and Parthenopeian Republics, the annexation of Savoy, Nice, Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine, the attitude of the French envoys at the Congress of Rastadt (which sat to settle disputes between France and the German Empire as distinct from Austria), and the annoyance caused to England and Turkey by the French invasion of Egypt.

The Troops: French—Army of Holland, 10,000, under Brune; Army of the Rhine, 30,000, under Bernadotte; Army of the Danube, 40,000, under Jourdan; Army of Helvetia (Switzerland), 30,000,

under Masséna; Army of Italy, 50,000, under Schérer; Army of Naples, 30,000, under Macdonald.

Allies—the numbers were superior, 225,000 Austrians disposed thus—in Bavaria 78,000 under Archduke Charles, in the Vorarlberg and along the Rhine 26,000 under Hotze, in the Tyrol 46,000 under Bellegarde, on the Adige River 75,000 under Kray, to be joined by Suwarroff's 60,000 Russians; in Naples and in Holland, English and Russian forces would operate.

Plans of Campaign: Brune and Bernadotte would be corps of observation, Jourdan would take the offensive in Bavaria, and Schérer in Northern Italy, Masséna acting as a support to the two preceding generals, whilst Macdonald protected Southern Italy. Thus the forces were unwisely scattered from the Texel to the Gulf of Tarentum. The Plan of the Allies was no better, for they massed in the Tyrol and in the Vorarlberg, though the vital theatre lay between the Rhine and the Danube.

The theatre was enormous, the operations occurring in Italy, Switzerland, on the Danube, on the Rhine, and in Holland.

First Operations of Jourdan, Masséna, and Bernadotte, March to April 1799: On March 1 Jourdan passed the Rhine at Basle and Kehl, and on the 6th Masséna crossed between Feldkirch and Coire, whilst his right under Lécourbe, *viâ* Dissentis and Thusis, moved into the valley of the Upper Inn.

Jourdan, debouching by the Kinzig, the Valley of Hell, and the Forest towns (Waldshut, etc.), posted himself between the Danube and the Lake of Constance—Left at Mengen, Centre at Pfullendorf, Right near the Lake, Advanced Guard at Ostrach. On the other side the Archduke, crossing the Lech and the Iller, beat Jourdan at Ostrach, March 22, and at Stockach, March 25, and then drove him over the Upper Rhine, April 6. The Austrian prince, held back by the orders of the Aulic Council, went into cantonments on the front Villingen-Engen-Singen.

Meantime, under Masséna, Lécourbe, acting in the Engadine and Dessolles' brigade from Schérer's Army of Italy passing up the Valteline, forced the Austrians back on Landeck; the com-

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mander-in-chief was, however, repulsed at Feldkirch (whence he could have connected with Jourdan), March 22, and had to recoil on Coire.

More to the north Bernadotte, supporting Jourdan, had occupied Mannheim, but the retreat of the latter compelled him to recross to the left bank of the Rhine. The forces of both these generals were then placed under Masséna.

The congress, which had for some time been sitting at Rastadt, was broken up by the declaration of war, and its close was marked by the disgraceful murder of the French envoys.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY, MARCH TO MAY 1799.

The total French force in Italy amounted to 116,000, and was not well posted—30,000 under Macdonald in Rome and Naples, 5,000 under Gauthier in Tuscany, 5,000 under Dessolles in the Valteline, 46,000 under Schérer on the Adige, besides 30,000 conscripts moving up as reinforcements.

The Austrians had 65,000 under Kray on the Adige, and they as well as the French were bent on the offensive, and on March 26 Schérer began a series of ill-conceived manœuvres, in the course of which Kray, crossing near Verona, brought on the battle of Magnano, April 5; he beat Schérer, and drove him behind the Adda with only 28,000 men. Meantime Suwarroff (with 30,000 Russians) and Mélas reached Kray, and the whole force (90,000) passed under Suwarroff's able command.

On April 27 Schérer was superseded by Moreau, and next day the French, in the battle of Cassano, were driven from the line of the Adda by the Russian's impetuous attacks. Moreau, then reduced to 20,000 against 90,000, executed a splendid retreat, with the double object of covering his line with France and of securing a junction with the Army of Naples. He moved in two columns—the one on Turin, the other on Alessandria. He sent back his matériel to France, and occupied a central position near Alessandria.

Suwarroff, though reinforced by Bellegarde's Army of the Tyrol, had to detach largely in order to besiege Mantua, etc., and in

consequence had only 40,000 field-troops. He moved on Tortona, and on May 12 failed in an attack on Moreau's left. The Russian resolved to divide his force—part to remain at Tortona, part to cross the Po and swing round on Turin. At the same moment Moreau, menaced by popular risings in his rear, decided to retire on Coni. On May 17 he sent Victor on the Riviera of Genoa by Acqui and Dego, and himself *viâ* Asti sent off his heavy baggage to France. Suwarrof pursued, occupying Turin on May 27, and the hostile peasants surrounded the French general, who, however, made for Coni and Garessio, and by the pass of S. Bernardo reached the Riviera on June 6. On the other hand Suwarrof, fettered by the orders of the Aulic Council, halted at Turin, whilst two other bodies were approaching—the French Army of Naples *viâ* Tuscany, and Bellegarde *viâ* Como (May 28) on Alessandria.

OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, MAY TO OCTOBER 1799.

Masséna found his three Armies of the Rhine, of the Danube, and of Helvetia scattered from the Engadine down to Düsseldorf. Against him were Bellegarde (30,000) in the Tyrol, Hotze (28,000) in the Vorarlberg, Archduke Charles (40,000) between the Danube and the Lake of Constance. If the Aulic Council had put these 98,000 men under the Archduke with a free hand he would have crushed Masséna's 30,000 in Switzerland. As a fact the prince fell ill, the Council interposed, and the three generals did not act in unison; Masséna therefore had time, and during May thus disposed his troops—Right (Lécourbe, Ménard, Lorges) from the Alps to the Lake of Zürich; Centre (Oudinot, Thureau, Vandamme, Soult) on the River Limmat; Left on the Rhine from Basle to Strasburg. Before taking up these positions Masséna had tried to stop the junction of Hotze and the Archduke, who, crossing the Rhine at either end of the Lake of Constance, were converging on him; he was too late, and in spite of brilliant combats, May 24 at Frauenfeld and Winterthur, the junction was effected, and Masséna took up the positions already stated.

The Archduke moved on the Limmat, where Masséna lay

entrenched on the heights in front; on June 4 the French leader repulsed fierce attacks, but fearing to stand with a river in his rear he abandoned his position and took up a new one on the chain of the Albis, where the Austrian prince did not venture to assail him. Then followed a long period of inaction and of waiting for reinforcements, and during August the only activity was displayed by Lécourbe, who occupied St. Gothard with his usual skill in mountain warfare.

As to the Allies, quarrels had arisen between Russians and Austrians, and the Aulic Council altered the distribution of the Armies. Korsakof with 30,000 Russians had arrived in Switzerland to reinforce the Archduke, Mélas and Suwarrof remained in Italy. The Council decided that the prince should move to the Rhine to second an English expedition to Holland, and that Suwarrof should replace him in Switzerland. This would keep the Austrians on the Rhine and in Italy, the Russians in Switzerland. This plan was to be executed towards the end of August, and Hotze was for the time to remain on the right bank of the Linth, in order to support the passage of Suwarrof *viâ* the St. Gothard. But before Suwarrof arrived, Korsakof's 30,000 on the right bank of the Lake of Zürich, and Hotze's 25,000 were struck by Masséna, who then had 37,000 on the Limmat, 12,000 under Lécourbe at the St. Gothard, 10,000 under Soult on the Linth, besides a division in the Valais, and another at Basle.

To anticipate Suwarrof's arrival Masséna resolved to attack Korsakof at Zürich whilst Soult fell on Hotze; hence occurred the Battle of Zurich, September 25 and 26, and the rout of Korsakof. On the 25th Oudinot crossed to the south bank at Closter Fahr and fell on Zürich, whilst Mortier acted in unison on the south bank. The Russian, reduced to 13,000, hurried over the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and Hotze's troops, equally beaten, fled over the river at Rheineck. Suwarrof was thus to come face to face with a victorious enemy.

He started with 18,000, preceded by Rosenberg (4,000) with orders to turn the St. Gothard *viâ* Dissentis. On September 23

Suwarrof reached Airolo, where he fought Lécourbe's advanced troops, and at Hospenthal Lécourbe forced him to Andermatt and with terrible losses through the Hole of Uri and over the Devil's Bridge. On the 26th (having lost his guns) he was at Altdorf, where he counted on getting Hotze's boats for crossing the lake (there was then no road to Schwytz). Not finding them he hurled himself into the Schachen Thal and thence into the Mütten Thal, where he was faced by Masséna at Schwytz and by Molitor arrived from Wallen See.

The latter's resistance in the Pass of Prägel threw him on Glaris, whence with enormous losses he passed *viâ* the Pass of Panix to Coire, having lost more than half his effective. Masséna withdrew to Schaffhausen and the Rhine was again in French hands.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY, MAY TO DECEMBER 1799.

To reinforce the beaten Army of Italy, Macdonald on May 7 moved with 15,000 men from Naples northwards. Passing through Rome, he reached Florence and Lucca May 25-29, having picked up troops raising his numbers to 28,000. He then connected with Moreau, but instead of at once falling on the Austro-Russians, Macdonald lost time in reorganising. Suwarrof acted at once, he himself with 20,000 men left Turin for Tortona, Ott near Piacenza (Placentia or Plaisance) to join him, Kray besieging Mantua to send him every available man, Bellegarde besieging Alessandria to block the Novi route against Moreau. He was thus ready for Macdonald.

The French plan was for Moreau *viâ* Novi and for Macdonald *viâ* Pontremoli to unite in the plains of Piacenza, Victor's division being transferred to Macdonald, who thus had 32,000. The latter moved June 6 and was met by Suwarrof in the Battle of the Trebbia, June 17-19, which ended in Macdonald's retreat with a loss of 15,000. At the same time Moreau debouching *viâ* Novi June 18 had worsted Bellegarde and moving on Tortona prevented Suwarrof from molesting Macdonald's retreat on Modena. The Russian turning back drove Moreau into his original positions round Genoa, but was then delayed by the Aulic Council insisting that he should attempt nothing till he had reduced Mantua, Alessandria, etc.

In consequence Macdonald, after a terrible march across the Apennines *viâ* Pistoia, reached the Genoa Riviera on July 17, joining Moreau.

Alarmed by Suwarroff's success the Directory created an Army of the Alps (south of the Great St. Bernard) under Championnet to protect the frontier, whilst Joubert replaced Macdonald and Moreau in the command of their Armies, now united as the Army of Italy and totalling 40,000 men.

Meantime Alessandria, July 22, and Mantua, July 30, had fallen, which raised Suwarroff's field troops to 60,000. Joubert moved to Novi, and was suddenly assailed by the Russian, August 15; the French commander was killed and his Army routed. Moreau resumed command and retired into his old Genoa positions. The victor did not pursue, but moved on Asti, because he was disturbed at the appearance of Championnet.

That general, 30,000 strong, had during August crossed the Alps from the Great St. Bernard southwards and was mastering Piedmont when Suwarroff approached. At that moment the latter was ordered to Switzerland and Mélas took his place. On the French side the Army of Italy was added to the command of Championnet, who after a series of manœuvres was beaten at Genola November 4, and by the close of the year the French retained only the Riviera of Genoa.

OPERATIONS IN HOLLAND, AUGUST TO OCTOBER 1799.

England, hitherto only subsidising the Coalitions, was so encouraged by French defeats that she at last put troops in the field. Seventeen thousand Russians (paid by England) and 30,000 English were to attack the French in Holland, where Brune had 15,000 French and 20,000 Dutch troops.

The English under Abercrombie landed at Helder August 27 and repulsed the French on Alkmaar. The Dutch fleet surrendered to the Allies, and the Russians and the rest of the English, all under the Duke of York, then landed. The invaders (36,000), beaten at Bergen September 19 and again at Castricum October 6, found themselves

compelled to agree to the Convention of Alkmaar, under which the Anglo-Russians evacuated Holland November 19.

At Zip on the Zuider Zee the English had constructed an entrenched camp in the bed of an old marsh that had been drained.

OPERATIONS ON THE RHINE, AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1799.

Meantime the Archduke Charles was intended to operate on the Lower Rhine and ultimately to connect with the Duke of York in an invasion of Belgium. In the beginning of September he moved from Schaffhausen to St. Blasien in the south of the Black Forest, and hearing that the French general, Müller, was investing Philippsburg, advanced north to Pforzheim, whereupon Müller recrossed the Rhine. No sooner did the Austrian prince learn of Korsakof's rout at Zürich than he returned southwards, and was arranging operations with Suwarrof, when Lécourbe, appointed to command the Army of the Rhine, renewed the invasion *via* Mannheim. The Archduke at once retraced his steps northwards and drove the French over the Rhine (December). Thus closed this campaign, no less celebrated than complicated.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) The result of the campaign was unfortunate for France; all Italy except the Ligurian Republic (Genoa) passed out of her control, and on the Rhine she was menaced, only in Switzerland and in Holland did she maintain her position; even the Ionian Isles were occupied by Russians and Turks. But soon after the *coup d'état* of November 9 (Brumaire 18), 1799, Bonaparte became First Consul, and though his peace proposals were rejected by Austria and England, he was more successful with Russia. The Tsar, Paul I., mollified by Bonaparte's unconditional release of all Russian captives, and exasperated by his defeats at Bergen and Zürich, recalled Suwarrof and dismissed the corps of French emigrants under Condé whom he had taken into his service. Thus the Second Coalition was much weakened; (2) In this campaign both sides erroneously assumed that in strategy mountains control valleys; of what avail was Masséna's successful irruption into the Grissons after the disaster of Stockach, or Lécourbe's

success in the Engadine after the French defeat at Magnano? The same lesson is taught by Hohenlinden 1800, by 1805, and by 1809. This does not apply to tactics; (3) Of the four celebrated passages over the Alps Bonaparte's was far the easiest, Hannibal's not so fiercely opposed as Suwarroff's, and Macdonald's (1800) the most hazardous; (4) The influence of politicians was felt, witness the Directory's error in invading Switzerland, overrunning Italy and exiling Bonaparte in Egypt, and the Aulic Council's error in checking Suwarroff by compelling him to besiege Mantua, and in removing the Archduke from Switzerland to make way for Korsakof. The occupation of Switzerland was a capital error; though it gave France a double re-entrant, yet it uncovered the French frontier in a portion hitherto secure and rendered the Rhine and the Maritime Alps liable to be turned.

1798—1801

SECOND COALITION (*continued*)

CAMPAIGN OF 1800.

RUSSIA having retired and England confining her activity to maritime warfare, the burden of the land conflict fell on Austria, and in this year the object of France was to compel Austria and England to agree to a peace. The theatre of operations included Southern Germany and Northern Italy.

The Armies: Thanks to the vigour of the First Consul, France had 195,000 men thus disposed: Masséna's Army of Liguria, 35,000; Moreau's Army of the Rhine, 100,000; Bonaparte's Army of the Reserve, 60,000. The Austrians, on the other hand, disposed of 220,000, namely, 100,000 under Mélas in Italy, and 120,000 in Germany under Kray.

Plans of Campaign: The French plan was for Moreau to cross the Rhine near the Lake of Constance, fall on Kray's flank and push him back into Bavaria, without the possibility of connecting with Mélas in Italy; Masséna near Genoa was to contain the greater part of Mélas' force, whilst Bonaparte crossing the Alps would throw himself across Mélas' communications, cut his retreat, and force him to surrender. In fact, it was the classical plan of marching on Vienna by the Danube and Po Valleys. The Austrian plan was for Mélas to take Genoa and to invade Southern France, whilst Kray at first defensive would on Mélas' success be able to invade Alsace and Switzerland. They thus foolishly made Italy their principal theatre, instead of Germany, whence lay the direct road to Paris. They desired at all costs to secure Northern Italy, and England coveted Toulon.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST PERIOD, APRIL TO JULY 1800.

Masséna: His Army, attacked in the Riviera on April 6, was cut in two, Suchet being driven westwards and Masséna being shut up in Genoa, April 18, which was at once invested by the Austrians and blockaded by the English fleet. For two months the French general displayed extraordinary activity and covered himself with glory; he yielded indeed, but only to famine. Ott besieged the place, while Mélas, turning on Suchet, drove him behind the River Var.

Moreau: At the head of an Army still Republican in sentiment, and with a devoted staff, he crossed the Rhine April 25 at Kehl, Brisach, and Basle, inducing Kray to expect an attack through the Black Forest from the west. Moreau, however, moving his centre from Basle up the north bank, covered the passage of his right at Schaffhausen, and thus turned the Austrian left flank (May 1). He beat them in various combats round Stockach and threw them back on Ulm, an entrenched camp. To cause Kray to evacuate this place was a necessity if the French were to advance (Kray at Ulm was to Moreau what Osman was to the Russians in 1877). Moreau therefore circled round Ulm on the south, and on June 19 forced a passage at Hochstedt, and as this movement threatened the Austrian communications, Kray evacuated Ulm and by a long *détour* to the north-east reached and crossed the Danube at Ingolstadt, whence he retired over the Isar and the Inn. The Armistice of Parsdorf, July 15, suspended further operations.

Strategic Comments: (1) Moreau displayed his usual caution, which prevented him from forcing a passage at Schaffhausen with his whole force and thus cutting in with all his strength between Kray and his magazines at Stockach and Biberach; that plan was suggested by the First Consul, who carried out a similar operation in the Marengo campaign; Moreau objected, owing to the danger of forcing the passage of, and to the difficulty of feeding, so large an Army; the result was that Italy became the principal theatre for the French; the First Consul had intended that Moreau should

strike the decisive blow, Moreau proved incapable, and Bonaparte had to settle the question in Italy; (2) Kray at first was unwisely dispersed, the moment he massed at Ulm he checked Moreau; (3) It was the possession of the re-entrant from Strasburg to the Lake of Constance that enabled Moreau to strike effectually at Kray's strategic flank—at Stockach the Austrian practically formed front to a flank.

Bonaparte: His Army of the Reserve, organised in secret, was massed early in May near Geneva. It consisted of three Corps, the Consular Guard, and a Cavalry Reserve; total, about 35,000 effectives. On May 14 it started, Lannes leading, and crossing the Great St. Bernard reached Ivrea May 27, having passed the fortress of Bard by a ruse similar to Wellington's at Burgos in 1812 (Bard surrendered on June 5). Detachments, moving through the Simplon, the Little St. Bernard, and Mont Cenis, distracted the enemy's attention.

The surprise was complete; Mélas thought that the movement against his rear was a mere feint. As a fact, Bonaparte sent Lannes with the advanced guard to demonstrate towards Turin whilst he himself moved on Novara, and on June 2 entered Milan. He was there joined by Moncey with 15,000 men, who, despatched from the Army of the Rhine, had arrived *via* St. Gothard. He next placed some troops on the Ticino River and on the Chiese River to cover his flanks, and marched himself with 30,000 men in three corps under Lannes, Victor, Desaix, and a Cavalry Reserve under Murat, towards Pavia, opposite to which on the south bank he massed his Army June 8. Murat occupied Piacenza (Placentia, Plaisance), which became a centre of operations.

Mélas, seeing his communications cut, moved on Alessandria, calling up Ott, who was blockading Genoa, and Elsnitz, who was opposing Suchet. As Masséna evacuated (June 5) Genoa with all the honours of war, Ott marched as ordered, but Elsnitz attacked by Suchet (reinforced by the Genoa garrison who had returned to France) lost 10,000 men and marched very slowly. Ott was directed on Piacenza to reopen the Austrian line of retreat, but beaten by

Lannes at Montebello (18,000 French, 15,000 Austrians) on June 9 was hurled back on to Mélas at Alessandria. Bonaparte then moving on Marengo fought Mélas at that place.

BATTLE OF MARENGO, JUNE 14, 1800.

Moncey on the Ticino would prevent Mélas' escape by that flank, and on June 13 Desaix was despatched with one of his two divisions along the Novi road to prevent his escape to Genoa. Thus the French Army numbered only 22,000 with fourteen guns against the Austrian 30,000 with 100 guns.

On June 14 the French positions were: Victor at Marengo, his left covered by the Cavalry of Kellermann (son of the hero of Valmy), his right by the Cavalry of Champeaux, and his front by an advanced guard under Gardanne at Pedrabona; Lannes in *échelon* on Victor's right near Fornace; on the extreme left Desaix at Rivalta; in rear the Consular Guard at Burana and Desaix's other division under Monnier in march from S. Giuliano towards Castel Ceriolo. The Austrians crossed the Bormida in three columns: Ott with the left on Castel Ceriolo; Mélas with the centre on Marengo; O'Reilly with the right *via* Stortigliona. Gardanne was forced back on Marengo, but for four hours Victor resisted the Austrian Right and Centre. At last, however, after heavy gun-fire, they pushed across the Fontanone. Lannes too late reinforced Victor's right towards Barbotta, but Victor had time to arrange for retreat. Lannes' right, quite uncovered, was menaced by Ott's cavalry, and at 3 p.m. the situation was critical.

Bonaparte to assist Lannes brought forward his Consular Guard, which, though he said it formed in square like a bastion of granite, was repulsed by the Austrian horse on Li Poggi, where one brigade of the division Monnier joined it. The other brigade of Monnier under Carra St. Cyr reached Castel Ceriolo and barricaded itself there, covering the retreat of the rest towards S. Giuliano. Mélas, confident of victory, left the pursuit to his Chief of Staff, Zach, and retired to send information to his Sovereign. It was 4 p.m. when Desaix, marching to the cannon, as ordered by Bonaparte,

arrived from Rivalta. "The first battle is lost," he cried; "there is time to win a second."

He placed his division in front of S. Giuliano; on his left Victor rallied his men, and on his right Lannes with the Consular Guard and Monnier as far as Castel Ceriolo; in rear and on the left of Lannes the Cavalry of Kellermann and Champeaux. Zach's pursuing troops were torn by Marmont's twelve guns, charged in front by Desaix, and taken on their left by Lannes and by the Cavalry of Kellermann. At that moment Desaix fell, but the Austrians, surprised by this unexpected onslaught, were driven through Marengo and Castel Ceriolo. At 6 p.m. victory declared for Bonaparte. Next day Mélas, quite cut off from the Quadrilateral, concluded the Convention of Alessandria, by which all Northern Italy as far as the Mincio passed to France.

Tactical Comments: (1) Numerical inferiority of the French; (2) Lucky intervention of Desaix; (3) Effect of Marmont's guns, compare Senarmont's battery at Friedland, 1807; (4) Kellermann's charge; (5) Excellent French counter-attack; (6) Austrian Artillery preparation good, compare Japanese practice 1904-5; (7) Austrians did not provide against a counter-attack, and they had foolishly detached their Cavalry to watch Suchet—compare Hooker's Cavalry detached at Chancellorsville, 1863; (8) The oblique attack, or the attack by column coming up after column by *échelon*, has achieved decisive successes, as at Leuthen, 1757, and at Salamanca, 1812. But to receive battle in that position is a different matter. To do so is to expose the successive columns to be overwhelmed by the rush of a victorious enemy. At Montebello the French oblique attack succeeded; at Marengo the French stood in that position to receive attack and narrowly escaped disaster. The difference is obvious. When the attacking Army advances in *échelon*, if it can overthrow the first column of the enemy, it throws it back upon the one in rear, which is soon overpowered by a torrent of fugitives; while, if it is stubbornly resisted, it is soon supported by fresh troops advancing on its flank. But when the troops in *échelon* stand still, all these advantages are reversed; Napoléon never intentionally received an

attack in *échelon*. At Marengo and at Eylau he was assailed unawares in that position by the enemy, and his ultimate extrication from destruction in both battles was owing to the opportune arrival of fresh troops.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) Mélas, intercepted, tried to break through the French at Marengo; (2) As long as Bard held out the line *viâ* St. Bernard was stopped, Ivrea therefore became the centre of operations. The fort fell June 5, and besides there was always another line *viâ* Simplon. On reaching Milan a line of communications ran through the St. Gothard.


OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND PERIOD, NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER 1800.

As the conference at Lunéville dragged, Bonaparte decided to hurry it by a winter campaign. The Army of the Rhine (Moreau) 100,000 strong, held the line of the River Isar; opposed to him was the Archduke John (*vice* Kray) with 120,000 on the River Inn. As this last river was strong, Moreau manœuvred so as to entice the enemy to advance; he succeeded and the Archduke moved November 28. The French general, supposed to be in retreat, then took post at the issue of the Forest of Hohenlinden.

BATTLE OF HOHENLINDEN, DECEMBER 3, 1800.

Moreau's idea was to allow the Austrians to enter the forest, to check them in front of Hohenlinden, and to take them in rear with the divisions Richepanse and Decaen moving *viâ* St. Christophe and Mattenböt. The French Left stretched from Preisendorf to Hartofen, the Centre under Ney and Grouchy, near Hohenlinden, was to close the Mattenböt defile, the Right under Richepanse, between Ebersberg and St. Christophe, was to issue at Mattenböt on the enemy's rear when he should be engaged in the forest.

The Austrians came on in four columns, not in communication; on the right Kienmayer *viâ* Isen, and Baillet-Latour *viâ* Burgrain, in the centre Kolowrath on Hohenlinden, on the left Riesch on St. Christophe; the centre the strongest.



Stanford's Geog^l. Estab^t., London.

The battle opened at 8 a.m. by Kolowrath's attack on Ney and Grouchy, whilst Richepanse, without waiting for Decaen who was in rear, moved on St. Christophe and there met Riesch. Counting on the arrival of Decaen, he left merely a brigade to hold Riesch and pressed on his march. He reached Mattenböt, sabred a regiment of dismounted cuirassiers, placed a regiment to face the Austrian rearguard, and himself with his last regiment turned to his left on the Austrians in the defile of Mattenböt. He fought against great odds till his brigade (set free by Decaen who routed Riesch) from St. Christophe arrived.

Moreau noticing the commotion caused in the hostile ranks by Richepanse's onset launched Ney and Grouchy to the attack, and at once the Austrian Centre fled in rout. Their Right had indeed at first repulsed the French Left, but the latter by a counter-attack regained their positions and were soon reinforced by Ney. The Austrian Right then fled. The loss of the Austrians was 20,000 men and 87 guns.

Tactical Comments: (1) Feigned retreat of Moreau drawing the enemy into the defiles; (2) Turning movement of Richepanse; (3) Brilliant charge of Richepanse's Cavalry; (4) Moral superiority of the assailant in wood-fighting; (5) Disconcerted action of the Austrian columns; (6) Retreat not prepared for by the Austrians; (7) This battle was more decisive than Marengo, but in it Moreau owed much to fortune. He aimed only at defence, and his splendid success was due to the lucky movement of Richepanse and Decaen.


Moreau pursued through Salzburg and Linz on to Steyer where an armistice was concluded December 23.

The Army of Italy meantime, under Brune, crossed the Mincio on Christmas Day and drove behind the Adige the Austrians whom Macdonald threatened on the side of the Tyrol. That celebrated general with 15,000 men concentrated near Coire, and then passed through the awful Via Mala to Splügen, where he crossed in despite of avalanches. By Chiavenna he reached Bormio, and, being checked by the Austrians on Monte Tonal, moved *viâ* Pisogno, at the head of the lake of Iseo, finally reaching Trent. Murat chased the Neapolitans

out of Roman territory, and Tuscany was also occupied. But all operations were closed by the Peace of Lunéville, February 1801.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: The Peace of Lunéville definitely assigned to France the left bank of the Rhine, and Italy as far as the River Adige; Austria also recognised the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine (increased by the inclusion of Venetia), and Ligurian Republics, as well as the new Kingdom of Etruria (Tuscany) under the Prince of Parma. In the same year peace was concluded by Naples, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey.

Thus the Second Coalition was broken up, and only England remained in arms. To the League of the Neutrals (Armed Neutrality, Northern Maritime Confederacy) formed by Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark to resist certain rules of maritime war, she replied by bombarding Copenhagen (1801), but England no less than France desired peace, and the result was the Treaty of Amiens, March 25, 1802. By this treaty England recognised all the recent Continental arrangements, and restored all Colonial conquests except Trinidad and Ceylon; she also engaged to transfer Malta to the Knights of St. John, the Cape to Holland, and Egypt to the Sultan; France agreed to evacuate Naples, the Papal States, and to guarantee Portugal. This peace lasted only till May, 1803, and Bonaparte, having in 1804 become the Emperor Napoléon I., began preparations at Boulogne for the invasion of England. His scheme failed for naval reasons which lie outside the scope of this work.



1805

THIRD COALITION AGAINST FRANCE

CAMPAIGN OF 1805

ENGLAND, in consequence of Napoléon's preparations at Boulogne for invasion, stirred up a Continental war. Thus originated the Third Coalition, consisting of England, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Naples. Napoléon, on his part, to avenge the defeat of his invasion scheme, swung his Grand Army round on the Allies of England.

The Coalition proposed to attack France and her Allies, Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemberg, from the east by the Danube Valley and from the south-east by the Po Valley, whilst other forces (Swedes) would act in Hanover, and others (Anglo-Russians) in South Italy—these last were to be opposed by Gouvion-Saint-Cyr with 20,000 men.

Austria set on foot three Armies: (1) The Army of Germany, 80,000, under Mack and the Archduke Ferdinand, moved on the River Inn in order to invade Bavaria; it was to be reinforced by 65,000 Russians under Kutusof; (2) The Army of Italy, 100,000, under Austria's best general, the Archduke Charles, massed on the River Adige; (3) The Army of the Tyrol, 25,000 under the Archduke John, and 10,000 under Jellachich in the Vorarlberg, who were to connect Armies (1) and (2). Austria unwisely started hostilities, without waiting for her Russian Allies, in the hope of detaching Bavaria from the French alliance. Mack crossed the Inn, September 8, 1805, seized Munich and occupied Ulm, the knot of the roads debouching from the Black Forest, a position of the first importance and the objective of two skilful operations, Moreau in 1800 turning it from the south, Napoléon in 1805 turning it from the north.

THE PLAN OF NAPOLEON

He proposed to assume the defensive in Italy and the offensive in Germany, where he intended to deal with the Russians and the Austrians separately. Murat and others had generally reconnoitred the region of the Upper Danube, and Savary, Chief of the Intelligence Department, had specially reconnoitred the routes from the Rhine to the Danube. The French Emperor's plan was to feint against Mack directly, and to move with all his strength—190,000 men and 340 guns—on to the Danube between Donauwerth and Ingolstadt, cutting the Austrian line of communications and compelling their Army to surrender. After this he intended to move against the Russians and Vienna. Meantime Masséna, with 50,000 men, would contain the Archduke Charles in North Italy.

THE MARCH ON ULM.

On August 25 the seven Corps of the Grand Army were put in motion towards the Rhine and the Main: I. Corps (Bernadotte), from Hanover on Würzburg to unite with the Bavarian Corps; II. Corps (Marmont), from Holland on Mayence and thence on Würzburg; III. Corps (Davout), IV. Corps (Soult), VI. Corps (Ney), V. Corps (Lannes), from the camp of Boulogne on Mannheim, Spire, Carlsruhe, Strasburg; VII. Corps (Augereau), from Brest on Strasburg, to act as a Reserve, together with the Imperial Guard (Bessiéres). On the same place also were to move 22,000 Cavalry under Murat. By September 25 these movements were completed with remarkable precision. To deceive the Austrians as to the true line of operations, Napoleon feinted with Cavalry from Strasburg through the Black Forest, whilst his columns poured on to the Danube at Donauwerth, October 6, cutting Mack's line with Vienna. The French troops then completely surrounded Ulm on both sides of the river, driving the enemy back on the fortress. Mack, paralysed by the danger and without supplies, capitulated October 20, with 33,000 men and 60 guns.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY.

Masséna and the Archduke Charles watched each other on the Adige, waiting for the result of the German campaign. On the news of the French success there, Masséna, on October 30, attacked the Austrian at Caldiero; the latter retired in the night towards Hungary *viâ* Laibach and Klagenfurt, followed by Masséna, who, however, could not move far, because he and St. Cyr had to be ready to oppose the Anglo-Russians at Naples.

MARCH ON VIENNA.

After Mack's surrender the Emperor, spite of Prussia's threatening attitude and of the English victory at Trafalgar (October 21), moved on Vienna, intending to fight the Russians, who had 54,000 under Kutusof on the River Inn, and 30,000 under Buxhöwden in Moravia.

On the Right, Ney and Augereau in the Tyrol captured Jellachich, and opposed the Archduke John, who, passing through the Brenner, managed to join the Archduke Charles in Carinthia, and both Archdukes then retired towards the Raab in Hungary; in the right Centre, Bernadotte and Marmont on Salzburg on the River Inn; in the Centre, Napoléon, with Murat's Cavalry and the Corps of Soult, Davout, and Lannes, crossed the Rivers Inn, Traun, and Enns; on the Left, down the north bank of the Danube, marched Mortier with three Divisions, which a flotilla was to connect with the Centre. The Emperor caught up the rearguard of Kutusof; the latter, however, passed the Danube at Krems, burnt the bridge, and fell on Mortier (isolated and far ahead of his flotilla), inflicting a loss of 3,000 men.

Meantime, Murat dashed on Vienna, and by means of a feigned armistice seized the great bridge there. The Emperor, on November 5, entered the Austrian capital.

CAMPAIGN OF MORAVIA.

Master of Vienna and of its bridge, the French Sovereign resolved to cut off Kutusof's retreat into Moravia. The Russian, intercepted,


managed, by employing a stratagem similar to Murat's, to escape and to rally the Austro-Russian forces at Olmütz, commanded by the two Emperors, Francis and Alexander. Napoléon, on November 19, established his headquarters at Brünn. His pretended hesitation and his delusive negotiations induced the Allies to advance towards Austerlitz, where the French Monarch accepted battle.


BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ, DECEMBER 2.

The Austro-Russians, elated by a slight success at Wischau, decided on battle. The French, 68,000 strong, stood in front of Brünn, in the angle formed by the Vienna and Olmütz roads, and behind the Goldbach stream, along which extended the lakes of Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, Satschan, and Mönitz. The Allies, 90,000 strong, had their headquarters at Austerlitz; their Right—Bagration and the cavalry of Lichtenstein—on the Olmütz road, east of Bosenitz; their Centre—Kutusof—near Pratzen; their Left—Buxhöwden—on Aujezd; their Reserve (the Russian Imperial Guard) near Austerlitz.

Napoléon divined that they would try to turn his Right, in order to cut him off from Vienna and to throw him back on Bohemia; as a fact he had an alternative line of retreat on Linz. He therefore allowed them to occupy (December 1) the plateau of Pratzen, an elevated region between the two Armies; and thus disposed his forces: on the Left, Lannes and Murat near Bosenitz, backed on Santon and its batteries, were to contain the enemy's Right; on the Right, Legrand with 7,000 men along the Goldbach from Kobelnitz to Telnitz, was to hold the Russian Left, this small force of 7,000 would be reinforced early on December 2 by 8,000 under Davout from Gross Raigern; in the Centre stood a powerful mass of 50,000—Soult on the Goldsbach between Girzikowitz and Kobelnitz, having for his objective the plateau of Pratzen, behind him Bernadotte, and in Reserve, near Schlapanitz, the Grenadiers of Oudinot and the Imperial Guard.

The battle opened on the French Right. Buxhöwden descended by Aujezd from the plateau and succeeded in crossing the Goldbach





and in driving Legrand out of Telnitz and Sokolnitz. At that moment Davout appeared, and regaining Sokolnitz, managed to hold the hostile masses pouring down from the plateau. It was exactly what Napoléon desired. On the French Left Bagration attempted to outflank, but Lannes having repulsed him delivered, with Murat's help, a counter-stroke which, in spite of Lichtenstein's charges, ended in the Allies retiring along the Olmütz road. In the French Centre, Napoléon, seeing the plateau almost deserted, the hostile Left occupied with Davout, and their Right repulsed, launched Soult on to the plateau. The two Divisions of Vandamme and Saint-Hilaire, supported by Bernadotte, climbed up the slopes, without replying to the Russian fire, deployed and threw the enemy back upon the opposite slopes. Kutusof saw the danger. It was imperative to recapture the plateau. A counter-attack was made by the Russian Reserve (10,000 guard troops) and all other disposable bodies, but Napoléon had foreseen this, and called up his Reserve (25,000), who broke the enemy; the Cavalry of Bessières, under Rapp, pushing as far as Austerlitz, cut the hostile forces in two.

Leaving Bernadotte to hold the plateau, the Emperor swung Soult's corps to the right through Aujezd, thus bringing that marshal on the rear of Buxhöwden who was held in front by Davout. The former assailed on all sides tried to flee across the frozen lakes. The French cannon broke the ice, and men, horses, and cannon were engulfed. A vigorous pursuit was at once organised—Lannes and Murat towards Olmütz, Davout towards Hungary. Loss: Allies, 35,000 and 180 guns; French, 8,000.

Tactical Comments: (1) Errors of Allies were weakness of Centre, bad reconnoitring, tardiness of the Reserve; they should not have fought at all, they should have retired, the Archduke Charles was moving towards the French Right, Prussia was ready to descend on the French Left; (2) It was on Napoléon's part a defensive-offensive battle; (3) The pursuit was vigorous; (4) Lannes' infantry combined skilfully with Murat's cavalry; (5) Soult's movements were perfect; (6) Napoléon induced the Allies to act as he desired.

The campaign closed with the Treaty of Pressburg, by which

Austria gave up Venetia, Istria, Dalmatia to the Kingdom of Italy (formed from the Cisalpine Republic), the Tyrol and Austrian Swabia to Bavaria and Würtemberg, whose rulers became kings. Next the Treaty of Schönbrunn compelled Prussia to accept Hanover—Napoléon intending thus to sow discord between Prussia and England—assigned Cleves to France, Anspach to Bavaria. On July 12, 1806, was formed, under French protection, the Confederation of the Rhine—Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg, several smaller states, and finally Saxony—and in the same year the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved, Francis becoming Emperor of Austria.

Strategic Comments: (1) The French soldiers remarked: “L’Empereur a battu l’ennemi avec nos jambes”; (2) This campaign is singularly like that of Marengo 1800; (3) In this campaign Napoléon first constituted Corps d’Armée, an Artillery Reserve, and a Cavalry Reserve; (4) His troops lived on the country, carrying four days’ bread and four days’ biscuit; (5) The visible telegraph was much used; (6) The Aulic Council committed three errors—100,000 men were left inactive in Italy, 80,000 only operated in Germany, 20,000 were wasted in the Tyrol.

THE GRAND ARMY OF FRANCE.

1st Corps	under	Bernadotte.
2nd	„	„ Marmont.
3rd	„	„ Davout.
4th	„	„ Soult (divisions of Vandamme, St. Hilaire, and Legrand).
5th	„	„ Lannes.
6th	„	„ Ney.
7th	„	„ Augereau.
Guard under Bessières.		
Cavalry under Murat.		

1806

FOURTH COALITION (FIRST PERIOD) IN CENTRAL EUROPE

CAMPAIGN OF JENA, 1806.

THIS Coalition, engineered by England (whose troops defeated Reynier in South Italy at Maida, July 4), was the same as the Third, except that Saxony was added to the enemies of France, and that Prussia took the place of Austria. Prussia had several causes of umbrage—violation in 1805 of her territory of Anspach, formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, forced acceptance of Hanover at Schönbrunn 1805, and Napoléon's obvious intention of resuming that province if he could thus facilitate a peace with England. In addition, the Prussian Court, especially the high-spirited Queen Louise, and the Prussian Army, confident in the traditions of Frederick the Great, thirsted for war. The theatre of operations stretched from the River Main to the River Niémen.

NAPOLÉON ON THE SAALE.

The Prussians had two Armies—75,000 under Frederick William III. and the Duke of Brunswick, based on Magdeburg; 56,000 under the Prince of Hohenlohe, based on Dresden. Instead of waiting, entrenched behind the Elbe, for the arrival of their Russian allies, the Prussians decided upon the offensive, invading Saxony (which perforce joined the Coalition) and hoping by a march on Fulda and Würzburg to cut the Grand Army's communications with Mayence. Brunswick accordingly took post at Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt, whilst Hohenlohe was extended between Weimar and Jena with advanced troops at Saalfeld. On his side, Napoléon rapidly concentrated his Grand Army (cantoned since Austerlitz in the Main Valley)—Right at Baireuth, Centre at

Bamberg, Left at Würzburg. The total number—including six Army Corps, Murat's reserve Cavalry, and the Imperial Guard—stood at 175,000, not counting Mortier at Mayence, and 40,000 Confederation of the Rhine troops under Prince Jérôme ordered to assemble at Baireuth. As Brunswick moved towards the north-west of the Thuringian Forest along the Fulda road, Napoléon planned to pass the Upper Saale into Saxony, to outflank the Prussians on their left and to cut them off from Berlin—it was Marengo and Ulm over again.

To confirm the enemy in his erroneous move the French Emperor demonstrated towards Hildburghausen and gathered an Army at Wesel under his brother Louis, King of Holland. Meantime the Grand Army moved, October 8, on the Upper Saale in three columns—Right, Soult and Ney, *viâ* Baireuth; Centre, Bernadotte, Davout, and Guard, *viâ* Kronach; Left, Lannes and Augereau, *viâ* Coburg. Murat went ahead *viâ* Kronach. The Right reached Plauen October 10, the Centre dispersed at Schleitz, October 9, 10,000 Prussians under Tauenzien, the Left on the 10th defeated at Saalfeld Prince Louis of Prussia, who fell in the action. In consequence Hohenlohe, who had advanced towards Mittel Pöllnitz, hurriedly recrossed the Saale at Jena, and Brunswick counter-marched, October 11, on Weimar to unite with Hohenlohe posted on the left of the Saale. These movements indicated a retreat behind the Elbe, and so Napoléon massed on Auma and Gera, and by the 13th had seized all the bridges on the Saale from Jena to Naumburg. At Naumburg, Davout, with 27,000, occupied the defile of Kösen, Bernadotte at Camburg, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, Soult, Guard on the right bank opposite to Jena, Murat coming up from Leipzig. Then Brunswick fearing for his communications with Berlin decided to hurry behind the Elbe. On October 13, therefore, the King and Brunswick made for Naumburg, leaving Hohenlohe to act as rearguard.


Napoléon was now afraid that the whole Prussian Army had united left of the Saale, and so he arranged to attack in front from Jena, whilst Davout (crossing at Kösen) and Bernadotte

JENA AND AUERSTÄDT

14 OCTOBER 1806

JENA 10 A.M., AUERSTÄDT 8 A.M.

Scale of Miles

Stanford's Geog^t Estab^t, London.

London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.

(crossing at Dornburg) would take the enemy in rear *viâ* Apolda. Bernadotte was given the alternative of joining Davout. These dispositions led to the two battles of Jena and Auerstädt, October 14; the first by Napoléon against Hohenlohe, the second by Davout against Brunswick, and that celebrated Marshal not only repaired his master's error but completed his victory.

BATTLE OF JENA, OCTOBER 14, 1806.

Hohenlohe imagined that he had to deal only with Lannes and Augereau, and that they were advancing down the left of the Saale from the South, and that the enemy's mass was making for Dresden or Leipzig (Brunswick had the same idea). The Prince therefore fronted south on the road west of Jena—Right under Rüchel at Weimar, Centre at Capellendorf, Left under Tauenzien at Cospoda and Closewitz. He failed to occupy Jena because he considered the Landgrafenberg inaccessible. Napoléon in the night, October 13-14, succeeded without the enemy's knowledge in crossing Lannes' corps and in posting it on the Landgrafenberg, where it bivouacked a few paces distant from the Prussian outposts. The French Emperor reconnoitring thought he had before him the concentrated Prussian Army.

At 7 a.m. in a thick fog the action commenced. Augereau advancing by the Mühl Thal from Jena threatened Tauenzien's right just west of Cospoda, Lannes drove his left from Closewitz, and Soult debouching from Löbstedt closed the road to Dornburg. Having thus obtained room for deployment, Napoléon at 10 a.m. checked further movements to give his corps time to come up; Hohenlohe, at last undeceived, re-formed his front, facing east, and advanced on Vierzehnheiligen to the support of his Left. Soon after, Ney from Jena passed unperceived in the fog between Lannes and Augereau, and with barely 4,000 men found himself face to face with Hohenlohe's mass. Formed in squares he resisted till Lannes rescued him, and then both Marshals carried Vierzehnheiligen. Then followed a general attack and Hohenlohe in rout was hurled back on Weimar.

At that moment, 2 p.m., Hohenlohe's Right (Rüchel) from Weimar (instead of covering the retreat) counter-attacked, but was repulsed and dispersed. Then Murat coming from Dornburg converted the defeat into a disaster, and at 4 p.m. the battle ceased. Of Hohenlohe's 40,000, 12,000 lay dead and wounded, 15,000 were captured; the French lost 4,000, out of their 100,000.

BATTLE OF AUERSTÄDT, OCTOBER 14, 1806.

The Prussian King and Brunswick had with 66,000 men quitted Weimar and reached Auerstädt, October 13, resolute on retreat to Naumburg and the Elbe. On the other hand, Davout in obedience to the Emperor, who had instructed him and Bernadotte to cross the Saale and to move on Apolda so as to take the Prussians in rear, occupied in the night, October 13-14, the defile of Kösen on the left bank—this would allow him to debouch in safety. A prisoner informed him of the approach of Brunswick, and as he had only three divisions, he called on Bernadotte for assistance, offering even to serve under him. But that officer wilfully misconstrued the Imperial orders, and marching from Camburg to Apolda remained inactive all the 14th, violating the great maxim—March to the cannon. Davout relying on his famous divisions—Gudin, Friant, Morand—though only 27,000, passed at 5 a.m., October 14, through the Kösen defile with the division Gudin, whilst Brunswick was quitting Auerstädt, and in the fog near Hassenhausen the advanced guards collided. Backed on the village, Gudin stood stiffly in squares. At 8 a.m. two more Prussian divisions and the division Friant appeared, and fierce fighting ensued till 11 a.m., when the division Morand came into line. It was at once charged by 10,000 horse under Prince William, but the squares stood firm and the cavalry fell back routed. Then Davout delivered a bold counter-stroke against the Prussian Left *vis-à-vis* Lisdorf and Eckartsberg. Brunswick at once fell back on Auerstädt, whence Davout drove him by gun-fire, and fleeing to Apolda he met the fugitives of Jena.

Losses: Prussians, 10,000 and 3,000 captured; French, 8,000. Brunswick was mortally wounded.

Tactical Comments: (1) Bernadotte should have helped Davout; (2) Note Napoléon's error as to the Prussians at Jena and the fact that he fought with a defile behind him. Indeed, if all the Prussians had been at Jena, his position would have been precarious; (3) Auerstädt was defensive-offensive on Davout's part; (4) Murat's celebrated pursuit; (5) Prussian reinforcements arrived in fractions; (6) Prussians had not arranged their retreat.

THE PRUSSIAN ROUT.

The Prussian Army had ceased to exist and Hohenlohe, now in chief command, sought to carry the débris of his forces, which united October 17 at Nordhausen, over the Elbe at Magdeburg on to Mecklenburg and thus to gain the line of the Oder. But Napoléon launching his corps in pursuit executed an oblique march from Jena to Stettin, so as constantly to outflank the enemy and to cut him off from the Oder and from junction with his Russian ally. Lannes, who took Spandau, and Murat chased Hohenlohe's 50,000 and captured him at Prenzlau, October 28; Soult and Bernadotte with Murat's help followed Blücher's 22,000 and compelled him to surrender at Lübeck November 8; on the same day Ney captured Magdeburg with its garrison of 25,000; Stettin capitulated October 29, and Küstrin on November 3. The Prussian King, with 15,000 men under Lestocq, fled to Königsberg, and on October 25 the French Emperor entered Berlin.

Meantime Mortier had overrun Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick, and approached Stralsund, and Prince Jérôme was besieging the strong places of Silesia; at that moment the Russians arrived in Poland.

Strategic Comments: (1) The Prussian intelligence was bad; (2) The Prussian Army was old-fashioned and entirely dependent on its magazines, and, like the Austrian, quite unable to live on the country, and their impedimenta were enormous—they were therefore very sensitive about their line of communications. This fact was the base of Napoléon's plans in 1800, 1805, and 1806.

The French Army on the contrary lived on the country and could therefore march rapidly, but on the approach of battle it was necessary to revert to the system of magazines, which were formed by the grand parks, requisitions on the country, and the magazines of the enemy. In this campaign Napoléon had two lines of communication—(a) Mayence to Bamberg, (b) Augsburg to Bamberg. On bursting into Saxony and thus uncovering those communications, and with a battle imminent, he checked for the moment his rear convoys and lived on a centre of operations—Auma—where he collected his parks of artillery, bread, meal, and set up hospitals. What Auma was in this case, Placentia (Piacenza) was in 1800, and Augsburg in the Ulm operations 1805. Such a system worked admirably in fairly fertile countries and in successful campaigns, but failed in Russia 1812, and in unsuccessful campaigns; (3) The Prussians would have done well to concentrate in mass at Jena; in that case their whole force would have fought Napoléon with a defile in his rear; (4) Two principles were illustrated—the advantage of the initiative and the fact that the army whose flank or communications are most immediately threatened, will abandon the initiative and conform to the movements of the enemy.

THE FRENCH TROOPS.

Grand Army.

1st Corps under Bernadotte.

3rd „ „ Davout.

4th „ „ Soult.

5th „ „ Lannes.

6th „ „ Ney.

7th „ „ Augereau.

8th „ „ Mortier.

9th „ „ Prince Jérôme.

Reserve Cavalry under Murat.

Guard under Bessières.

2nd Corps under Marmont (in Dalmatia).

1806-7

FOURTH COALITION (SECOND PERIOD) IN POLAND AND IN PRUSSIA

CAMPAIGN OF 1806-7.

RUSSIA, seconded by England, still remained in arms. As to England, Napoléon aimed at her ruin by proclaiming in his Berlin Decree, November 21, 1806, the Continental Blockade, shutting off all her commerce with France and the allies of France.

As to Russia, he assailed her not only directly, but also indirectly, by concluding alliances with the Sultan Selim and with the Persian Shah.

Master of the River Oder by the reduction of Stettin and of Küstrin, the French Emperor at Berlin in the course of November directed the Grand Army upon the Vistula. On the 28th of that month, Murat with the Advanced Guard entered Warsaw amidst the enthusiastic cheers of the Poles, who looked on the French as certain to revive the Polish Kingdom. As a fact Napoléon, anxious not to alienate the Tsar permanently, never meant to revive that Kingdom, but he took advantage of Polish enthusiasm to add to his army Polish regiments of Cavalry, who served him not less faithfully than did the Mamelukes of his Guard. On December 19 the French Emperor arrived at the Polish capital (which then became his centre of operations) with 120,000 men—on the Right, near Warsaw, Davout, Augereau, Lannes, Guard, Oudinot's infantry Reserve, Murat's 10,000 reserve Cavalry; in the Centre, Soult; on the Left, near Thorn, Ney, Bernadotte, Bessièrès' 8,000 heavy Cavalry. The guns were 3 per thousand men. The base was on

the River Oder, the line of communications running *viâ* Frankfort on the Oder-Posen-Warsaw; the secondary base was on the Vistula.

The Russians, 100,000, under Kaminski, in two corps (Benningesen and Buxhöwden), with 16,000 Cavalry and 5 guns per thousand men, had in 1806 crossed the Niémen too late, and were able only to rally their broken Prussian allies. They were based on Grodno, with Königsberg as an alternative.

OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

Benningesen lay on the Bug and the Narew from Czarnovo to Ostrolenka; Lestocq with the remnant of the Prussians, 15,000 strong, at Soldau on the Ukra (based on Königsberg). This marshy and woody terrain was difficult for Cavalry and Artillery, and indeed Napoléon remarked of Poland, "Dieu, outre l'eau, l'air, la terre et le feu, a créé un cinquième élément, la boue."

To dislodge the hostile forces and to separate them from Lestocq and pivoting on his right to throw them back on the marshes and woods of Poland, the French Sovereign ably passed the lower Ukra, December 23, after a brisk combat at Czarnovo. On December 26 came a general attack—Lannes on Pultusk, Davout on Golymin, Ney on Soldau against Lestocq's left, all three places being captured, and Benningesen falling back on Ostrolenka and Lestocq on Königsberg. Further advance on Napoléon's part was checked by the inclement weather and by uncertainty as to whether the Russian line of retreat lay to Königsberg or not.

The French troops accordingly went into quarters from Warsaw to Elbing, their supply being much facilitated by the Rivers Vistula, Ukra, and Narew. Elsewhere the Emperor continued his ceaseless activity, *e.g.* Léfèbvre besieged Dantzic, Prince Jérôme the strong places of Silesia (Breslau, etc.), and at Constantinople General Sebastiani helped the Sultan to fortify the Dardanelles against the English Admiral, Duckworth.

OPERATIONS IN PRUSSIA.

On January 14, 1807, the aged Kaminski was superseded by Benningsen, and he suddenly, in spite of the rigorous season, took the offensive in order to succour Dantzic. Screened by the forest of Johannisberg, he moved *viâ* Heilsberg, and, being joined by Lestocq, fell on Bernadotte, the French Left, at Mohrungen, January 25, 1807. The Emperor instructed his lieutenant to recoil before the Russians, intending himself, with Davout, Soult, Augereau, reserve Cavalry, and the Guard, to move down the right of the Alle *viâ* Allenstein and intercept the enemy (compare the movement on Jena, 1806). The order was intercepted and Benningsen avoided the danger by retiring along the road to Königsberg, though with the loss of his magazines on the Alle—a loss greatly to the advantage of the French.

Napoléon pursued *viâ* Allenstein and Heilsberg, and on February 7 Benningsen, bent on battle, halted at Eylau.

BATTLE OF EYLAU, FEBRUARY 8, 1807.

On February 7, the armies being in presence, the French situation was critical—they had in hand only Soult and Augereau, the Guard and Murat's Cavalry. Davout was distant 16 kilomètres (10 miles), and on the left Ney still farther away. These two Marshals were called up, Davout to turn the enemy's Left *viâ* Molwitten, Ney to fall on his Right *viâ* Althoff. Their arrival would raise the French numbers to 64,000 and 200 guns.


February 8, the French held a front from the north of Eylau to Rothenen; on the Left, near Eylau, Soult and Light Cavalry; in the Centre, near the cemetery, Napoléon and the Guard; on the Right, near Rothenen, Augereau and St. Hilaire's division of Soult with the Cavalry of Murat and Bessières; guns along the whole front. The Russians, 60,000 strong with 300 pieces, held an arc from Serpallen to Schloditten, cavalry on either flank, and guns in the centre. At 7 a.m. the battle opened with a terrible and destructive cannonade, but in spite of losses Napoléon resolutely waited

for Davout. The Russian Right took the offensive on Eylau, and Augereau was launched against their Centre, but his troops, blinded by a snowstorm, were crushed by grape-shot from 72 guns and sabred by the Russian horsemen, who penetrated right up to the cemetery. In 15 minutes Augereau lost 5,200 men. To set Augereau free Napoléon hurled the 80 squadrons of Murat and Bessières in their celebrated charge upon the enemy's Centre, and the latter was repulsed. At the same moment a column of 4,000 Russians, who had lost their way in the fog, seriously menaced the cemetery and Napoléon's personal safety; but that commander set in motion against them his mounted bodyguard and some Guard battalions, whilst a brigade of Murat's chasseurs fell on their flank—in the twinkling of an eye the whole column was sabred or captured. Still on the whole the Russians were winning.

On the French Left, Soult was containing the enemy, and on the Right at 12 noon Davout *viâ* Serpallen penetrated to Klein Sausgarten, and Kuschitten, but then came Lestocq with 9,000 Prussians *viâ* Schmoditten and fell on Davout, who had to draw back through Auklappen to Klein Sausgarten. Again, at 8 p.m., fortune declared for the French—Ney appeared, close on the heels of Lestocq, *viâ* Althoff, and approaching Schloditten threatened Benningsen's communications with Königsberg; but at 10 p.m. Benningsen re-carried the village, and late at night the Russians and Lestocq retired on Königsberg. So shattered was the victorious army that Murat could not pursue till next day, when he harried the retreat up to the very gates of Königsberg.

Tactical Comments: (1) Ney said, "Quel massacre, et sans résultat!" The Russians retired in good order; (2) Losses: Russians, 30,000; French, 10,000; (3) Contrast Ney's conduct with that of Grouchy in 1815; (4) The fate of Augereau shows the danger of attacking in column.

After this terrible conflict Benningsen took post at Heilsberg and the Emperor on the River Passarge, Lannes' Corps covering Warsaw passing under Masséna, Augereau's Corps being broken up and Napoléon occupying himself with various matters, *e.g.* questions



connected with foreign policy, with newspapers, with the French Academy, the Opera, and the Legion of Honour.

On May 26, Dantzic (henceforth Napoléon's centre of operations) fell with vast stores into the hands of Léfèbvre, and on June 4 Benningsen resumed operations, in the course of which Bernadotte was wounded, and his place taken by Victor. At this time the Grand Army mustered 155,000 men, having been strengthened by Mortier's Corps and by a Reserve under Lannes, whilst Benningsen had 140,000 Russians, and on the extreme right at Heiligenbeil Lestocq's 20,000 Prussians.

BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND, JUNE 14, 1807.

After a sanguinary struggle at the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, June 10, which Napoléon did not take, but which Benningsen evacuated for fear of being cut off, the Russian general during the night retired down the right bank of the Alle, and on the 13th reached Friedland. To cut in between Lestocq and his allies, and to intercept Benningsen from Königsberg, Napoléon, sending Murat and Soult after Lestocq on Königsberg, made for Eylau, but warned that the Russians would, in order to crush Lannes (moving isolated down the left bank on the French right) and in order to join Lestocq, cross to the left bank of the Alle, he directed Lannes to oppose the enemy's passage at all costs.

On June 14, at 1 a.m., Lannes arrived at Posthenen, and observed that the enemy, having passed on bridges thrown at Friedland, were already on the left of the Alle. Not being able with 10,000 men to arrest their movement, Lannes occupied in strength Posthenen (centre), the wood of Sortlach (right), and Heinrichsdorf (left), and at the same time advised his master of his perilous situation. From 3 a.m. Lannes stood his ground waiting for reinforcements; towards midday the French numbers rose to 26,000, and the Marshal, though still far inferior in numbers, extended his left under Mortier north of Heinrichsdorf; in order to conceal his inferiority he deployed in single line (duc de Luxembourg did the same at Fleurus, 1690).


On the other side the Russians, 60,000 strong, stood before

Friedland, Right under Gortschakof on the Alle, Left under Bagration on the wood of Sortlach ; a Reserve of 15,000 covered the bridges, Cavalry on the wings, batteries on the right (higher) bank. A long artillery duel allowed Napoléon to bring up his whole force, and on seeing the enemy with the defile of Friedland and the river behind them, he exclaimed, "Ou ne surprend pas souvent l'ennemi dans une pareille faute." He thus disposed his troops :—On the Left at Heinrichsdorf, Mortier ; in the Centre near Posthenen, Lannes ; on the Right, Ney, as far as Sortlach, Victor between Ney and Lannes ; in Reserve, Guard behind Posthenen and reserve Cavalry on the extreme wings.

At 5 p.m., whilst Lannes and Mortier stood on the defensive, the French monarch with his Right fell on the Russian Left, which was separated from the rest of the Army by the ravine of the Mühlen Fluss. Ney, in the teeth of a terrific cannonade, advanced from the wood of Sortlach with a great battery of 36 guns in front, rolled up the enemy, and with the help of Victor and the Guard drove him over the river, the Russians burning the bridges. Meantime the Russian Right, lured on by the calculated retirement of Mortier and of Lannes, vainly hurried back and tried to clear the way, but Lannes and Mortier at once assumed the offensive, and after a savage struggle the Russians, rather than surrender, plunged into the stream. It was now nine in the evening. The whole Muscovite Army in full rout fled east across the Niémen.

Tactical Comments : (1) Losses, Russian, 25,000 and nearly all their guns ; French, 8,000 ; (2) It was a decisive victory ; (3) Power of the massed French batteries ; (4) Delay of Benningsen ; (5) Bad tactical position of the Russians.

The results of this battle were the surrender of the Prussian fortress of Königsberg and the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit, July 8, 1807, by Napoléon and the Tsar—a treaty aimed at England and inspired by the ideas of the Continental blockade. This great treaty contained the following clauses : (1) France acquired from Russia Cattaro and the Ionian Isles ; Russia obtained Finland from Sweden, Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey ; (2) The Tsar



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undertook to enforce the Continental blockade; (3) Prussia retained only Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia; (4) Prussia lost Dantzic (declared a Free City), her Polish Provinces (formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the King of Saxony), and her provinces west of the Elbe (constituted into the Kingdom of Westphalia for Jérôme Bonaparte, and the Grand Duchy of Berg for Murat); (5) Prussia to pay an enormous war contribution.

Strategic Remarks: (1) England should have materially assisted Russia in this campaign; (2) Napoléon's military genius displayed the first signs of decay, though we must praise his advance on Golymin and his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg; (3) Benningsen's march behind the forest, his stroke at the French left, his retreat and his conduct at Eylau were excellent.

At this time enormous was Napoléon's power, but Prussia was patiently reorganising. England, mistress of the ocean, was swooping on the Dutch and Spanish Colonies, and the Continental blockade, if it did stimulate French industries, irritated the people of Europe, who saw themselves barred from a lucrative commerce. It was a gigantic machine of war which recoiled on its author.

1809

FIFTH COALITION (CENTRAL EUROPE)

CAMPAIGN OF 1809

PLAN OF THE COALITION.

IN Austria the Archduke Charles had organised an army of 300,000, and a Reserve of 200,000, and that empire allied herself with England, Spain, and Portugal. She reckoned on German irritation, a Tyrolese rising, Russian neutrality, English subsidies, and the embarrassing Peninsular War. She put on foot four armies: (1) Archduke Charles with the Army of Germany, 200,000 men, to operate in the Danube Valley; (2) Archduke John with the Army of Italy, 60,000 men, to invade Italy; (3) Archduke Ferdinand with the Army of Galicia (40,000) to enter the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; (4) Jellachich with 20,000 men to rouse the Tyrol. Note that this time the Austrians wisely placed only 60,000 in Italy, instead of 100,000.

PLAN OF NAPOLEÓN.

France put in the field the Army of Germany, 270,000, of whom 80,000 were allies, organised in 6 Corps—2nd Corps under Lannes, 3rd under Davout, 4th under Masséna, 7th (Bavarians) under Léfèbvre, 8th (Württembergers, Hessians, Badenese), under Vandamme, 9th (Saxons) under Bernadotte, besides the Guard and Bessièrès' reserve Cavalry.

In Westphalia, one Corps under Jérôme; in Italy, 60,000 men under Prince Eugène; in Dalmatia, the Corps of Marmont, and in Poland, that of Poniatowski.

In January 1809 the only French troops in Germany were those of Davout (60,000) at Würzburg, and after the preliminary moves the Emperor planned to push his mass on Vienna, thus turning the Austrians in Italy and in the Tyrol. Prince Eugène and Marmont would also move on Vienna, whilst Poniatowski would merely hold the Archduke Ferdinand.

OPERATIONS IN BAVARIA.

Berthier (Imperial Chief of Staff), who commanded in the Emperor's absence, brought Davout to Ratisbon and Masséna *viâ* Strasburg and Ulm to Augsburg, whilst Léfèbvre held the line of the Isar River. This was their position when, on April 10, the Archduke Charles, intending to destroy the French (thus dispersed) in detail crossed with 150,000 men the River Inn, whilst his lieutenant, Bellegarde, with 50,000 from Bohemia, advanced by the left bank of the Danube on Ratisbon. On April 16 the Archduke passed the Isar at Landshüt, driving the Bavarian divisions behind the Abens towards Abensberg. His idea was to hold Masséna with his Left, and moving his Right and Centre on Ratisbon crush Davout between himself and Bellegarde—an able plan ruined by the usual Austrian delay. Napoléon, with reinforcements and the contingents of the confederation, arrived just in time.

CAMPAIGN OF THE FIVE DAYS, APRIL 19-23, 1809.

April 17, the French Emperor reaching Donauwerth, found his forces dangerously dispersed: Davout (Left) at Ratisbon, Masséna (Right) at Augsburg, Bavarians (Centre) at Abensberg. He at once ordered concentration. At the same time the Archduke, who had 120,000 at Landshüt, unwisely separated his forces into two bodies—Left (three Corps) under Hiller and the Archduke Louis, 60,000 men, Right and Centre, under himself, 90,000 men. The ensuing movements led to five combats in the wooded terrain between the Danube and the Isar.

Masséna moved eastwards on Pfaffenhofen, Davout, leaving a regiment in Ratisbon, moved towards Abensberg, and collided with the Archduke, who was making for Ratisbon; Davout, victorious at Tengen, April 19, effected, by a flank march, his junction with Napoléon near Abensberg—thus 120,000 men had concentrated, and the French plan became to separate the Archduke, near Tengen, from Louis and Hiller on the Abens. On April 20, leaving half of Davout's force to contain the Archduke at Tengen, Napoléon, with superior numbers (65,000 v. 50,000), attacked Hiller and the Archduke Louis at Abensberg, meantime directing Masséna, on Landshüt, to cut their retreat. Hiller and Louis beaten, fled on Landshüt, upon which town Napoléon, and on the east bank of the Isar Masséna, converged April 21, driving Hiller and Louis beyond the Isar apart from the Archduke Charles, who remained inactive between Tengen and Eckmühl.

On April 20 the Austrian Prince had secured his passage over the Danube by taking Ratisbon, with its stone bridge intact, thus effecting a junction with Bellegarde, and on the 22nd decided to deliver battle at Eckmühl, and, with his Right, *viâ* Abach, to threaten the French communications. But Davout stiffly resisted until the arrival of Napoléon with Lannes and Masséna from Landshüt (making 75,000 French v. 48,000 Austrians) forced the Austrians back on Ratisbon. The Archduke, throwing a garrison into the city, crossed the Danube to join Bellegarde, and to move on Vienna by the left bank. On April 23 the French sovereign, who here received a wound in the heel, captured Ratisbon, and this marvellous campaign of five days closed, having cost the Austrians 50,000 men and their lines of communications, and having also uncovered their capital.

OPERATIONS IN VARIOUS THEATRES.

In Italy the Archduke John beat Prince Eugène at Sacile, throwing him back on the Adige, but the Prince, reinforced, drove the Austrian north-east through the Tarvis Pass, and defeating

him, June 14, on the Raab, compelled him to cross to the left of the Danube at a great distance from the Archduke Charles.

In Poland the Archduke Ferdinand wrested Warsaw from Poniatowski; but, passing into Galicia, the latter roused the country and forced the Austrian to recoil on Krakau.

In the Tyrol the peasant rising under Andréas Hofer allowed the Austrians to enter Innsprück, and Léfèbvre, coming from Salzburg, was unable to crush the rising, though he succeeded in chasing Jellachich from the Tyrol. The latter sought to rejoin the Archduke John, but was routed May 25 by Prince Eugène at St. Michel on the Mühr.

In Holland an English expedition, known as the Walcheren Expedition, attempted to create a diversion in favour of Austria. It sailed (July 28) too late, though in considerable strength—37 ships of the line, 23 frigates, 33 sloops, 82 gunboats, and 400 transports with 40,000 troops under Lord Chatham, an incompetent leader. Secrecy was not preserved, and the medical arrangements were defective. On reaching Holland, the general and the admiral differed as to the objects to be accomplished, and instead of dashing on to Antwerp, Lord Chatham proceeded to lay siege to Flushing, in Walcheren Island. This delay allowed 30,000 French troops under Bernadotte to collect at Antwerp, which city therefore Chatham could not hope to capture. Sickness broke out amongst the invaders, and by Christmas the island of Walcheren was evacuated. The expedition cost 20 millions and thousands of lives.

OPERATIONS IN AUSTRIA.

The Archduke Charles was for some distance pursued by Davout; Léfèbvre, moving into the Tyrol, covered the right flank; Masséna skirting the south bank of the Danube protected the left.

Napoléon moved along the right of the Danube on Vienna, rolling before him the troops of Hiller, who had superseded Louis. He crossed the Inn, and after the terrible combat of Ebersberg on the Traun, May 3, whence Hiller in rout fled to Mautern and crossing rejoined the Archduke Charles, entered the Austrian capital for

the second time, May 13. But now the bridges were broken and he had to cross in the presence of Archduke Charles, who occupied the Marchfeld. Vienna became his centre of operations. He selected for a point of passage Ebersdorf, four miles below Vienna, where the river is divided into two by the great island of Lobau—between Lobau and the right bank the river is 700 yards broad, between Lobau and the left bank 120 yards. May 19 a boat-bridge enabled Masséna to cross at 10 p.m. to Lobau. For the passage to the north bank some bridges were thrown at the re-entrant bend, the extremities of which were guarded by the villages of Aspern and Essling. On May 20 Masséna crossed and occupied these two villages. On May 21 Lannes and the Guard reinforced Masséna, bringing the numbers up to 50,000, and the Archduke with 80,000 men and 300 guns assailed the two Marshals, who were isolated by the south bridge being damaged. After a savage struggle the French, under Masséna's masterly guidance, barely held their ground. At night, the bridge being repaired, reinforcements passed, and on May 22 the Emperor with 70,000 attacked; the enemy's centre was yielding, when the bridge south of Lobau was swept away by Austrian fire-ships and by a violent rise of the river. Napoléon, knowing that he was short of ammunition and that now his retreat was gone, ordered retirement into Lobau; to cover the retreat Essling, taken and re-taken thirteen times, and Aspern were held till night by sheer heroism, but at a cost of 15,000 men and of Lannes' life. Masséna directed the operation.

Tactical Comments: (1) Napoléon fought with a bridge behind him, and (2) attacked in column, which suffered much from fire-action (compare Waterloo, Albuera, and Borodino).

BATTLE OF WAGRAM, JULY 6, 1809.

After this check Napoléon employed a month and a half to create of Lobau an impregnable base of operations. He threw three bridges south of Lobau and prepared four for the northern shore. He called to him Eugène from the Raab, Marmont from

Dalmatia, Bernadotte from Linz, raising his numbers to 180,000 and 750 guns. On his side the Archduke, strongly entrenched between Aspern and Essling, had 140,000 and 700 guns, without counting the Archduke John's 30,000 at Pressburg.

On July 1 the division Legrand crossed to the north bank at the original point, and thus drew away the Austrians' attention from the eastern side of the island.

In the stormy night of July 4-5 the army crossed to the north bank at the eastern end of Lobau, thus turning the works of the Archduke, who was watching the original point of passage. This was admittedly the most remarkable military passage of a great river. At daybreak, July 5, the Archduke was astounded to see the French deployed in the Marchfeld with their left on Enzersdorf. He at once evacuated his entrenchments to take up new positions, 15 miles long: Left between Wagram and Neusiedel on the Wagram plateau; Centre between Wagram and Aderklaa; Right from Aderklaa to the Danube. Napoléon moved his Right—Davout—to Glinzendorf and Grosshofen; his Centre—Oudinot, Eugène, Bernadotte—on Wagram and Aderklaa; his Left—Masséna—to Aspern and Essling, thus connecting with Legrand. In second line near Raschdorf the Guard, Marmont, Wrede's Bavarians and heavy Cavalry; and on the left wing the Cavalry of Maruloz and Lasalle; on the right that of Grouchy and Montbrun's cuirassiers. The numbers stood at 180,000, including 30,000 Cavalry and 600 guns. The French thus held a salient against the Austrian re-entrant. At 7 p.m. an unsuccessful effort was made upon the heights of the Rüssbach.


July 6 the Archduke took the offensive, his idea being to contain with his Left, to crush with his Right the French Left, cut their connection with Lobau, and then bring down his Left and annihilate the enemy. Napoléon's objective was the plateau of Wagram, the possession of which would enable him to outflank the Austrian Left, and the capture of the plateau was assigned to Davout. Masséna was moved on Aderklaa, leaving two divisions (Boudet and Legrand), 18,000, to guard Aspern and the bridges.

Fierce were the Archduke's assaults on Boudet and Legrand at Aspern and Essling, but Masséna understood their object; he therefore massed towards Aspern by a retrograde flank march, and sternly resisted. This left a gap in the French front between the centre and Masséna; Napoléon filled it with Drouot's massed battery of 100 guns, south of Aderklaa, and under the cover of their fire the French Centre stood firm. The moment that Davout and Grouchy appeared on the heights of Neusiedel with Oudinot on Wagram, the Emperor, sure of success, snatched a few minutes' sleep; he then launched Macdonald in a column of 8,000 of Eugène's men on the Austrian Centre. Their objective was the steeple of Süssenbrunn, which they reached 1,500 strong, but Wrede and the young Guard arrived in support, Gerarsdorf was gained and the Austrian army cut in two. Masséna also advanced, and at 3 p.m. the Archduke ordered a retreat, and it was not till 6 p.m. that John appeared at Siebenbrunn. His delay cut short his military career.

Tactical Comments: (1) Losses, Austrians 36,000, French 18,000; (2) The pursuit was not immediate, for Wagram was not a decisive victory, and the French Cavalry were not available; (3) Effect of massed French batteries; (4) Austrian front too extended; (5) Austrian centre weak; (6) Austrian retreat well arranged; (7) French movements well combined; (8) Masséna's dangerous tactical flank movement; (9) Heavy losses of the great French column; (10) Fatal effect of the non-arrival of the Archduke John. Contrast Ney at Eylau and at Bautzen, Blücher at Waterloo, Lee at Second Manassas, Nogi at Mukden, and compare Grouchy at Waterloo.

The Archduke retired north-east pursued by Masséna and Marmont, and the campaign was closed by the Treaty of Vienna: Austria to cede (1) the region of the Inn River to Bavaria; (2) Galicia, partly to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, partly to Russia; (3) The Illyrian Provinces (Carniola, Trieste, Croatia, Istria, Dalmatia) to France.

Strategic Comments: (1) Military state of France in 1809—the armed forces (including 30,000 Guard) totalled 600,000, which enormous number could be reached only by calling up young



conscripts and by retaining time-expired men. Such a number was necessitated by constant wars, by the carrying out of the Continental Blockade, and by garrisoning so many fortresses. To keep up the huge total Napoléon had recourse to foreign contingents, and they, as well as the young conscripts, were an element of weakness. Hence from 1809 we find his victories less decisive and more costly. On the other hand his opponents had learnt much from defeat, and displayed a rising national enthusiasm, coincident with the decline of such enthusiasm in France ; (2) Note the use of the visible telegraph ; (3) Note Berthier's defective strategic deployment ; (4) The Archduke John, instead of retiring on the Raab, should have cut Napoléon's line at Linz.

GENERAL REMARKS : EUROPE, 1809-12.

In 1810 Napoléon married the Austrian Archduchess, Maria Louisa, and in 1811 was born his son, the King of Rome. Napoléon's power reached its zenith ; in 1809 the Papal States were annexed, in 1810 Holland was incorporated, as also Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Oldenburg, the Valais, Hanover, and part of Westphalia. Napoléon was French Emperor, King of Italy, Mediator of the Swiss Republic, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine ; his brother Jérôme was King of Westphalia, his brother Joseph King of Spain, his brother-in-law, Murat, King of Naples, and his Marshal, Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden.

Russia, Prussia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden enforced the Continental Blockade, and the sole enemies were England, Spain, and Portugal.

Throughout the vast extent of the dominions subject to his rule, the French Monarch had substituted order for disorder, and equality of opportunity in place of privilege. A career was open to all talent, however humble, and indeed his civil administration was so excellent that even foreign states copied his example. (See Fisher's *Napoleonic Statesmanship in Germany*, and Corréard's *Précis d'Histoire*.)

RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1808-12.

Causes: the Muscovites and Ottomans were perpetually at enmity, and in 1806 this enmity was brought to a head by a dispute about Wallachia and Moldavia. War was declared in 1807, but operations were deferred till 1809.

In that year the Russian general, Prince Prosorowsky, with 105,000 men, in vain attempted to carry Giurgevo and Braila by assault; his death gave the command to Bagration, who succeeded in capturing Braila. In 1810 Kaminski, crossing the Danube, took Silistria, and moved against Shumla, a celebrated fortress and an important strategic point. The assaults failed, as also the desperate attack on Rustchuk. These disasters were relieved by a Russian victory at the great battle of Battin, September 7-8, which led to the surrender of Rustchuk. The sudden death of Kaminski gave the command to the illustrious Kutusof, who in 1811, finding his numbers reduced by the necessity of detaching troops towards Poland in view of impending war with France, was reduced to the defensive, and barely held his own in the battle of Rustchuk, July 2.

The Russians then recrossed to the north bank of the Danube, followed by part of the Ottoman Army, but Kutusof, with great ability, passed a force over the river, and fell upon and routed the Turks on their own or southern side. Thus the Turkish Army on the northern bank was in imminent peril, when a Convention at the end of October saved the situation. The Russians, fearful of war with France, wanted peace, as also did the Sultan. The result was the Peace of Bucharest, 1812, by which the River Pruth was fixed as the boundary between Russia and Turkey.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) Turkey displayed extraordinary powers of resistance; (2) Great military value of the Janissaries or Yenetcherae, whose destruction in 1825 seriously weakened Turkish strength; (3) When an army lies astride a river its great danger is in being struck on its own side (compare Jackson's attack on McClellan's Army when astride the Chickahominy river,

1862; also consider the German position in France on August 17, 1870); (4) Such was the reputation of the Ottoman cavalry that the Russians often formed their Army into one great square, as Korsakof did at Zürich, 1799, and, better still, into several squares, as Napoléon did at the Pyramids. In recent times the Russians have employed ordinary tactics, partly because they improved in discipline, and partly because the Cossacks, once the formidable vassals of the Sultan, were annexed by the Tsar; (5) Two things only have saved Turkey in wars succeeding the destruction of the Janissaries—the pestilential character of the lower Danube and the fortresses along that river.

1812

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA

CAUSES OF WAR.

THE Austrian marriage embittered the relations of the Russian and French Emperors, as also did the annexation of the duchy of the Duke of Oldenburg, the Tsar's brother-in-law; complications arose on the Continental Blockade and on the Polish question. Both sides prepared for war in 1811, the Russian ruler closing his wars with Sweden and Turkey.

The theatre stretched from the Baltic to the Marsh of Pinsk, and included specially the space between the Dwina and the Dnieper.

Napoléon put in the field 640,000 men. The Grand Army included eight Corps:—

1st Corps	under	Davout,
2nd	„	„ Oudinot,
3rd	„	„ Ney,
4th	„	„ Prince Eugène,
5th	„	„ Poniatowski,
6th	„	„ G. St. Cyr,
7th	„	„ Reynier,
8th	„	„ King Jérôme,

and the Guard, the Reserve Cavalry, the 10th Corps (Poles and Prussians), under Macdonald, and an Austrian Corps. On the communications were the 9th Corps (Victor) and the 11th Corps (Augereau), not counting the various garrisons. There were 370,000

French, 80,000 Italians, Poles, and Swiss, and 150,000 Germans and Dutch—the last two unreliable.

Napoléon moved at the beginning of 1812 and reached the Elbe in March, the Oder in April, and the Vistula in May. On June 6 he crossed the last river and reached the Niémen in three columns—Centre, 200,000, to cross the Niémen at Kovno (Guard, Murat, Davout, Oudinot, Ney); Left on Tilsit, Macdonald; Right, Eugène with 80,000 Italians and Bavarians (the latter under G. St. Cyr); further to the right at Grodno, King Jérôme with 70,000 Poles (under Poniatowski), Westphalians, and Reynier's Saxons; on the extreme right 30,000 Austrians under Schwartzenberg on Brest-Litovsky; Rearguard under Victor between the Oder and the Vistula, and Reserve under Augereau between the Oder and the Elbe. Note the feeble wings, formed mainly of foreign troops.

Russia had 220,000 men in two masses, barring the roads to Moscow—at Vilna, Barclay de Tolly, with 160,000 covering the Vitepsk road; at Minsk, Bagration, with 60,000 covering the Mohilev road.

On the left of Bagration and facing the Austrian frontier stood Tormasof with 40,000, and in Wallachia 60,000 under Tchitchakof. In addition were considerable reserves.

PLANS OF CAMPAIGN.

The Russian plan was to retire, constantly wasting the land, and to fight the invader when exhausted—in fact, to imitate Wellington in 1810. The French plan was to interpose between the two Russian masses, to secure the so-called gates of Russia, and then to defeat Bagration and Barclay in detail.

THE MARCH INTO RUSSIA.

On June 24 the Army passed the Niémen, and on the 28th Davout, Murat, and the Guard occupied Vilna, which became the

centre of operations. The Russians being separated in two bodies, the Emperor planned to cut the retreat of Barclay de Tolly, who recoiled on the Dwina at Drissa. On July 10 he was not pressed by Napoléon, because the latter had to halt fourteen days at Vilna to assemble his lengthy columns. The French plan then was with their Left and Centre to move on Polotsk and cut Barclay from Moscow. In executing this plan Napoléon had to halt at Gloubokoïe July 18-22. But Barclay abandoned the entrenched camp of Drissa, and divining the enemy's project moved up the Dwina to Ostrovno, July 26, where there was an action. He feigned a desire to stand at Vitépsk July 28, and hurried to Smolensk in order to join Bagration. His retreat and that of Bagration was marked by merciless destruction of villages and of all provisions. Barclay left on the lower Dwina only Wittgenstein with 25,000 men, to face whom Napoléon detached Macdonald and Oudinot, whilst following Barclay with Murat, Ney, Eugène, and Guard, his centre of operations being Vitepsk.

Meantime Davout with part of his Corps and 10,000 horse was sent to intercept Bagration, whom Jérôme would take in rear. But the latter delayed, and just as he and Davout were closing on Bobruisk, the Emperor added his brother's command to the marshal, and the King's anger led to further delay which saved Bagration. The Russian passed the Beresina at Bobruisk. Checked by Davout at Mohilev July 23, he crossed lower down at Starai-Bychov and thence gained Smolensk. The two Russian Armies, 140,000 strong, were thus united, and again Napoléon perforce halted.

The Grand Army then had its Right at Orcha and its Left at Vitepsk, and of the 400,000 who had crossed the Niémen there remained only 250,000, and as Oudinot, St. Cyr, and Macdonald were detached to cover the left flank, whilst Reynier and Schwartzenberg contained Tormasof, Napoléon held in hand only 175,000 men. As to the second line troops Victor was on the Vistula and Augereau at Berlin.

BATTLE OF SMOLENSK, AUGUST 17, 1812.

Then Napoléon planned to outflank them both in the space between the Dwina and the Dnieper—"the gates of Russia." He therefore crossed the Dnieper August 11 at Orcha, calling up Davout towards Krasnoë, and on August 16 arrived on the left bank before Smolensk. If he could seize the place, he would succeed, but all the 17th a Russian Corps held it, and evacuated at night after firing the bridge and the town. Thus the main Russian Army had time to retreat.

In despair Napoléon launched Ney in direct pursuit, and Junot with the Westphalians along the left bank to cross and to head the retreating enemy. The latter general, in ill health, failed; the former and Murat at Valoutina, August 19, succeeded only in checking the Russians for a day. The pursuer and the pursued then moved on Moscow, the Russians wasting the country and making one last effort to save the holy city; at this time Victor was called to Smolensk and Augereau to the Vistula.

BATTLE OF THE MOSCOVA OR OF BORODINO, SEPTEMBER 7, 1812.

Barclay, a German, had been superseded by the aged Kutusof, a Russian, who, in order to gratify the Russians by fighting, decided on battle at Borodino with 140,000 men and 640 guns. He stood on heights between the Moscova, the Kolocza, and the forest of Outitza—Right, under Miloradovitch, from the Moscova to the new Moscow road and to the Gorki redoubt; Centre, under Barclay, from that road to Semenoffskoïe, protected by the grand redoubt; Left, under Bagration, was backed on Semenoffskoïe and the Outitza forest, and covered by three batteries, called the Flèches Bagration; the Left was comparatively weak. In the Outitza forest Kutusof placed an entire corps to take the French in flank and to push them back on the Kolocza. In advance was the redoubt of Schwarardino, in reserve the Russian Guard.

On September 5 Napoléon with 130,000 men and 587 guns

took possession of Schwardino, and next day each side remained quiet, Napoléon bridging the Kolocza.

On September 7 Napoléon, merely containing the hostile right, directed Eugène to carry Borodino and the grand redoubt, and Ney to attack between the latter and the Flèches, which last Davout would assail, whilst Poniatowski from the Outitza wood was to debouch upon the Russian rear. In reserve the Guard and one division of Davout (Friant). At 6 a.m., under the fire of 180 guns, Eugène carried Borodino, crossed the Kolocza, and captured for the moment the grand redoubt. Davout fell on the Flèches, but he was wounded and recoiled. His place was taken by Ney and Murat, who at frightful cost won the three Flèches. It was 10 a.m., and the battle would have been decided if the Emperor had listened to Ney and Murat, who suggested a vigorous attack *viâ* the ravine of Semenoffskoïe, cutting in two the Muscovite Army. For this they asked for the reserve troops. He sent them only Davout's division, perhaps with excess of prudence.

Then came the Russian counter-attack; pouring from their Right, their masses regained the grand redoubt from Eugène, and assailed Ney and Murat at the Flèches. The two marshals were on the point of attacking the grand redoubt, but had to suspend action owing to a furious onslaught of the Hetman Platof's Cossacks near Borodino on the French convoys parked at Valoujeva. Their repulse and Poniatowski's capture of the Outitza heights, allowed an assault on the grand redoubt. With five Cavalry regiments Caulaincourt swept the ravine of Semenoffskoïe, and approached the grand redoubt from its rear at the moment when Eugène scaled its parapets in front. It was 3 p.m., the Russians withdrew on Kniaskovo and Psarevo. Then it was that the marshals called for the as yet unused 18,000 Guardsmen; the French Sovereign's reply was, "Je ne veux pas faire démolir ma garde; s'il y a une seconde bataille demain, avec quoi la livrerai-je?" Instead he massed 400 pieces on the enemy, "Puisqu'ils en veulent encore, donnez leur-en." Night closed the most sanguinary of Napoléon's battles.


BATTLE OF THE MOSCOVA OR OF BORODINO

7 SEP. 1812, 5 A.M.

Scale of Miles



French.....
Russians.....



London : Hugh Rees, Ltd.

Tactical Comments: (1) Losses, French, 30,000; Russian, 60,000, including Bagration; (2) The French could not attempt a turning movement, because they had not enough numbers, their Artillery and Cavalry were worn out, the news from Spain was bad, such movements did not demoralise Russian troops; (3) Napoléon was ignorant that Kutusof had occupied the wood and therefore Poniatowski was unexpectedly delayed; (4) The French massed guns and used their Cavalry to great effect; (5) Napoléon hesitated to use his Guard; (6) The Russians held a strong defensive position, but had too many men on their Right; their reserves acted disjointedly; (7) Note the importance of hasty fortifications and the great moral effect of Cavalry on the enemy's rear.

The Russians retired in the night and the French, following, entered Moscow September 14; but next day burst forth the fire which laid four-fifths of the city in ruins. Meantime Kutusof placed himself at Taroutino. Negotiations were entered into, delusive on the part of the Tsar, who was merely waiting for winter. As Moscow afforded supplies, and as his numbers stood at 100,000 with 600 guns, the Emperor objected to retire, but when, on October 18, Kutusof took the offensive, he decided on retreat, and on October 19 quitted the city, where he left Mortier with 10,000 (they rejoined him at Mojaïsk), and wished to take the Kalouga route to Smolensk, but Kutusof checked Eugène October 24 at Malo Jaroslavetz. This drove the Emperor north to Mojaïsk and into the old wasted line of march. Kutusof's mass was on the left, Miloradovitch on the rear, Platof's Cossacks on the right. From Viasma to Smolensk was one continuous rearguard action, Ney replacing Davout in command of the rearguard. November 6 snow fell.

November 9, at Smolensk, Napoléon divided his Army (50,000) into four corps. The stores at Smolensk could not be properly distributed. The Emperor would now have wintered at this place, but for events on his wings. In the south Tchitchakof and Tormasof united, contained Schwartzenburg with part of their forces, and were moving the rest on Borisov; in the north the Russian Corps

from Finland and Wittgenstein united, and though repulsed by St. Cyr at Polotsk, had pushed that general and Oudinot back on Lepel. Thus the French retreat was imperilled. Again Kutusof headed the French, and at Krasnoë attacked November 17 Eugène, Davout, and Ney; the last suffered heavily, and, nearly cut off by 50,000 Russians, succeeded with his 7,000 in rejoining the main body at Orcha by crossing the frozen Dnieper to the north and making a wide *détour* (November 18-20). The Army crossed the Dnieper at Orcha, and found its path all but barred by Kutusof and by the Beresina, on which the two other Russian Armies were hurrying.

PASSAGE OF THE BERESINA, NOVEMBER 25-29, 1812.

The Emperor moved on Borisov, where he calculated to find a bridge guarded by Dombrowski. But November 22 he learnt the bridge was in the hands of the enemy. He was pursued and nearly headed by Kutusof and Platof's Cossacks, whilst from the north, on the left bank, arrived Wittgenstein (who had escaped Gouvion St. Cyr in spite of his defeat by the latter at Polotsk), and from the south, on the right bank, appeared Tchitchakof with 40,000 (whose advance Schwartzberg and Reynier had not arrested) debouching from Minsk and burning the Borisov bridge. Against these three Armies Napoléon arranged three bodies: (1) his own retreating troops, namely, 25,000 still organised and 40,000 stragglers, (2) and (3) Victor and Oudinot and St. Cyr, 23,000, who joined at Orcha. Worse still, the thaw started, and the river foamed with blocks of ice. Bridging was out of the question, when fortunately General Corbineau lighted upon a ford at Studianka, November 23, and the veteran general, Eblé, was at once charged to establish there two trestle bridges. For two days and a night the pontoniers worked in the icy stream, and twice saw their labours destroyed by accident.

November 27 the passage began, Victor on the left bank holding back Kutusof and Wittgenstein; Oudinot, the first on the right bank, containing Tchitchakof, who had been retained at Borisov by

a mere demonstration of Partouneaux. November 28 the enemy's guns played on either bank, and there was furious fighting, Oudinot and Ney hurling back Tchitchakof, Victor heading against Kutusof and Wittgenstein, and Partouneaux at Borisov having his division annihilated. All the time the terrible crossing went on amidst scenes of frightful confusion, and with the Russian fire ploughing huge gaps in the passing multitude. Night fell, and 28,000 French had forced their passage against 72,000, Victor crossing last. During all this night Eblé, who had not slept for six nights, tried to stir up out of their stupor the stragglers on the left bank.

November 29, by order, Eblé, on the appearance of some Cossacks, burnt the bridges. Many were engulfed, and from those on the eastern bank rose a yell of horror as the wild horsemen of Muscovy swept on them, spear in hand.

On December 5, at Smorgoni, the Emperor left for Paris, naming Murat as his substitute. The Army, harassed by the Cossacks, made Vilna on the 9th, and Murat soon handed over his command to Prince Eugène.

This campaign, which with its close in fearful cold cost France over 300,000 men, terminated with a stampede across Prussia, Brandenburg, and Saxony, and on the Elbe, out of the 400,000 who passed the Niémen, barely 40,000 gathered, whereas the Russians lost a little over 150,000 men.

General Remarks and Strategic Comments: (1) The cold and hunger had ruined the Grand Army, and henceforth Napoléon's power sank. Peoples and Kings banded against France. Aristocracies always hated Napoléon, and the peoples, though grateful for his just administration, had their national sentiments awakened, and felt the sacrifices entailed by the Continental Blockade. France stood alone; (2) We here deal with the strategy, not of Armies, but of groups of Armies; (3) The French could not, as in 1800, 1805, 1806, and 1809, live on the country, and convoys were required on the old system, and all along they delayed the marches; (4) Napoléon failed against Bagration, against Barclay, and against them united—his failure was due to supply difficulties, bad roads, the

variation of night and day temperature which killed the horses, fatigue of the troops, overestimation of the enemy's numbers which led to his own abnormal forces, inferiority of his horses, excellence of the Russian animals, the greater mobility of the smaller Russian numbers, their good supply, their knowledge of the country, defective French maps, the French looting which disgusted the Lithuanians (naturally favourable to Napoléon), non-appointment of Polish intelligence officers, and the incapacity of Jérôme and of Eugène ; (5) When before Smolensk, Orcha became the French centre of operations, and the line of communication was changed to Borisov-Minsk-Vilna ; (6) The French Cavalry were organised in Corps ; (7) In Russia Napoléon failed as Charles XII. of Sweden had failed 1709—both should have halted during the winter for supplies. Russia cannot be successfully invaded ; (8) South German troops did much to save the French ; (9) If Napoléon had had command of the sea and had based himself on Memel, he might have succeeded ; (10) The decision not to halt at Smolensk was perhaps wise ; that the fall of Moscow would be decisive was a natural thing to expect, and besides constant progress was a necessity of the Emperor's political position ; (11) Alison denies that the cold was the real cause of the ruin—he says it hurt the Russians more than it did the French, and that five-sixths of the losses occurred before snow fell. He thus tabulates the real causes—retreat not arranged for, magazines only at Smolensk, Borisov, Minsk, Vilna, destruction of cavalry at Borodino, the Cossacks, Kutusof's able parallel pursuit.


PASSAGE OF THE BERESINA

25-29 November, 1812.

REFERENCE.

Retreat of the French Army	1
March of Kutusof	2
" " Wittgenstein	3
" " Tchitchakof	4

ENGLISH MILES.



1813-14

SIXTH COALITION

CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

THE Sixth Coalition was not, like the preceding ones, the work of England; it was the result of Napoléon's defeat in Russia and of the consequent national uprising of Germany, and it was the German people that constrained Alexander of Russia and Frederick William III. of Prussia to enter on this contest. Those two Sovereigns in February 1813 signed the Kalisch Convention. Austria pursued a waiting policy and England did not join the Coalition till June, by which date there were enrolled against France and the Confederation of the Rhine the following powers: Russia, Prussia, England, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Austria.

The theatre of operations stretched from the Baltic on the north, to Bohemia and the Danube on the south; from the Niémen on the east, to the Rhine on the west.

At the opening of the campaign the Russians numbered about 100,000 and the Prussians 120,000; Napoléon rapidly formed a Grand Army by calling up conscripts before their time, by mobilising 100,000 National Guard and by forming 10,000 Gardes d'honneur, but—fatal defect—Cavalry were wanting, and to supply it the Artillery was much augmented. His Army included eight Army Corps and the Guard, say about 160,000, plus 50,000 men in the strong places on the Vistula and on the Oder. During the campaign Napoléon brought up about four more Army Corps.

The object of the French Emperor was to carry the war between the Elbe and the Oder, and in the spring he took the initiative, but in the autumn the offensive passed to the Allies, though Napoléon never forgot his fundamental plan.

CAMPAIGN OF THE SPRING.


After 1812 the remnants of the Grand Army fell back, in March 1813, behind the Elbe at Magdeburg. Prince Eugène, their commander, threw strong garrisons into Dantzic, Thorn, Spandau, Küstrin, Glogau, and then held 40,000 in hand to contain the Russians and to wait for the arrival of his master. That monarch moved on the River Saale with 140,000 men (including three weak Cavalry Corps) under Ney, Marmont, Bertrand, Oudinot, Soult, Mortier, and Bessières, the Guard commander. He formed a junction with Eugène, and then made for the Elbe across the plain of the Elster, meeting with resistance, in the course of which, on March 1, Bessières was killed, and on May 2 Lützen was fought, 200,000 men being engaged. The French were heading for Leipzig; the Allies—Wittgenstein on the Right, Blücher in the Centre, Miloradovitch on the Left—moving westwards from Dresden, brought on the battle which cost each side 20,000 men, and left Napoléon a barren victory, for he had not the Cavalry to secure the fruits.

The Allies abandoned the Elbe and fell back on the upper Spree, whilst Napoléon on May 9 entered Dresden, the capital of his faithful ally, the King of Saxony.

He then sent off Eugène into Italy, and detached Ney with 60,000 upon Torgau in order to threaten Berlin, and with the rest of his troops moved against Blücher and Wittgenstein, entrenched in a strong position near Bautzen, which position presented two distinct lines of defence—the Spree and the Bloeser-Wasser—the left resting on the Erz Gebirge and the right on marshes.

BATTLE OF BAUTZEN, MAY 20-21.

The Emperor on May 19 sent orders to Ney at Torgau to draw down rapidly on the Spree at Klix. May 20 the battle opened; on the French right Oudinot crossed the Spree at Sinkwitz in order to draw the Allies' attention to that quarter, but the real struggle



was in the centre, where Macdonald, the Guard, and Cavalry passed at Bautzen, Marmont at Nimschut, and by evening Bautzen and the line of the Spree were in French hands. On the left Bertrand crossed at Nieder Gürk, and further north Ney arrived at Klix.

During the night the Allies took up a position on their second line—Left under Miloradovitch from Drohm-Berg to the Bloeser-Wasser, Centre under Wittgenstein behind that stream and entrenched on the heights of Baschütz, Right under Blücher near Krechwitz and Preititz, extreme Right under Barclay, 30,000 strong, at the windmill near Gleine. Reserve and Cavalry at Bloesa.

May 21, at 6 a.m., Oudinot fell on the Allies' Left so as to distract their reserves from the vital point—their Right—and the Tsar weakened his Centre to reinforce his Left. At the same moment Ney debouching from Klix overwhelmed Barclay and gained Preititz, 10 a.m., in the rear of Blücher, who was assailed in front by Bertrand, and who was thus in imminent peril. Ney, however, without intelligence as to what was happening in front, hesitated, though Jomini, his Chief of Staff, urged him to push on Würschen and Hochkirch, so as to cut off the enemy's retreat. Instead, the Prince of Moscow arrested his offensive, abandoned Preititz, and thus allowed the Prussian general, who saw his danger, to recoil behind the Bloeser-Wasser. Napoléon, observing the hostile wings shaken and the centre weakened, ordered a general frontal attack accompanied by violent Artillery fire, and carried the Allies' positions. The latter retired in good order on the River Oder, disputing every inch of ground.

Tactical Comments: (1) Losses, Allies, 15,000; French, 10,000; (2) Ney's hesitation alone saved the Allies from ruin; (3) The fatigue of the French conscripts and the lack of horsemen deprived the victory of its full results; (4) French Artillery preparation before the decisive attack—compare Japanese practice in Manchuria, 1904–5; (5) Remarkable battle front of the Allies; (6) Disastrous result of the Allies' passive defence—compare the passive defence of the British at Maiwand, 1880.

NEGOCIATIONS.

From June 4 to August 10 the Austrian statesman, Metternich, and the French ruler entered on mutually delusive negotiations at Pleswitz and at Prague, the former hoping to find a chance for Austria to join the Coalition, the latter hoping to strengthen his Cavalry. This armistice of Pleswitz or Poischwitz was a capital error on the part of the French monarch. On August 10 the discussions ceased, and Austria and Sweden at once declared war.

CAMPAIGN OF THE AUTUMN.

Napoléon had now to meet three Armies, 350,000 strong, disposed in a semi-circle, namely, Army of Bohemia near Prague, 130,000, under Prince Schwartzemberg; Army of Silesia west of Breslau, 120,000, under Prince Blücher; Swedish Army of the North, covering Berlin, 90,000, under Bernadotte, Prince Royal of Sweden, who had deserted Napoléon. On his side the French Sovereign thus disposed his forces: Oudinot, with 70,000 (Corps 4, 7, 12), east of Wittenberg, opposed Bernadotte; Ney, with 100,000 (Corps 3, 5, 6, 11), including two Cavalry corps, faced Blücher in Silesia; 70,000, including two Cavalry corps on the front Dresden-Bautzen-Zittau, withstood Schwartzemberg; St. Cyr, with one Army Corps, held Dresden, and the Emperor in person stood with his Guard, 40,000 strong, at Görlitz.

Napoléon wanted to act against the Army of Bohemia, but Blücher was pressing Ney; Napoléon therefore hurried there, and, beating the Prussian at Goldberg August 23, drove him behind the Katzbach. Meantime, the Austrian Prince debouching by the River Mulde, on the French rear, was menacing Dresden; the French Sovereign, in consequence, left Macdonald with three Army Corps (3, 5, 11), to hold Blücher, and himself returned to the Saxon capital with his Imperial Guard, 6th Corps, and Cavalry Reserve, and, in the Battle of Dresden August 26-27, routed Schwartzemberg; it was 120,000 French against 180,000 allies, the latter losing 30,000 men. In this battle fell Moreau, fighting

on the side of the enemies of France. After the defeat the combined sovereigns came to an agreement always to attack the lieutenants of their redoubted antagonist, but always to decline battle with that monarch in person, *e.g.* (1) Schwartzberg, slackly pursued by Murat, enveloped and captured at Kulm August 30 nearly all the Corps of Vandamme (isolated by Murat's slowness), whom Napoléon had despatched from Zittau to arrest the Austrian retreat in the Töplitz defile; (2) On the River Katzbach Blücher drove Macdonald, who was too extended, in a disastrous retreat August 26; (3) Oudinot, on the road to Berlin, was beaten by Bernadotte at Gross Beeren August 23, and the French general having lost 12,000 fell back on Wittenberg, where Ney superseded him; (4) Ney advanced again, and with 50,000 faced the Swedish Prince's 80,000 at Dennewitz, September 6. The result was fatal to the Prince of Moscow; his Saxon allies deserted, he lost 15,000 men, and had to fall back on Torgau. Then it was that a double concentric movement massed round Leipzig the entire forces of both combatants, the Allies having now decided to assail even Napoléon.

BATTLE OF LEIPZIG, OR OF THE NATIONS, OCTOBER 16-19.

After Dresden the French monarch had desired to move on Berlin, but the above disasters forced him to march east to the succour of Macdonald. On the Emperor's approach the Prussians retired, whereupon the former retraced his steps to Dresden. As to the Allies, it was decided that Blücher, from Silesia, should join Bernadotte; he therefore moved down the Elbe, and crossed at Wartenburg, and then made for Düben, Bernadotte meantime passing the same river at Rosslau. Ney recoiled before them on Eilenburg, and Napoleon to support him made for Düben, hoping to beat the two hostile Armies in detail, but Blücher crossing the Mulde formed a junction with the Swedes at Zörbig; then was seen an interesting situation, for each threatened the other's communications. The Prussian showed a firm countenance, and even dared further to menace the French connection with

the Rhine, but Bernadotte, in alarm, withdrew towards the Elbe, thus seriously endangering his colleague. On the other hand Napoléon, with what seemed like overweening audacity, planned to strike at the Prussian capital—such a move would have violated the maxim that an Army whose communications are more immediately threatened will always abandon the initiative and conform to the movements of its adversary—he was restrained, partly by the opposition of his marshals, partly by the defection of Bavaria, October 8, which uncovered the French frontier, partly by the movements of Schwartzberg. That Prince from Töplitz, *viâ* Commotau and Chemnitz, made straight for Leipzig, detaching left of the Elster the corps of Giulay to cut the French retreat at Lindenau. Napoléon, on the defensive for the first time in his life, ordered all his forces, except two corps (1, 11), invested in Dresden, to concentrate on Leipzig, a dangerous central position, where his idea was to prevent the junction of the three great hostile Armies, and to beat them in detail—they numbered 300,000 against his 190,000. The Army of Silesia and the Army of the North then resumed their advance on Leipzig, their horsemen near Lützen connecting with Giulay, and Bernadotte's eccentric movement towards the Elbe bringing him on Prince Blücher's left instead of on his right. This eccentric move was to cost the Allies dear in the great battle. The obvious plan of the three Armies was to hem in the French on Leipzig.

October 16. The battle opened 9 a.m., the French Infantry being ranged in two ranks to conceal their inferior numbers. Preceded by a furious Artillery fire, Schwartzberg from the south, 160,000 strong, came on against the Emperor on the plateau of Wachau, where the latter held in his hand 115,000 men, consisting of Augereau, Poniatowski, Victor, Lauriston, Macdonald, Murat, and in reserve the Guard. Five times was Wachau taken and retaken, but Napoléon, under the fire of Drouot's 80 guns, delivered a counter-stroke in the direction of Gulden Gossa with a mass of two Army Corps, which rolled back the Austrian Infantry, and was

checked only by an unexpected charge of Cavalry. After 40,000 men had fallen this indecisive combat ceased.

Meantime, in the north, Ney and Marmont with but 20,000, anxiously expecting the rest of Ney's force, which was from Düben to come up on their right, contained near Möckern Blücher's 60,000. In Leipzig itself stood the Cavalry of Margaron, whilst Bertrand's Army Corps held against Giulay the Lindenau bridge, the only line of retreat and approached by a long defile cut by five or six canals with only one bridge over each. During this day the French retained all their positions, except that Ney and Marmont were compelled to fall back behind the River Partha, for fear of being cut off from Leipzig by the impending arrival of Bernadotte.

October 17 passed without renewal of strife, but the French Monarch drew in his troops with the object of covering his line of retreat by the Lindenau bridge, so that he occupied a front from Connewitz on the Pleiss on his Right through Probsteyda and Stötteritz to Schönfeld on the Partha on his Left. This day reinforcements reached either side—Ney's 20,000 arrived from Düben *viâ* Eilenburg, taking post on his Right; Bernadotte filed up on Blücher's Left from the side of Taucha, whilst 40,000 Austrians strengthened the Army of Bohemia. The Allies then totalled 300,000 against 130,000.

October 18. The Austrian prince from the south advanced in three columns, the two other Armies from the north. In spite of numbers the Austrians could not carry the lines of Probsteyda-Stötteritz, nor did Ney fail to hold his own against Blücher and Bernadotte, though his Saxons and Würtembergers under Reynier passed over to the enemy, and fired on their quondam friends. The French, however, retained their positions, and the day closed with a fire from 2,000 guns, and with a French loss of 40,000 and an Allied loss of 60,000.

October 19 Napoléon decided on retreat, and under cover of night all his Corps retired on the single bridge of Lindenau, guarded by Bertrand. When day broke the Allies surrounded Leipzig.

obstinately defended by Poniatowski and Macdonald. The rear-guard was closely pressed by Cossacks, and when the officer charged with the destruction of the bridge saw the Polish prince's lancers mixed with the Cossacks he lost his head, and the premature demolition of the bridge caused the loss of 30,000 Frenchmen. Macdonald escaped by swimming ; Poniatowski was drowned. The whole battle resulted in a loss of 130,000 men, of whom about 50,000 were French.

Napoléon rapidly reached the Rhine *viâ* Hanau, where, October 30, he annihilated the Bavarians who attempted to intercept him. On November 4 he crossed the Rhine 60,000 strong.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY.

In the north-east of Italy Prince Eugène inflicted a defeat on the Austrian, Hiller, at Caldiero, November 14. The treachery of King Murat soon after reduced the prince to impotence.

Tactical Comments on Leipzig: (1) Pursuit by Allies weak ; (2) Napoléon fought with a defile behind him ; (3) French Infantry formed in two ranks ; (4) Artillery much used by the French ; (5) Retreat not sufficiently prepared for by the Emperor ; (6) Allies' Artillery not well used ; (6) Allies' flank attacks weak, especially at Lindenau.


Results of the Campaign: (1) All the strong places on the Rivers Vistula, Oder, and Elbe capitulated, except Dantzic, held by Rapp, and Hamburg held by Davout with 25,000 men. Molitor had to evacuate Holland. At Dresden, Gouvion St. Cyr concluded an honourable capitulation, permitting him to return to France ; but the Allies treacherously retained as prisoners his 30,000 men ; (2) This campaign created a breach between Napoléon and the French nation, especially as the Allies, in the Proclamation of Frankfort, offered France her natural boundaries ; (3) "Napoléon's energy was evinced in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany at the head of an enormous Army before his enemies had time even to understand the extent of his

BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

16-17-18 OCTOBER 1813.

POSITIONS, MORNING 16.

Scale of Miles



Stanford's Geog^y Estab^t, London.

London: Hugh Rees, Ltd.

misfortunes in the Russian campaign. The victories of Lützen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe; but those battles were fought with the heads of columns the rear of which were still filing out of France, and with young troops. Wherefore when he had given himself a fixed and menacing position in Germany he more readily listened to the fraudulent negotiations of his trembling opponents, partly in hope of fair dealing, partly to organise and discipline his soldiers, confident in his own unmatched skill in directing them if war was finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon the family tie between him and Austria; he saw indeed that with her hope to regain former possessions was uppermost and he was prepared to concede them; yet he seems to have been quite unsuspecting of the long course of Austrian treachery. He knew not that while negotiating with France an offensive and defensive treaty in 1812, the Austrian cabinet was secretly aiding the plan of a vast insurrection extending from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian provinces. The management of this scheme was entrusted by the English cabinet in concert with that of Austria to General Nugent and Mr. King at Vienna, while their agents went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast. Many Austrian officers were employed, and Italians of great families entered into commercial houses to enable them with more facility to carry on this plan. Moreover Austria, while actually signing the treaty with Napoléon, was with unceasing importunity urging Prussia to join the Russians in opposition to him; the feeble operations of Prince Schwartzberg, the manner in which he uncovered the Emperor's right flank and permitted Tchitchakof to move to the Beresina in the Russian campaign, were but continuations of this deceitful policy. And it was afterwards openly advanced as a merit by the Austrian cabinet, that her offer of mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made solely with the view of gaining time to organise the army which was to join the Russians and Prussians: finally the armistice itself was violated, hostilities being commenced before its termination to enable the Russian troops safely to join the Austrians in Bohemia.

“Nevertheless Napoléon’s genius triumphed at Dresden over the unskilful operations of the allies directed by Schwartzenberg, whose incapacity as a commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and Ney, have prevented final success, but for the continuation of a treachery which seemed at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness they were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so vast, so original, so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his contemporary generals that even Wellington’s sagacity failed to pierce it, and he censured Napoléon’s long stay on the Elbe as an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. Yet he urged as a reason for not invading France the Emperor’s tenacity in holding Dresden ; thus showing how widely the moral influence of that position was felt. Napoléon had more profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he left at Dresden, at Torgau, and Wittemberg, blamed by shallow military critics, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies ; but with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin, and re-opening his communications with his garrisons both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated between those rivers ; and with an Army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons—an Army more compact and firmly established also ; because he would have been in direct communication with the Danes and with Davout’s force at Hamburg, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blücher and the Swedes felt his first stroke ; the next would have taught the allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of execution, his marshals had not opposed his views, and the Bavarians, on whom he depended to check the Austrians in the valley of the Danube, had not made common cause with their

opponents and marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipzig followed, the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the allies, and Napoléon, now the prey of misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his Army; having on the way, however, trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede who attempted to stop his passage at Hanau.

“Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes to their subjects that constitutional liberty would reward their prodigious exertions against France, hopes which with the most detestable baseness they had previously resolved to defraud, assembled greater forces than they were able to wield, and prepared to pass the Rhine. Yet distrusting their immense superiority of numbers they still pursued their faithless system. When Napoléon marched to Leipzig he sent orders to St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite with the garrisons on the lower Elbe; the messengers were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little enterprising to execute such a plan of his own accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed to regain France. The capitulation was broken, and general and soldiers remained prisoners.

“After the Leipzig battle Napoléon’s adherents fell away by nations. Murat, the husband of his sister, joined Austria, and thus forced Prince Eugène to abandon his position on the Adige. A successful insurrection in favour of the Prince of Orange broke out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was then violated, and more than half a million of armed men were poured across the frontiers of France in all the violence of brute force; for their military combinations were contemptible, and their course marked by murder and devastation”; (4) Napoléon has laid it down as a great maxim that concentration “under the beard of the enemy” is an error, but he did it himself at Bautzen, and at Eylau, 1807, as also Wellington and Graham at Vittoria, 1813, Wellington and Beresford at Toulouse, 1814, Wellington and Blücher at Waterloo, 1815, and Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince at Königgrätz, 1866; (5) The French losses were immense, mainly

owing to the Emperor's system of making his men live on the country.

FRENCH TROOPS.

1st Corps	under	Davout—then under Vandamme.
2nd	„	„ Victor.
3rd	„	„ Ney.
4th	„	„ Bertrand.
5th	„	„ Lauriston.
6th	„	„ Marmont.
10th	„	„ Macdonald.
12th	„	„ Oudinot.
14th	„	„ St. Cyr.

In addition 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th Corps.

Guard under Bessières.

1814

SIXTH COALITION (*continued*)

CAMPAIGN OF FRANCE, 1814.

RETURNING in November 1813, the Emperor called for a levy of 300,000 men, but he raised only 135,000 against the 500,000 Allies, and after deducting the garrisons on the north and east frontiers and of Paris, he was left with a Field Army of 85,000.

He thus disposed his troops: Mortier, 20,000, between the upper Seine and the upper Marne; Victor, 12,000, near Strasburg; Marmont, 10,000, near Mannheim; Ney, 18,000, near Coblenz; Macdonald, 13,000, near Cologne; Maison, 12,000, at Antwerp.

At the opening of 1814 three hostile Armies crossed the Rhine: (1) the Army of Bohemia under Schwartzemberg, 160,000 strong, *viâ* Basle and Langres; (2) the Army of Silesia under Blücher, 60,000 strong, *viâ* Mayence and Nancy; (3) the Army of the North under Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, 90,000 strong, through Belgium. A reserve of 160,000 followed. In Italy Bellegarde, with 70,000 Austrians, went to help the renegade Murat's 30,000 Neapolitans against Prince Eugène, whilst Wellington with 100,000 British, Portuguese, and Spanish, was operating in the South of France against Soult.

The theatre comprised Champagne, Southern France, and North Italy. In Champagne the theatre was traversed by numerous rivers running generally parallel, which presented considerable obstacles; their bridges Napoléon held, and the small towns served him as dépôts and hospitals, thus relieving him of long convoys and of pontoon equipage, whereas the Allies moved with heavy impedimenta, especially cumbrous in this marshy theatre and wintry weather. His line of communications ran from Paris, between the

Seine and the Marne, and his centre of operations changed from Châlons to Arcis, to Sézanne, to Nogent, to Provins, as the campaign progressed. Blücher, based on the Rhine fortresses, had his line of communication by the route of Strasburg; Schwartzenberg, based on Basle, had his by the route of Basle; Bernadotte was based on Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen). Napoléon's plan was to contain one hostile Army whilst massing against the other.

THE INVASION.

Schwartzenberg, violating Swiss neutrality, crossed December 21, 1813, the Rhine near Basle. His extreme Left failed against Augereau at Lyon; his Left and Centre moved on Dijon and Langres, driving Mortier on Troyes; his Right leaving troops round Belfort drove Victor on Nancy, where Ney joined his colleague.


Blücher on January 1 crossed the Rhine at Mayence, his Left on Nancy to connect with Schwartzenberg, whilst Marmont fell back before him on St. Dizier, finding there Ney and Victor.

The Army of the North in two Corps under Winzingerode and Bülow halted for political reasons at Namur, Macdonald retiring on Châlons.

Thus at the close of January the French were posted: on the Right Mortier, 15,000, at Troyes; in the Centre Ney, Victor, and Marmont, 33,000, at Vitry; on the Left Macdonald, 12,000, on Châlons. The Allies had Bernadotte's Army at Namur; Blücher from St. Dizier to Dommartin, with reserve at St. Mihiel; Schwartzenberg on Bar-sur-Aube, with Left at Dijon. Blücher and the Austrian then resolved to move united on Troyes.

OPERATIONS AGAINST BLÜCHER AND SCHWARTZENBERG, JANUARY 26—FEBRUARY 7.

Making Châlons his centre of operations, Napoléon on January 25 joined the three marshals at Vitry, and to prevent the junction of Blücher with Schwartzenberg moved on St. Dizier, where he drove Blücher's rearguard under Sacken on Vassy, the Prussian leader



having himself already passed on. This manœuvre having failed, the Emperor, by the cross road of Montierender, covering his Left with Marmont who, *viâ* Vassy, cut Blücher's line of communications, pursued the Prussian leader, and on January 29 beat him at Brienne, thus really forcing him back on his Austrian ally. Next day at La Rothière the French Sovereign stood in presence of Blücher and Schwartzemberg. Marmont arriving raised the French numbers to 32,000 against 100,000.

BATTLE OF LA ROTHÈRE, FEBRUARY 1, 1814.

The Emperor supposed he had to deal with Blücher only, and thus posted his troops: On the Right, Gérard at Dienville on the Aube; in the Centre, Victor at La Rothière; on the Left, Marmont at Morvilliers; in reserve, Ney.

The Allies' Right, Wrede, was to outflank Marmont: their Left, Colloredo and Giulay, moved down both sides of the Aube; in the Centre, Sacken, Alsubief, and Würtemberg. In reserve were strong forces.

At 1 p.m. the Allies came on, though Colloredo was not then up. The French Right held its own, Gérard, though on the lower bank, holding a church which enabled him to repulse all Colloredo's efforts, but Victor and Marmont were driven back, and Napoléon arranged to retreat by the Lesmont bridge. Ney, by a counter-attack, recaptured La Rothière; Drouot, with the batteries of the Guard, came into action; and lastly Marmont ably covered the Left, and then himself retired by the bridge of Rosnay-sur-Voire. At night the French retired on Troyes, except Marmont, who made for Arcis-sur-Aube.

Tactical Comments: (1) French front too long; (2) Effect of French counter-attack and of their Artillery in covering defeat; (3) Napoléon's able arrangements for retreat; (4) Allies' enveloping movements ill digested; (5) Allies' weak pursuit.

Meantime Macdonald had to retire *viâ* Eprenay on La Ferté sous Jouarre, pursued by Yorck (of Blücher's Army).

OPERATIONS AGAINST BLÜCHER, FEBRUARY 7-14.

After their victory at La Rothère, Blücher, desirous of entering Paris first, decided to march by the Marne valley and Schwartzenberg by the Seine valley. This decision to separate was taken because they no longer feared Napoléon and in order to ease supply. The Prussian therefore turned north in pursuit of Macdonald; the leading troops under Sacken reached the marshal at La Ferté, but the latter blew up the bridge and fell back on Meaux. Napoléon then decided to fall on the left flank of Blücher's long-drawn-out columns—Sacken at La Ferté, Yorck at Château Thierry, Blücher with his mass at Champaubert and Vertus. The Emperor left Troyes for Nogent, where Marmont rejoined him.

Leaving Victor and Oudinot on the Seine from Nogent to Bray to act as a containing force, Napoléon moved to Sézanne, February 9, with Marmont, Ney, Mortier, and the Guard, and partly destroyed the corps of Alsuvief February 10 at Champaubert. Leaving Marmont with a division at Etoges to hold Blücher, the Emperor marched on Montmirail, where February 11 he beat Sacken, and drove him on Yorck at Chateau Thierry, where he beat them both February 12. They broke the bridge, and fled to the north bank. Meantime Blücher pressed Marmont back on Vauchamps, where Napoléon joined the marshal, and routing the Prussian, February 14, threw him back on Châlons—at this place Yorck and Sacken arrived two days later. Thus Blücher was *hors de combat*, and had lost 30,000 men. Winzingerode, *viâ* Avesnes and Laon, reached Soissons February 14.

OPERATIONS AGAINST SCHWARTZENBERG, FEBRUARY 15-23.

Meantime Schwartzenberg had forced Victor and Oudinot to retire behind the River Yerres, the Austrians advancing on both banks of the Seine, Colloredo reaching Fontainebleau. To meet them the Emperor moved *viâ* Meaux. Leaving Mortier (who had pursued Yorck and Sacken, and had garrisoned Soissons after Winzingerode's departure to Reims) and Marmont to hold

Blücher, Napoléon rejoined Victor and Oudinot, February 16, on the Yerres. Having picked up Macdonald, he had 35,000 men, and Ney was behind with 20,000. The Emperor's presence was felt, and the French at once drove Schwartzberg back on the Seine at Nogent, Bray, and Montereau, which last was captured after desperate fighting February 18. Oudinot failed at Nogent and Macdonald at Bray, and Victor's tardy arrival lost great advantages at Montereau—he was disgraced and his Guard command passed to Macdonald. All the Austrians, including Colloredo, then regained Troyes. Napoléon pursued *via* Méry-sur-Seine, intending to attack Schwartzberg by the right bank, but at Méry he found Blücher with 50,000 men from Châlons. Napoléon therefore moved by the left bank on Troyes, intending battle, but the Austrian had recoiled on Bar-sur-Aube. These manoeuvres of Napoléon were brilliant.

OPERATIONS AGAINST BLÜCHER AND BERNADOTTE,
FEBRUARY 26—MARCH 16.

Whilst Schwartzberg recoiled on Chaumont, Blücher was to join Bülow (who had arrived *via* Laon on Soissons) and Winzingerode (at Reims), and then with 100,000 march on Paris. On February 24 the Prussian, crossing the Aube at Anglure, passed through Sézanne, pushing Marmont on Mortier at La Ferté, whence the two marshals (14,000 strong) fell back behind the Ourcq, breaking the bridges.

At once Napoléon left Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard to hold Schwartzberg, and himself reached La Ferté March 2. Blücher retired on the Aisne to connect with Bernadotte's troops. The two marshals pursued on Oulchy, the Emperor on Fismes. In front of Blücher lay the Aisne and the bridge of Soissons in French hands; he was in deadly peril when all at once General Moreau yielded Soissons to the Army of the North, which moved on the town by both banks.

Thus was Blücher saved, and his junction with the Army of the North raised him to 100,000 against Napoléon's 50,000. The

latter then injudiciously passed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, and attacked Blücher March 7 at Craonne, and drove him, together with the Allies' garrison of Soissons, on Laon, where March 9 and 10 the French again assailed the Allies, who offered a desperate resistance. Marmont was by this time worn out, and on the night of March 9, separated by a marsh from the Emperor, was roughly handled by Blücher. Next day Napoléon, by his firm attitude imposing on the enemy, retired on Soissons, and Marmont on Berry-au-Bac. The Emperor made a night attack (March 12-13) on 15,000 of Blücher's reinforcements under St. Priest, just arrived at Reims, and cut them to pieces. At this place the Emperor rested his troops for three days, whilst Blücher lay at Laon, sick and wanting supplies, March 10-19.

LAST OPERATIONS OF SCHWARTZENBERG.

Meantime Schwartzenberg had slowly pushed Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard behind the Seine from Nogent to Montereau, but fearing Napoléon's return was massing towards Troyes. That Sovereign, leaving Marmont and Mortier (20,000) on the Aisne to contain Blücher, moved from Reims, *viâ* Epernay, on Plancy (March 19), and then moved by both banks on Arcis, whither he called up Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, which would give him 60,000 men. But, before they came, he, having only 16,000, was assailed, March 20, by 32,000 Austrians. After fighting a whole day he broke the Arcis bridge and retired on Sommepeuis.

On the Aisne Blücher, in spite of Marmont and Mortier, crossed to the south bank and entered Reims.

Then Napoléon formed a new plan—to throw himself on the Allies' communications, to call Marmont and Mortier to him at St. Dizier, to rouse the peasants (he was unwillingly driven to this expedient), to draw 50,000 from the garrisons, and thus with 120,000 men to act on the Allies' rear. When Napoléon moved on St. Dizier, Schwartzenberg decided to resign his line of communications *viâ* Basle, to unite with Blücher, and to live upon the communications

which the Allies had *via* Reims and Monson Belgium, and thus united to move against St. Dizier, but March 24, after capturing a French despatch which disclosed the Emperor's plan and the weakness of Paris, the Allies resolved to neglect Napoléon's movements and to occupy his capital.

In consequence only 10,000 Cavalry under Winzingerode followed the Emperor, whilst Blücher and Schwartzberg, between the Seine and the Marne, moved on the city, pushing back Marmont and Mortier, who had been trying to reach St. Dizier. In the course of the movements, two divisions of the Garde Nationale under Pauthod (rearguard of Macdonald) were surrounded at Fère Champenoise by the enemy's Cavalry and annihilated March 25. Paris was not fortified, and on March 30 the Battle of Paris ended in the defeat of the two marshals and the capture of the city.

Meantime Napoléon at St. Dizier defeated Winzingerode March 26, and some prisoners informed him of the march of the Allies' masses on Paris. He at once hurried round by Fontainebleau, but it was too late, the city had fallen. He then contemplated renewing the struggle on the River Loire, but Marmont abandoned his cause, and the Emperor abdicated April 6. He was to retain the Imperial title, to possess the island of Elba, and to be granted 2,000,000 francs yearly by France.

OPERATIONS NEAR LYON.

Schwartzberg's extreme left under Bubna had moved on Lyon, and on March 20 defeated Augereau at Limonest.

OPERATIONS IN ITALY.

On the Adige Prince Eugène with 35,000 men faced Bellegarde with 70,000 men, and his position was rendered more precarious because Murat, King of Naples, joined the Allies. Eugène and Bellegarde, however, engaged in a battle of two days' duration on the Mincio, February 9 and 10, in which the Austrians were worsted.

OPERATIONS IN HOLLAND AND BELGIUM.

Bernadotte, anxious not to offend France (to whose crown he aspired), operated in person, sending only Bülow's and Winzingerode's Corps on to the Marne. He had altogether 170,000 men, including 9,000 British under Sir Thomas Graham; acting against Maison he on January 13 beat the French at Merxem. Graham then formed the sieges of Antwerp (defended by the celebrated Carnot) and of Bergen-op-Zoom—he failed in both.

CLOSE OF THE SIXTH COALITION.

The First Treaty of Paris, 1814, restricted France to her frontiers of 1792, and of all her conquests she kept only Mülhausen, Montbéliard, Avignon, half Savoy, Venaissin, Landau.

Remarks and Strategical Comments: It is not possible in a summary to do justice to this marvellous exhibition of Napoléon's genius in a campaign admittedly the most brilliant of all time. In it his efforts were stupendous, he controlled not alone his own operations, but those in the south, on the Saône, in Belgium, and in Italy, whilst also conducting intricate political negotiations.

Napoléon no doubt committed errors, *e.g.* (1) Battles of La Rothière and Laon (where he was separated by a marsh from Marmont); (2) attacking Schwartzemberg in front instead of on the right flank, February 17—his reason was to encourage the Parisians; (3) he should have called up Eugène, and should not have left 73,000 veterans in 53 foreign fortresses; (4) his blow at Plancy, March 19, was not sufficiently to the east to effect interception; and his blow later on *viâ* St. Dizier was so far to the east that it was disregarded. But one must praise his march from St. Dizier to Brienne, his operations against Blücher, February 10 to 14, his great manœuvring powers, and his whole plan. "To have struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties was scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds. But like the Emperor to calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and accuracy; to seize every favourable chance with

unerring rapidity; to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy; never urged to rashness by despair, yet enterprising to the utmost verge of daring consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoléon has been called, in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of mankind."

The Allies' whole plan was vicious. Colloredo was in peril February 17, and Schwartzenberg's withdrawal of Wittgenstein from the north bank of the Aube February 7, without telling Blücher, led to that prince's defeats February 10 to 14; but the Prussian's march to Méry-sur-Seine February 20 was vigorous. The theatre, indeed, was splendid for defence, and in it the initiative was by no means an advantage, and railways would seem to increase the powers of the defence. The Allies moved on treble and exterior lines, Napoléon on single and interior; compare 1815 and 1796-97.

1807-14

THE PENINSULAR WAR

CAUSES.

NAPOLÉON's Continental Blockade against England had been accepted by all Europe except Portugal, he therefore concluded with Spain, 1807, the Treaty of Fontainebleau, providing for the conquest and partition of the recalcitrant country. Portugal was annexed, and the French ruler, taking advantage of the divisions among the wretched royal family of Spain, induced the King and his son, Ferdinand, to resign their right in favour of his brother Joseph, who at once handed over the crown of Naples to Murat, 1808. This enterprise Napoléon himself afterwards condemned as being one of the chief causes of his downfall.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PENINSULA.

The Peninsula (about 550 miles square) is elevated, with great varieties of climate and of products; *e.g.* in Andalusia the harvest ripens in June, in Estremadura fourteen days later, in the North later still. It offers such difficulties to military operations that a French king truly said, "In Spain a small army will be beaten, a large one starve." Parallel ranges of mountains run across the country, *e.g.* Sierras Nevada, Morena, Toledo, Guadarama, d'Estrella, Cantabrian chain, and Pyrenees; the Iberian Mountains form the water-shed. The rivers also run parallel, *e.g.* Guadalquivir, Guadiana, Tagus, Douro, Ebro; generally speaking, these rivers are navigable in Portugal, not in Spain, nor do they mark the lines of the great roads.

The main roads from France are the Bayonne or Royal road to Madrid and the Perpignan road to Barcelona. From Spain to Lisbon armies can use four routes—*viá* Oporto, *viá* Rodrigo, along the Tagus, *viá* Badajoz. There are several good harbours, and its chief fortresses are San Sebastian, Pampeluna, Burgos, Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajoz, Elvas.

The country is very favourable to the operations of Guerillas or Partidas, and in this warfare the Spaniards are past-masters; but though the Partidas harassed the enemy's communications, they never could, without the aid of a regular Army, have defeated the French veterans.

CONQUEST OF PORTUGAL, 1807.

Junot starting from Bayonne with 25,000 men, and giving out that Gibraltar was his objective, marched *viá* Salamanca and entered Lisbon November 27, whence the Portuguese Royal Family sailed to Brazil.

INSURRECTION OF SPAIN, 1808.

Under pretext of reinforcing Junot, the Emperor despatched more troops into Spain, and between November, 1807, and March, 1808, moved Dupont with 27,000 to Valladolid, Moncey with 30,000 and Bessières with 25,000 into Biscay, Duhesme with 15,000 into Catalonia; in addition Barcelona and Pampeluna were seized, and Murat in chief command established headquarters at Burgos. Riots at Madrid then broke out March 19, 1808, against King Charles IV.; taking advantage of this, Murat, with Moncey's and Dupont's troops, occupied the Spanish capital. The news that the King and his son had abdicated in favour of Napoléon's brother, Joseph, roused a general insurrection at the end of May in favour of Ferdinand VII., then interned in France. Next month Portugal rose and appealed to England.

Murat met the insurrection by sending Dupont on Seville, Moncey on Valencia, Bessières on Burgos to guard the line with

France; the last, on July 14, beat the Galicians under the Spaniard, Joachim Blake, at Medina del Rio Seco, and thus allowed Joseph to enter Madrid. But Saragossa held out, Moncey failed in Valencia, and, worse still, Dupont, with 17,000 men, capitulated at Baylen to the Spaniard Castaños. Joseph at once quitted Madrid and retired the French troops on to the River Ebro.

In Portugal the insurgents, assisted by 18,000 English under Sir Arthur Wellesley, beat Junot, at Vimiera, August 21, and compelled him to sign the Convention of Cintra, by which he evacuated Portugal and was shipped to France.

THE EMPEROR IN SPAIN.

The Emperor having consolidated his alliance with the Tsar at the famous Erfurt meeting, decided to crush Spain with the Grand Army under himself in person—that Army was thus composed:—

1st Corps	under	Victor.
2nd	„	„ Sout.
3rd	„	„ Moncey.
4th	„	„ Léfèbvre.
5th	„	„ Mortier.
6th	„	„ Ney.
7th	„	„ Gouvion St. Cyr.
8th Corps	=	Junot's old Army.
Cavalry Reserve under Bessièrès.		
The Guard.		

Total, 160,000.

Of the original invading troops Joseph had on the Ebro about 70,000, faced by 120,000 Spaniards—namely, Blake's Galicians (60,000) on the Left; Castaños and Palafox's Andalusians and Aragonese (45,000) on the Right; besides 12,000 at Burgos in the Centre. During October Napoléon moved his Right, Léfèbvre and Victor, against Blake; his Centre, Soult, Bessièrès, and the Guard, against Burgos; his Left, 3rd and 6th Corps under Lannes, against Castaños and Palafox. The result was that in November Blake

was beaten at Espinosa, Soult took Burgos, and Castaños and Palafox, routed at Tudela, were driven into Valencia and Saragossa.

Meantime Mortier was moved to Aragon, St. Cyr to Catalonia, and the 8th Corps added to Soult; then covered by Soult on the west, and by Lannes on the east, the Emperor carried the Somo Sierra pass, entering Madrid December 4.

Spain, however, was not subdued, and a fierce guerilla warfare burst forth. To meet it Léfèbvre moved down the Tagus to Almaraz Bridge, Lannes and Mortier invested Saragossa, whilst St. Cyr defeated the insurgents in Catalonia, and Napoléon in person, with Soult, operated against the English, who, under Sir John Moore, had advanced to Valladolid December 14. The English general, menaced by Napoléon (Ney, Bessières, and the Guard) on his right, and by Soult on his left, fled into Galicia, where Soult beat him at Corunna, January 16, 1809, forced the English to embark, and subdued Galicia. Napoléon meantime, with the Guard and Bessières, had returned to Paris to deal with Austria.

THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA, JANUARY 16, 1809.

In the following account of the battle the English view is expressed, namely, that it was a tactical, if not a strategic, victory for Moore.

On January 11 Corunna was reached, but the wind having been contrary the fleet had not yet arrived. The bridge at Burgo over the River Mero was broken; the horses, which had foundered because hammers and nails had not been sent out, were destroyed, and it is to be said that the terrain was unsuitable for them, and they could not have been embarked; the works towards the sea were dismantled, and those towards the land improved. "Three miles from the town were piled 4,000 barrels of powder in a magazine, and a smaller quantity was collected in another storehouse. Both were fired on the 13th. The inferior one exploded with a terrible noise, shaking all the houses in the town; and when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like the bursting forth of a volcano. The earth trembled for miles, the

rocks were torn from their bases, the agitated waters of the harbour rolled the vessels as in a storm; a vast column of smoke and dust, with flames and sparks shooting out from its dark flanks, arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, where it burst, and then a shower of stones and fragments of all kinds, descending with a roaring sound, killed many persons who had remained too near; stillness, slightly interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded, and the business of the war went on."

On January 12 Soult concentrated opposite Burgo. To the south of Corunna lay two ranges of hills; the more distant and loftier, stretching from Burgo westwards towards St. Christobal, was the stronger position, but as it was too long for his numbers Moore had to occupy the nearer and lower range.

On January 13 the French marshal, having repaired the Burgo Bridge, crossed the Mero River. Next day, the 14th, the fleet entered the harbour, and at once the dismounted cavalymen, the sick, and nearly all the guns and remaining horses, were sent on board.

On January 15, Delaborde's division having arrived, Soult numbered 20,000 men, including 4,500 Cavalry and 40 guns, and with them proceeded to occupy the loftier range of heights; whereupon Hope's picquets opposite the French Right became engaged, and, being galled by the fire of two guns, Colonel M'Kenzie of the 5th Regiment pushed out with some companies to seize the battery; but a line of the enemy's Infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, immediately arose, killed the colonel, and drove his men back with loss. Next day, the 16th, in the morning, the marshal formed his order of battle thus:—On his right behind Palavea Abaxo stood Delaborde; in his centre, behind Portosa, was ranged Merle; on his left, behind Elvina, lay Mermet, having on his extreme left a battery of 11 heavy guns, 1,200 yards from the British right; to the north-west stretched Lahoussaye's dragoons, Lorges' dragoons, and Franceschi's light cavalry. Soult's plan was to contain the English Left and Centre, attack the Right, and cut in between Corunna and Moore's Army.

On the British side some generals urged the commander to treat with Soult so as to secure an unmolested embarkation; but the suggestion was haughtily declined, though if the French had not attacked that day Moore would certainly have shipped all his force that night. The numbers were 14,500 veteran Infantry, 40 hussars, and 9 six-pounders, and it was a great advantage that fresh ammunition and new muskets had been served out from the stores at Corunna. The position measured 2,500 yards long, and had only two weak points—its western end was commanded by the French guns, and the whole position could be turned from the west, which fact accounts for Fraser's station; the general idea of the English leader was that, if he repulsed Soult, he should deliver a counter-attack on the enemy's left, much as Lee afterwards acted at the Second Manassas in 1862. He formed his order of battle thus:—On his left behind Palavea Abaxo stood Hope, with Hill's brigade and Leith's brigade (51st, 59th, 76th), and in second line Colonel Catlin Craufurd; on his right, behind Elvina, was ranged Baird, with Bentinck's brigade (4th, 42nd, 50th) and Manningham's brigade (1st Royals, 26th, 81st), and in second line the Guards. The Reserve, under Ed. Paget, was near the village of Airis, having one battalion under Disney in front of Franceschi; skirmishers connected it with Baird's right. On the extreme right, across the road to Santiago and Vigo, was posted Fraser's division. Nine six-pounders were distributed at suitable points, and a picquet from Baird held Elvina.

The contest opened at 2 p.m. when the French Cavalry rode forward; and, covered by clouds of skirmishers and by a heavy artillery fire, their Infantry moved in four columns. No. 1 and No. 2 columns, formed by Mermet, in spite of the British grape-shot, carried Elvina, and then menaced Baird's right flank and right front; No. 3 column, formed by Merle, assailed Baird's left and Hope's right; No. 4 column, formed by Delaborde, struck Hope's left. Moore sent the 50th and the 42nd Highlanders against column No. 2, which was breaking through Elvina, and wheeled back the 4th on Baird's right to meet column No. 1; he also

ordered up Fraser to hold the French Cavalry and Paget's reserve to act on the left of column No. 1.


Near Elvina, column No. 2 fiercely struggled with the 50th, one of whose majors, C. Napier, afterwards the victor of Meeanee, was severely wounded and captured; he was treated with great courtesy by Marshal Soult and by Marshal Ney. The enemy was forced into the village, and the Guards being called up, the 42nd took them for a relief, but Moore shouted out: "My brave Highlanders, you have still your bayonets. Remember Egypt!" and again the Scots rushed forward. Meantime Paget had descended into the valley, sending the 95th Rifles and the 52nd in extended order to cover Baird's right, and with the rest of the Reserve moved up to deal with column No. 1, whose flank was galled by the 4th; this column was driven back, and the great French battery was threatened. The hostile dragoons were hampered by the stone fences, and Franceschi was held in check by Fraser. At the same time Baird was badly hit, and furious fighting went on along the whole line.

As he watched the contest in Elvina Moore was struck by a cannon-ball; without showing a sign of agony he was placed in a blanket, and when his sword became entangled with the wound he would not permit it to be withdrawn, saying: "It is better as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me." His fall gave the command to Hope, and under him the Reserve forced Lahoussaye's dismounted dragoons to retire and drew near to the great battery, Elvina was retaken from column No. 2, and column No. 4, under Foy, was driven out of Palavea Abaxo by Nicholls with the 14th. If Fraser and Paget had advanced, the French, who had little ammunition and whose only retreat lay over the Burgo bridge, must have been routed; but as darkness was approaching, and as the enemy still had superior numbers, Hope stayed the advance, and, spiking his guns and collecting his wounded, proceeded to embark his men.

Tactical Comments on the Battle: (1) The British loss is usually stated as 800; the French loss was, according to Napier, 3,000,

BATTLE OF CORUNNA 16th January, 1809

English Miles
0 $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{3}{4}$ 1
Stanford's Geog. Estab^l, London.



according to Oman, 1,500. The enemy's high percentage compared with ours was due to their attack in column, to the fact that the British used new muskets and fresh ammunition, and to the exceptionally deadly nature of English fire. Besides, the ground barred all Artillery movements, and the French columns were exposed to grape, which their distant batteries could not return ;

(2) Moore displayed sound tactical skill, and though our Army embarked, it was victorious ;

(3) When Moore moved against Napoléon's communications it was a strategic counterstroke and a successful one ; in the battle he planned a tactical counterstroke which, but for his fall, would have been equally successful. At Fredericksburg, 1862, Lee should have delivered such a counterstroke ; defence should be active, not passive (as it was at Maiwand, 1880). Moore's death stopped Fraser and the Reserve from rolling up Soult, and yet Hope cannot be blamed for staying his hand ; for, even if he had crushed the marshal, he must have embarked, inasmuch as Ney was fast approaching ;

(4) Fraser fired no shot and lost no man, and lent no support to Paget ;

(5) The British line was, as usual, too much for the French column.

CAMPAIGN OF 1809.

These successes, and the triumph of Victor over Castaños' men at Ucles, south-east of Madrid, January 13, induced Joseph to re-enter his capital. We then get three three distinct theatres (1) in the East, (2) in Portugal, (3) in Andalusia. These separate operations are obligatory on any invader of Spain, because of the peculiar geographical features of that country.

(1) In the East, Lannes and Mortier besieged Saragossa, St. Cyr moved on Tarragona ; (2) Portugal was to be assailed by Soult from the North and by Victor along the Tagus ; (3) in Andalusia Sebastiani (vice Léfèbvre) was to operate.

(1) St. Cyr, harassed by guerillas, fell back on Gerona, which he continued investing till the close of the year; Saragossa, under Palafox, after an heroic resistance, yielded to Lannes, February 20, but Lannes' successor, Suchet, found himself attacked by Blake with 40,000 men, and it was only after two battles that he gained mastery in Aragon.

(2) and (3) In Portugal and Andalusia, Soult occupied Oporto, March 29, but Victor could give no help, his hands being full with the guerillas. In consequence Soult, assailed May 12 by the English, now under Wellesley, and by the Portuguese under Silveira, had to evacuate Oporto and to beat a disastrous retreat into Galicia, reaching Lugo May 23, with the loss of all his baggage. In July Wellesley invaded Spain up the Tagus, joining 36,000 Estremadurans, under Cuesta, and driving Victor back on Talavera, where Joseph came up. On July 27 and 28, in the Battle of Talavera, the French were repulsed by the English general. The Emperor, however, had directed Soult to form a junction with Mortier and Ney and to fall on Wellington's rear; the combination failed because Soult was delayed by bad roads, and because Joseph at Talavera attacked prematurely. None the less Wellington had to retire *via* Badajoz.

The French having gathered against Wellington, Del Parque, with the Galicians, entered Castile, and Venegas with the Andalusians approached Toledo. The latter was driven by Joseph and Sebastiani into the Sierra Morena, the former by Ney into Ciudad Rodrigo, but he soon issued to threaten the French line of communications through Burgos, whilst 60,000 Andalusians threatened Madrid. Del Parque, however, was again forced by Ney into Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult, concentrating Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, routed the Andalusians at Ocaña November 19. The campaign closed.

CAMPAIGNS OF 1810, 1811, AND 1812.

The treaty of Vienna, 1809, rendered part of the Grand Army disposable for Spain.

1810. (A) Operations against Wellington: Masséna with 70,000 men—

2nd Corps	under	Reynier,
6th	„	„ Ney,
8th	„	„ Junot,
Cavalry	„	Montbrun—

was to invade Portugal, whilst 70,000 men would hold the French line through Burgos, and the 9th Corps, under Drouet, would hold the Bidassoa River. Masséna moved, on the Right Junot disarming Asturias and taking Astorga, on the Left Reynier sweeping down the right bank of the Tagus, and in July Ney, in the Centre, making himself master of Rodrigo, and on August 28 of Almeida.

On the other side Wellington had 35,000 English, 55,000 Portuguese regulars, three independent bands of 7,000 each, and the *levée en masse*. He checked Masséna September 27 at Busaco, and then retired into his Lines of Torres Vedras, an inexpugnable position between the Tagus and the sea, occupied by more than 100,000 troops. Masséna sat in front for six weeks, and then retired on Santarem for the winter.

1811. In 1811 (March 5) the marshal, pursued by Wellington, retreated to Salamanca (April 5), having lost over 30,000 men.

Wellington then proceeded to invest Almeida, to succour which Masséna returned and fought the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro May 5. The marshal was defeated, and the results were that Almeida fell and Marmont superseded Masséna. After numerous confused movements the campaign closed.

1812. Wellington had been reinforced, and the French had sent their best troops to Russia. The English general captured Rodrigo in January, Badajoz in April, and Almaraz Bridge in May, thus cutting the connection between Marmont and Soult; he then beat the former at Salamanca (July 22), entered Madrid, and moving on Burgos, besieged it in September. The position was perilous; but Soult, evacuating Andalusia and effecting a junction with King

Joseph, recaptured Madrid, raised the siege of Burgos, and calling to him Marmont's beaten army, drove Wellington in retreat into Portugal (November). The campaign then closed.

(B) 1810. In Andalusia: After Ocaña there were still 50,000 Spaniards in arms to oppose Soult's 55,000 (Victor, Sebastiani, Mortier). The French beat the Spaniard Arcizaga in the Sierra Morena, took Grenada, Malaga, Seville, and drove the Spaniard Albuquerque into Cadiz. This place was then besieged by Victor and defended by 35,000 Anglo-Spanish.

1811. Soult in order to assist Masséna moved north-west from Seville, capturing Olivenza, Badajoz, and Campo Mayor (March), but the guerillas and the defeat of Victor at Barossa (Chiclana) by the garrison of Cadiz recalled him. The Allies at once retook Olivenza and besieged Badajoz. Soult returned to succour it, and though defeated at Albuera (May 16), he none the less obliged the Allies to raise the siege.

1812. He then returned to Seville, which he evacuated in 1812 as stated above.

(c) 1810-12. In the East: From 1810 to 1812 Suchet, in spite of the guerillas, subdued the whole country, capturing all the towns except Alicante and Carthagena, beating Blake at Saguntum October 25, 1811, and being checked in his career only by Wellington's occupation of Madrid, 1812, which necessitated his rendering support to King Joseph.

CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

The disaster in Russia was fatal to France; the Emperor recalled Soult, and Joseph was left with only 72,000 (not counting Suchet), whereas Wellington had in hand 100,000 men. The latter took the offensive and drove Joseph through Burgos over the River Ebro, on which river he beat him at Vittoria (June 21), whence the King fled *viâ* Pampeluna into France.

Soult at once superseded Joseph, but even his abilities could not prevent Wellington from taking San Sebastian (August 31)

and Pampeluna (October 31) and from crossing the Bidassoa into France.

The flight of Joseph necessitated the retreat of Suchet from Valencia into Catalonia, whence he had to detach 10,000 men to assist Napoléon.

CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE, 1813-14.

The south of France is unfavourable to the movements of Cavalry, being cut up by many streams—*e.g.* Nivelle, Adour, Nive, Garonne, besides numerous tributaries. The Adour is 300 yards broad below Bayonne, and its mouth is full of sandbanks; the Garonne is very liable to floods. All these streams were obstacles to military operations, and extremely favourable for the defence. The only good roads were: one parallel to the Pyrenees from Bayonne to Perpignan with a branch to Toulouse, and two from Bayonne to Bordeaux, one along the coast, the other through Dax. Floodings were constant, and along the coast north of Bayonne lay the barren and sandy Landes. The only good ports were St. Jean de Luz, Bayonne, and Bordeaux, and the only real fortress was Bayonne.

PASSAGE OF THE NIVELLE, NOVEMBER 10-12, 1813.

Soult's Right was unassailable, and his weakest point was at the bridge of Amotz, just where Clausel's left connected with d'Erlon's right. Therefore Wellington directed Hill from Maya with 26,000 to assail d'Erlon, Beresford from Echallar with 24,000 to attack the weak point, whilst on his left Charles Alten's Light Division with Spaniards and Portuguese would move on the Ascain bridge. Allies numbered altogether about 90,000 against 60,000 French, minus Foy and Paris, who were more to the east (really engaged, over 50,000 Allies against about 25,000 French).

November 10: The Allies rapidly carried the small Rhune and moved on Amotz and Ascain bridges, whilst Hill roughly drove back d'Erlon also on to the former bridge, Colonel Dickson bringing

his guns on to most difficult positions, and finally the left of Clausel and the right of d'Erlon were quite broken. Clausel's right and centre still held their ground, but even they were soon after driven in rout back on the river between Ascaïn and Amotz.

Meantime on the Allies' Left Hope, with the 1st and 5th Divisions, contained Reille.

November 11: The Allies slowly advanced.

November 12: Soult retired on Bayonne, the Allies following and Foy coming in to his chief. Losses: French, 51 guns and over 4,000 men; Allies, 2,700.

Tactical Comments: (1) Soult fared as generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply want of numbers (60,000 Infantry and Artillery held a sixteen-mile front) or of hardiness—lines succeed against raw troops, but Marlborough broke the French lines in Belgium, and as to Torres Vedras, they were never attacked. Soult copied them, his works having a river on one flank and the ocean on the other, and his front being on mountains covered with redoubts and partly protected by inundation. But he had only three months to construct them, his labours could be seen, and his men had been defeated; whilst Wellington had a year, his works were secret, and his men had been victorious. Lines almost imply inferiority and must be adhered to, and their strength is the strength of the weakest point, whereas the attackers can act freely. This does not apply to entrenched camps which serve as a pivot for a field army; (2) Soult's great error was in not supporting Clausel with troops from the right; he also wasted Foy; (3) Wellington had greater numbers and greater skill, and yet the French Right escaped him—it might not have done so if the chief attack had been entirely against Clausel.

A further advance was impossible owing to the awful state of the roads, to serious difficulties with Spain, and to extensive pillaging by the troops—these latter evils were stopped by Wellington's rigour and by sending back to Spain all the Spaniards (25,000) except Morillo, and thus supplies could be purchased without difficulty from the French people.


MAP

To Illustrate Operations
of 1813-14

BETWEEN the PASSAGE of the
NIVELLE and the
BATTLE OF ORTHES.

Fortified Places shown thus ☼
Boundary lines between Countries — . — . — .

English Miles



NOTE:—The troops are placed so as to indicate generally the positions occupied at the *commencement of the Passages of the Nivelle, the Nive, and Gaves (with the Lower Adour), respectively.*

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The Allies went into cantonments west of the Nive, whilst Soult occupied the entrenched camp of Bayonne at the junction of the Nive and the Adour—his Right, Reille and Villatte, with a swamp in front and gunboats in the lower Adour; his Centre, Clausel, stretched to the Nive with an inundation in front; his Left, d'Erlon, on the front of Mousserolles between the Nive and the Adour, with an extreme left up the Nive at Cambo under Foy and Paris.

PASSAGE OF THE NIVE, DECEMBER 9, 1813.

Plan of attack: Allies' Right, Hill, with 2nd Division, etc., to cross at Cambo and assail d'Erlon; Centre, Beresford, with 3rd, 6th Divisions, etc., to cross at Ustaritz against d'Erlon; Left Hope and Alten, with 1st, 5th, Light Divisions, to contain Clausel and Reille; in reserve, 4th and 7th Divisions. Numbers: 80,000 and 50 guns.

Hill, crossing at Cambo, marched down on Bayonne; Beresford passed by pontoon at Ustaritz and joined Hill. Foy retired on Bayonne; whilst Morillo, crossing higher than Cambo, drove Paris south-eastwards. West of the Nive, Hope and Alten held in play Clausel and Reille. Loss, each side 800.

The Allies thus held an arc, south-east of Bayonne—a dangerous position, for their wings were connected only by a bridge, whilst their able opponent held an interior position. The reasons for Wellington incurring this danger were: he was too cooped up between the sea and the River Nive, on the east bank he could worry Soult's communications along the Adour and get forage himself, and he could not place his whole army on the east bank without cutting himself off from St. Jean de Luz; so he chose the bold course (Robinson).

BATTLES ROUND BAYONNE, DECEMBER 10-13, 1813.

December 10: Soult's able plan was to crush the Allies' Left; he passed over part of d'Erlon, who with Clausel assailed our Left

with fierceness near Arcangues, which, however, he could not carry; Reille, with equal vigour, assailed Barrouilhet, and equally failed to carry it. Wellington then sent to the point of danger the 3rd and 6th divisions from east of the Nive, and 4th and 7th divisions from the Reserve. The battle ended, having cost the French 2,000 and the Allies 1,500.

December 11: Soult made a severe attack on Hope at Barrouilhet.


December 12: A fierce cannonade near Barrouilhet. Wellington recrossed the 6th division to strengthen Hill east of the Nive; whilst Soult, leaving part of his force in the camp west of the Nive, moved his main body to the camp east of that river. During the night a flood broke the pontoons above Bayonne, and thus isolated Hill's 14,000 in face of Soult's 35,000.

December 13, Battle of St. Pierre or Moguerre: Hill held a front through St. Pierre from the Adour to the Nive. The French attacked with the most vigorous courage in this most desperate battle, but were finally repulsed, the 92nd Highlanders especially distinguishing themselves. Meantime the bridge was repaired, and heavy reinforcements reached Hill (6th, 4th, 3rd, 7th divisions).

The action cost Soult 3,500 men, the Allies 1,500. It should be said that Wellington underrated Soult when he exposed Hill to the action of December 13, but Hill showed marked ability.

Wellington then crossing the Gaves blockaded Bayonne, and defeated (February 27) Soult at Orthez, whence the French general retired on St. Séver on the Adour.

The marshal then retired south-east so as to draw the English from the sea and to connect with Suchet, who was moving out of Spain by Perpignan. He moved *viâ* Tarbes and St. Gaudens on Toulouse, closely pursued. One English column branched off and entered Bordeaux, whilst the main body under Wellington fought Soult at Toulouse (April 10), after which he retired on Castelnau-dary. Toulouse was not a decisive victory for the English leader; indeed, it is often claimed as a French triumph.



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BATTLE OF TOULOUSE, APRIL 10, 1814.

Soult had Reille in St. Cyprien; north of Toulouse, on the Languedoc canal, he had Daricau's division of d'Erlon; on the Pujade Hill, St. Pol's Brigade; on the Mont Rave, Clausel had Harispe with Villatte and d'Armagnac in second line; in Toulouse itself, Travot's reserve.

Wellington planned that Picton's 3rd division, Bock's Cavalry and Alten's light division should deal with Daricau, that Freyre and some Portuguese guns should move against St. Pol, that Beresford with the 4th and 6th divisions and three batteries should cross to the west of the Ers at Croix d'Orade, and move east of Mont Rave against the St. Sypière redoubt. Ponsonby's Cavalry would connect him with Freyre, and Lord Edward Somerset's Cavalry up the west bank of the Ers, and Vivian's Cavalry up the east bank, would hold Berton's Cavalry. Hill would threaten St. Cyprien. Numbers: Allies, 52,000 with 64 guns, including Hill's 13,000 and 18 guns; French, 40,000 with 80 guns.

At 6 a.m. the Allies moved; Freyre carried the Pujade, Beresford, minus his field guns, which could not move through the mud, began his march, Vivian swept the east bank of the River Ers. Then Freyre's Spaniards twice assailed the Mont Rave hornwork, but, hampered by the hollow road and riddled by withering musketry, they fell into rout and were saved only by Ponsonby's charges. As a fact, these Spanish attacks were delivered too soon, because Beresford had not yet moved against Mont Rave. Picton also was repulsed by Daricau. It all depended on Beresford. Wellington had no reserve, whereas Soult, as Hill could not force St. Cyprien, moved from that suburb 10,000 men under Taupin to the St. Sypière to deal with Beresford. Taupin delayed, and when he did charge, the rockets (new to the French) and the 6th division drove his men up the height. St. Sypière was won, and Taupin's men fled on to d'Armagnac.

At 2.30 p.m. Beresford moved north along Mont Rave against the redoubts, where Harispe fought desperately, and Freyre's third attack on the hornwork failed, but Beresford's men would not give


in, and at 5 p.m. the French fell back on Toulouse, and the Spaniards, ready for a fourth assault, occupied Mont Rave. Allies lost 4,600, of whom 2,000 were Spaniards; French lost 3,000.

Tactical Comments: (1) Soult at Toulouse fought in ignorance of Napoléon's abdication, April 6; (2) The French have claimed this battle as their victory, but the fact remains that Wellington took the city; (3) Soult's chief error was in not crushing Beresford when moving east of Mont Rave; (4) Wellington exposed Beresford to great danger during his flank march. Robinson defends Wellington by saying that it was the only possible method of attack, that it succeeded, that the Spaniards not waiting for Beresford, and Picton turning his feint into a real attack, produced a lack of troops to act against the north end of Mont Rave, otherwise the pressure would have been taken off Beresford.

On April 14 hostilities ceased.

Comment on Soult's Campaign, 1813-14.—His chief error, against which his master warned him, was leaving so many men in Bayonne, but vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, cannot be denied him. In nine months he repaired five strong places (Bayonne, Pau, Dax, St. Jean Pied de Port, Toulouse), entrenched five great camps (at Serres, on Bidassoa river, two at Bayonne, Bidart to Ustaritz), changed his line of operations at St. Séver, and fought twenty-four combats. Defeated in all, he fought the last as fiercely as the first. He was beaten because Suchet failed him, because the south of France was treacherous, and because he was pitted against a genius with invincible troops.

Comment on Wellington's Campaign, 1813-14.—His passages of defended rivers were excellent, surprise and secrecy being marked points. He was careful of his communications, delivered vigorous counter-attacks, concealed his troops, believed in line against column, resorted to flank attacks as at Orthez, marched separately and concentrated on the battle-field, e.g. the operations against Joseph in 1813 and the movement against Soult at Toulouse.



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GENERAL REMARKS.

This war ended by Wellington invading the south of France at the very moment when the Allies invaded the east. It was, indeed, necessary for Napoléon to expel the Bourbon King from Spain; but in the war he forgot his own principles—unity of armies, unity of aim, unity of command. (Still the war woke Spain from her torpor, and French ideas of liberty have penetrated the Peninsula.) The Emperor himself, annoyed with an irregular warfare which victory did not terminate, handed it over to his lieutenants, to whom he often issued contradictory orders. The marshals also were jealous of each other, and the King lamentably weak. The nature of the country also, the fanaticism of the Spaniards, and the genius of Wellington were important factors in the result.

Besides, the French plan of operations was too vast, their forces too dispersed—the sole objective should have been the Lower Tagus, whereas Andalusia was strongly and erroneously occupied. The French marshals, *e.g.* Soult in Andalusia and Suchet in the East, acted like independent chiefs.

Alison, the historian of Europe, thus tabulates the causes of Wellington's success—his central position, the inferiority of the enemy's supply system, the guerillas, *e.g.* Mina in Navarre, etc., the variance between the King and the marshals. He also tabulates the main obstacles with which the English leader had to contend—Portuguese and Spanish incompetence, intrigues of many members of the Cadiz Cortes with Joseph, want of money, lack of trained officers, and of a good hospital service.

The supply system: Napoléon's system when applied to Spain and in operations that could not be closed by sudden success led to difficulties. Want of money prevented the formation of large magazines, and the French system was rightly described as *La Maraude*. Their large armies could not remain concentrated for any length of time, and could not operate in the early months when the crops had not yet ripened. Their system was to force requisitions

without payment, and they had no magazines, though for sudden movements they did keep reserve dépôts, and at times had the advantage of being able to act regardless of lines of communication. For them dispersion rendered supply easier.

On the other hand Wellington employed the slower and more expensive, but in the end more advantageous system of magazines, and by thus being able to remain concentrated was able to meet the enemy's superior numbers. Besides, he obtained supplies from overseas up the rivers, and his regular payments attracted the Portuguese traders; consequently his Army was more mobile than the enemy's.

In tactics Wellington believed in "line" against "column"—fire action against shock action; he also concealed his troops as much as possible. His weakest points were perhaps the tardiness of his pursuits and the general conduct of his sieges, as to which he has been blamed for the immense loss incurred.

1815

SEVENTH COALITION

CAUSES.

FRANCE was discontented with the Bourbon King, Louis XVIII., and Napoléon knowing this escaped from Elba, and landing in the south, re-entered the Tuileries, March 20. All the Sovereigns of Europe at once declared War. The campaign which followed is full of disputed points, *e.g.* did Wellington promise Blücher at Ligny assistance which he never rendered? did La Haie Sainte fall at 4 p.m. or at 6 p.m.?

The French Troops.—In two months Napoléon raised 360,000 men, of whom 123,000 were the field troops of the Army of the North, all veterans, mainly composed of prisoners returned to France in 1814. This Army contained 22,000 Cavalry, of whom 13,000 were Reserve Cavalry under Grouchy, 344 guns and 18,000 Guard of all arms: it was organised in five Corps, Guard and four Corps of Cavalry Reserve, namely:

1st Corps	under	d'Erlon.
2nd	„	„ Reille.
3rd	„	„ Vandamme.
4th	„	„ Gérard.
6th	„	„ Lobau (<i>i.e.</i> Mouton).
Cavalry	(13,000)	under Grouchy.
Guard	(18,000)	„ Mortier.

In addition 5 Corps of observation in the Jura, the Alps, the Var, at Toulouse, in the Pyrenees, and 1 Corps to check civil war in La Vendée (in the west of France).

The Allies had 1,000,000 men on foot—in Belgium Wellington with 82,000 Infantry, 14,000 Cavalry, and 196 guns, one-third being British, two-thirds Dutch, Belgian, etc.; and Blücher with 117,000 Prussians, including 12,000 Cavalry and 312 guns; to move on the middle Rhine 225,000 Russians under Barclay de Tolly; to move on the upper Rhine 250,000 Austrians under Schwartzberg; in Italy 75,000 under Frémont; besides reserves. In addition the Swiss, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Danes, and the Swedes.

The plan of Napoléon was, before the Austro-Russians could deploy on the theatre, to act against the Allies in Belgium, to interpose, *viâ* Charleroi, between Wellington and Blücher, who were divergently based on Ostend and Cologne, to beat them in detail and then to fall upon the right of the Austro-Russians.

Wellington always feared Napoléon would manœuvre round the English Right and threaten Brussels and Ghent (where was Louis XVIII. of France).

The plan of the Allies was to march concentrically on Paris, starting on July 1.

The theatre extended all along the French frontier, but Belgium was the principal scene of action.

OPERATIONS IN BELGIUM.

On June 14 the French Sovereign had, unknown to the Allies, concentrated with his usual celerity behind the Forest of Beaumont. Wellington lay from Oudenarde to Nivelles with reserve at Brussels, Blücher from Charleroi to Namur with reserve at Liège. The connecting link was Quatre Bras.

The French stretched from Maubeuge on their left through Beaumont to Philippeville on their right; Wellington had 2nd Corps (Hill) near Ath on his right, 1st Corps (Prince of Orange) near Braine-le-Comte on his left, Reserve at Brussels, and Cavalry (Lord Uxbridge, *i.e.* Lord Paget or Lord Anglesey) near Ninove; Blücher had 1st Corps (Ziethen) near Charleroi, 2nd Corps (Pirch I.) at Namur, 3rd Corps (Thielmann) at Ciney, 4th Corps (Bülow)

at Liège. The Allies' cantonments were unwisely extended, probably for reasons of supply.

Early on June 15 the French moved on the Sambre—Left, d'Erlon and Reille, on Marchiennes; Right, Gérard, on Châtelet; Centre on Charleroi. At this moment General Bourmont deserted to the Allies, carrying valuable information. Charleroi was taken and the Sambre crossed. Then Napoléon pushed his Left under Ney—d'Erlon, Reille, and one Cavalry division—on Quatre Bras, so as to keep apart the two Allied Generals, and his Right under Grouchy—Vandamme, Gérard, and two Cavalry Corps—on Fleurus. But Ney, imposed on by the enemy, did not pass Frasnes, nor did Grouchy attain Fleurus—fact is that Vandamme was annoyed at being placed under Grouchy.

On the other side Blücher ordered concentration near Fleurus, and Wellington directed his Right on Ath and Braine-le-Comte, and his Left and Centre on Nivelles, a point of concentration safer and quicker than Quatre Bras; but as Baron de Rebecque and the Prince of Orange detained their Belgians at Quatre Bras, Wellington accepted the fact, and next day concentrated his Left and Centre there.

On June 16 Napoléon moved Grouchy on Fleurus with Vandamme, Gérard, the Guard, and three Cavalry Corps, and Ney on Quatre Bras with d'Erlon, Reille, Kellermann's Cavalry and the Guard Light Cavalry; numbers of Ney 42,000 and 96 guns. Lobau remained in reserve at Charleroi. The Emperor in person joined Grouchy.

BATTLE OF LIGNY, JUNE 16, 1815.

Numbers, French 68,000 including 13,000 Cavalry and 210 guns (not counting Lobau); Prussians, 87,000 including 8,000 horse and 224 guns. Wellington, who rode over from Quatre Bras, told Blücher his troops were exposed—Gneisenau, Prussian Chief of Staff, was offended at the remark.

Blücher stood for battle, and Napoléon calling up Lobau attacked at 2.30 p.m. The attack would have taken place at noon but for

Gérard's delay. The Prussian resistance was obstinate, and the Emperor, confident that Ney would have little difficulty at Quatre Bras, called on him to fall on the Prussian rear. This order was carried to d'Erlon direct by Colonel de Forbin-Janson or Labédoyère, who was afterwards to inform Marshal Ney. The corps of d'Erlon appeared on the French Left and then disappeared, recalled by Ney, who misconstrued the Imperial instructions, and in order to win the battle Napoléon had to launch his Guard, but the enemy, though beaten, was not routed.

BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS, JUNE 16, 1815.

Ney exaggerating the British forces, and conscious that Wellington never showed his strength, did not attack in the morning; at 11 a.m. he was ordered to occupy Quatre Bras, but did not act till near 2 p.m. By that time the arrival of British reinforcements had rendered his task more difficult, and to support Reille he needed d'Erlon, who he learnt had started for Ligny. At the same time he received a despatch from Soult, the Imperial Chief of Staff, to fall on Blücher's rear after mastering Quatre Bras. The Prince argued that he must take Quatre Bras at all costs, and so recalled d'Erlon; he vainly tried to repel Wellington with Cavalry, and then retired on Frasnes, meeting there d'Erlon, whose inaction had led to the repulse at Quatre, and to the incomplete victory at Ligny. The conduct of Ney in delaying to attack Quatre Bras and in recalling d'Erlon is indefensible.

On June 17 Napoléon decided to turn on the English. Grouchy (35,000) with Vandamme and Gérard, and a Cavalry Corps under Exelmans and Pajol was to pursue Blücher; he himself with Lobau, the Guard, and Reserve Cavalry moved towards Ney. But delays occurred, and in particular Grouchy made a false move towards Namur, and when he did learn of the Prussian retreat on Wavre, foolishly halted at Gembloux. Ney did nothing all the morning, whilst Wellington was retiring on Mont St. Jean with assurances from Blücher at Wavre that he could count on him for the next day.

Napoléon and Ney followed the Iron Duke through a violent downpour of rain, and in the evening bivouacked near Plancenoit, after despatching an order to Grouchy to rejoin him next day. The exact meaning of this order is not clear, but on June 18, at 1 p.m., another order was despatched directing Grouchy to fall on Bülow's rear—it did not reach him till 6 p.m.

BATTLE OF WATERLOO, JUNE 18, 1815.

Wellington was on the plateau of Mont St. Jean behind the road from Ohain to Braine l'Alleud lined with a hedge on either side, embanked and forming a ditch in front of the position, the approaches of which were strengthened by the Château of Hougomont, the farms of La Haie Sainte, Papelotte, and La Haie constituting strong advanced posts. The English stretched about three miles from Braine l'Alleud on their right across the Brussels road towards Ohain on their left. Hill commanded on the right, the Prince of Orange in the centre, Picton on the left. Infantry lined the sunken road of Ohain, which obstacle the French could not see. Hougomont and the three farms were held in strength. Reserves on the northern reverse slopes, Cavalry on the wings and in the centre. Wellington's first line was Infantry with Cavalry on the flanks, thus—on the Right, Cooke's division (Guards), and a squadron of 15th Hussars; Hougomont was held by the light companies of Cooke's division, some Nassauers and Hanoverians. Behind, and between Merbe-Braine and the Nivelles road, was Clinton's division. In the Centre, Alten's division, which also held La Haie Sainte. On the Left, Picton's division with Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade much exposed on the slope, and lastly the Cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian. On the extreme right Chassé's Dutch-Belgians at Braine l'Alleud, connecting with the troops at Hal—these troops (17,000) were Dutch-Belgians and two brigades of Colville's 4th division.

The second line was mainly Cavalry—west of the Charleroi road three brigades, east of it Ponsonby's Union Brigade. Reserves in rear of the right and right centre; guns along the main ridge.

Numbers, 55,000 Infantry, 12,000 Cavalry, and 184 guns, not including the 17,000 at Hal. Wellington waiting for Blücher was defensive, and anxious for his communications, which lay on his right, he kept during the 17th and 18th at Hal, six miles from Waterloo, this large detachment—4th British division, 1st Dutch-Belgian division, and Dutch-Belgian Indian Brigade—17,000.

Napoléon on reconnoitring decided to capture the advanced posts, to attack the enemy's Left, so as to interpose between Wellington and Blücher, to roll it up on the Centre, to master the Brussels road, and to drive Wellington into the Soignes forest. He thus disposed his troops: Left, Reille, with guns in front; Right, d'Erlon, with guns in front; Piré's and Jaquinot's Cavalry divisions on the wings; in second line in the Centre, Lobau with Kellermann's and Milhaud's Cuirassier corps and Domon's and Subervie's Cavalry divisions on either flank; behind Lobau, the Guard, with the Guard Cavalry under Guyot and Léfèbvre-Desnouettes on either flank. Numbers: 58,000 Infantry, 16,000 Cavalry, 246 guns, not including Grouchy's 35,000. The attack was delayed to give the ground time to harden. Meantime Blücher at Wavre was moving 60,000 Prussians against the French Right, leaving 30,000 at Wavre to make head against Grouchy.

At 11.30 a.m. the guns opened, and fierce and vain assaults were made on Hougomont by Jérôme's division of Reille's Corps. At 1 p.m. the Emperor prepared to attack the English Left, when he perceived far off on his right the Prussians (Bülow's Corps). Bülow moved *viâ* Chapelle St. Lambert; Pirch I. *viâ* Lasne. To check them he despatched Domon's and Subervie's Cavalry divisions and Lobau, thinking that Grouchy's impending arrival would catch Bülow between two fires. This detachment of 10,000 men seriously modified Napoléon's battle plan. Ney then was ordered to assail the English Left. This order reached Ney at 1.30 p.m., and after half an hour's cannonade from eighty guns, he with d'Erlon's Infantry attacked, the four divisions marching in *échelons* by the left, with 400 yards' interval between each *échelon*. Wellington now drew troops from his Right, and the English Infantry rose from amongst

the corn. Ney, however, carrying the Ohain road, reached the plateau; but the Scotch Dragoons under Ponsonby charged him on the left flank and drove him into the valley, and, though the Scotch were cut up by Milhaud's Cuirassiers and Jaquinot's Lancers, yet d'Erlon had been repulsed, losing 5,000 men.

Bülow opened fire, and Napoléon resolved to drive him back and then to fall upon the English Centre, thus modifying his first plan. The Young Guard reinforced Lobau, and to connect d'Erlon with Reille (grouped round Hougomont) Napoléon sent to Ney the Cuirassiers of Milhaud and the Light Cavalry division of the Guard.

Wellington, to avoid the French fire, had retired his first line, leaving only his guns on the edge of the plateau, and, in spite of the Emperor's orders not to try anything against the English Centre till the final attack, Ney charged the isolated guns with two Cuirassier divisions (Milhaud and Delort) and overturned the first English line; but Wellington's reserve Cavalry (three brigades) arrived, and into the resulting combat were drawn all the French squadrons—Léfèvre-Desnouettes' Lancers and Chasseurs, whom Napoléon with misgivings supported with Kellermann's and Guyot's Dragoons and Cuirassiers—10,000 horse. The first line was composed of Cuirassiers, in burnished steel; the second of the red Lancers of the Guard, in brilliant uniform; the third of the Chasseurs of the Guard, in rich furred costume of green and gold, with black bearskin shakos on their heads. To the English it looked like a sea of steel, and wild charges followed.

The English squares on the whole held their own. Ney, who had three horses killed under him, and who at 6 p.m. carried La Haie Sainte with troops of d'Erlon (Major Baring retiring with 42 men out of nine companies), called for Infantry. "Veut-il que j'en fasse!" cried Napoléon, who now had in hand only his precious Old and Middle Guard; and at that moment Bülow and Pirch I. began to threaten the French Right, penetrating at 6 p.m. even into Plancenoit, whence, however, Morand, with half the Middle Guard, without firing a shot, expelled them.

This gave Napoléon a chance, and at 7 p.m. the Emperor ordered Drouot to form in squares ten battalions of the Old and Middle Guard (twelve battalions of the Young and Middle Guard being at Plancenoit and two battalions of the Old Guard remaining at La Belle Alliance), and to move to the aid of Ney. Slowly they climbed the plateau against Wellington, who again drew on his Right, and whose guns played on them; whilst Maitland's 2,000 Fusiliers, rising amidst the corn, riddled them with a withering fire. The Guard recoiled, and just then Ziethen's Corps (*viâ Ohain*) appeared at Smohain. The French Army was thus enveloped and fled all in rout, except the Old Guard, which formed in squares covered Napoléon's own retirement. The flight, urged on by the pursuing Prussians, lay *viâ* Genappe, Charleroi, and Laon.


The same day at 8 a.m. Grouchy, from Gembloux, moved on Wavre, instead of to the sound of the cannon at Waterloo. He reached Wavre at 4 p.m., and there attacked the Prussian rearguard (Thielmann), but at 6 p.m., receiving Napoléon's order to rejoin, he prepared to obey next day.

On June 19, hearing of Waterloo, he rapidly retreated *viâ* Dinant, Rocroy, and Laon, rallied 30,000 stragglers, then gained Paris June 29, raising Davout's force there to 100,000. Napoléon abdicated.

The Allies entered France; Blücher *viâ* Avesnes, Guise, and Compiègne, Wellington *viâ* Cambrai and Péronne. Blücher then moved to the west of Paris, Wellington to the north, and the campaign closed with the combat of Rocquencourt, July 1, and with the surrender of Paris.

The Emperor himself fled to Rochefort, in the west of France, whence he meant to sail for the United States, but finding this impossible he surrendered to the Captain of the *Bellerophon*, and was exiled to St. Helena. He died in that island May 5, 1821.

Tactical Comments on Waterloo: (1) The only real manœuvre tried by Napoléon against Wellington was the attack on Hougomont intended to draw him away from the Prussians—in fact,



WELLINGTON'S ARMY.**1st Corps under the Prince of Orange:**

- Cooke's 1st Division (Maitland's and Byng's Guard Brigades).
 and Alten's 3rd Division (C. Halkett's British Brigade, Ompteda's Brigade of King's German Legion, Kielmansegge's Hanoverian Brigade).
 and Perponcher's Dutch-Belgian Division (Bylandt's and Saxe-Weimar's Brigades).
 and Chassé's Dutch-Belgian Division.

2nd Corps under Lord Hill:

- Clinton's 2nd Division (Adam's British Brigade, du Plat's Brigade of King's German Legion, H. Halkett's Hanoverian Brigade).
 and Colville's 4th Division (Mitchell's Brigade).

Reserve under Wellington:

- Picton's 5th Division (Kempt's and Pack's British Brigades, Vincke's Hanoverian Brigade).
 and Cole's 6th Division (Best's Hanoverian Brigade, Lambert's British Brigade).
 Kruse's Nassau Regiment.
 Brunswick Corps.

Cavalry under Lord Uxbridge:

- Somerset's Guard Brigade;
 Ponsonby's Union Brigade;
 Dörnberg's Brigade;
 Vandeleur's Light Brigade;
 Grant's Brigade;
 Vivian's Brigade;
 Arentschildt's Brigade;
 Belgian Cavalry (Chigny and Collaert).

BLÜCHER'S ARMY.

Corps of Ziethen, Pirch I., and Bülow.

NAPOLÉON'S ARMY.**1st Corps under d'Erlon:**

- Divisions of Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte;
 Jaquinot's Cavalry Division.

2nd Corps under Reille:


- Divisions of Bachelu, Jérôme, Foy; Piré's Cavalry Division.

3rd Corps under Vandamme (of which only Domon's Cavalry Division was present).**6th Corps under Lobau:**

- CAVALRY
 Subervie's Division;
 Kellermann's Corps;
 Milhaud's Corps.

Imperial Guard under Drouot:

- Old Guard, Middle Guard, Young Guard; Guyot's and Lefebvre-Desnouettes' Cavalry Divisions.



WELLINGTON'S ARMY.

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- and Chassé's Dutch-Belgian Division.

2nd Corps under Lord Hill :

- Clinton's 2nd Division (Adam's British Brigade, du Plat's Brigade of King's German Legion, H. Halkett's Hanoverian Brigade).
- and Colville's 4th Division (Mitchell's Brigade).

Reserve under Wellington :

- Picton's 5th Division (Kempt's and Pack's British Brigades, Vincke's Hanoverian Brigade).
- and Cole's 6th Division (Best's Hanoverian Brigade, Lambert's British Brigade).
- Kruse's Nassau Regiment.
- Brunswick Corps.

Cavalry under Lord Uxbridge :

- Somerset's Guard Brigade ;
- Ponsonby's Union Brigade ;
- Dörnberg's Brigade ;
- Vandeleur's Light Brigade ;
- Grant's Brigade ;
- Vivian's Brigade ;
- Arentschildt's Brigade ;
- Belgian Cavalry (Chigny and Collaert).

BLÜCHER'S ARMY.

Corps of Ziethen, Pirch I., and Bülow.

NAPOLÉON'S ARMY.

1st Corps under d'Erlon:

- Divisions of Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte ;
- Jaquinot's Cavalry Division.

2nd Corps under Reille:

- Divisions of Bachelu, Jérôme, Foy ; Piré's Cavalry Division.


3rd Corps under Vandamme (of which only Domon's Cavalry Division was present).

6th Corps under Lobau :

- CAVALRY
- Subervie's Division ;
- Kellermann's Corps ;
- Milhaud's Corps.

Imperial Guard under Drouot:

- Old Guard, Middle Guard, Young Guard ; Guyot's and Lefèvre-Desnouettes' Cavalry Divisions.



he despised the Iron Duke, though Soult warned him; (2) The position of Wellington was similar to that of the Russians at Friedland, and Napoléon's plan of attack was similar in both cases; (3) Losses, French 25,000, Allies, 20,000; (4) At Hougomont Reille should have used more Artillery, instead of engaging nearly his whole Infantry; (5) Many of the Peninsular veterans being in America, Wellington's troops were by no means equal, man for man, to his great antagonist's; (6) On the French side, Napoléon's plan was able, its execution inferior, little Artillery preparation, want of combination of the three arms, wasting of the Cavalry, defective formation of the Infantry, retreat not provided for, Grouchy's want of initiative. On the defective formation of Infantry in d'Erlon's corps, Camon remarks:—"Au lieu de ranger ces troupes en colonnes de bataillons par division à demi-distance ou à distance entière, ordonnance favorable aux déploiements rapides comme aux formations en carré, on a rangé chaque échelon par bataillon déployé et serré en masse." On the Allies' side, Wellington had too many troops on his Right, and he did not hold La Haie Sainte in sufficient strength; able use of cover; judicious use of Cavalry; squares resisted French horse; a defensive-offensive battle; active pursuit; (7) Napoléon's declining powers are proved by the fact that he did not support his Cavalry and Infantry with each other, he allowed them to act separately; (8) Wellington committed errors: (a) the exposure of Bylandt's Belgians; (b) the retention of 17,000 men at Hal during the whole of the 18th (this is not admitted to be unwise by all the authorities, because the French might have tried a raid on that wing); (9) Note the superiority of the line in fire-power over the column, and the value of strong advanced posts, and the importance of concealing troops in defensive battles; (10) The Cavalry attacks on Infantry were the most powerful ever made; (11) The Prussian share in the battle is best expressed in Wellington's words:—"I attribute the success to the assistance of Blücher, whose general (Bülow) came full on the French flank."

REMARKS AND STRATEGIC COMMENTS.

(1) Second Treaty of Paris, 1815, reduced France to her limits of 1790, except that she retained Avignon and Venaissin, and in addition took away Philippeville and Marienburg, Bouillon, Sarrelouis, and Landau; dismantled Hüningen, gave Savoy to Piedmont.

(2) The Congress of Vienna assigned the Rhenish Palatinate to Bavaria, constituted Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg as the Kingdom of the Netherlands under William of Holland, placed Prussia in the Moselle Valley, handed over Lombardy and Venetia to Austria. The object of all the above arrangements was to cripple France.

The Congress of Vienna, 1814-15, falsified the popular declarations made by the Sovereigns when calling on their subjects to crush Napoléon: the Congress regarded only the rights of Princes. Its decisions were that France should be crippled as above, and also by the neutralisation of the Netherlands and of Switzerland, and of Northern Savoy; that Valais, Geneva, and Neuchâtel should be added to Switzerland; that Spain and Portugal should pass again to their respective Sovereigns; that Italy should be parcelled out thus: The King of Sardinia to have that island, Savoy, Piedmont, and Genoa; Austrian princes to rule Tuscany and Modena; the Empress Maria Louisa to take for life Parma, Placentia (Piacenza), and Guastalla; the Pope to recover all the States of the Church; the Bourbon to be restored in the two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily); Austria to receive Lombardy and Venetia.

Austria also recovered East Galicia, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Salzburg, and Illyria, and acquired the Valteline and Ragusa. Prussia received her old provinces increased by Swedish Pomerania, part of Saxony and districts on the Moselle. Hanover became a Kingdom and was restored to England; Bavaria was assigned the Rhenish Palatinate. In place of the Holy Roman Empire was constituted the Germanic Confederation under Austria. Russia gained Finland, Bessarabia, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Sweden obtained Norway, and Denmark Lauenburg. Krakau (last relic of Poland)

was erected into a Republic. England, mistress of the sea, gained Heligoland, Malta, and the Ionian Isles.

Soon after Austria, Prussia, and Russia formed the Holy Alliance, ostensibly to rule on Christian principles, really to suppress all Liberal movements.

(3) Wellington's line of communications ran from Ostend, Blücher's *viâ* Liège, and thus the Allies were, as the Austrians and Sardinians in 1796, on divergent lines. Napoléon as in 1796 struck at the point of junction with a view of separating the Allied Armies and defeating them in detail.

(4) When Blücher moved to Wavre, he abandoned his Liège line and constituted a new one *viâ* Louvain upon Cologne.

(5) At Ligny Ney failed the Emperor, at Waterloo Grouchy failed him—in fact, as he put it himself, “At Ligny my Left, and at Waterloo my Right failed me.” His defeat was due to a series of accidents; on June 15 Bourmont deserted and gave the enemy information, Vandamme not getting orders in time was at Charleroi at 3 p.m., instead of at 10 a.m., and thus Fleurus was not occupied—otherwise next day Blücher would have been taken *en flagrant délit de réunion*. Besides, if Ney had occupied Quatre Bras this day he could have taken Blücher in flank next day; on June 16 Gérard was slow in moving on Ligny, d'Erlon was disobedient, Ney foolishly recalled d'Erlon; on June 17 Grouchy's pursuit was as feeble as it could be, Ney did not press Wellington, the storm delayed the Emperor's march; on June 18 the state of the ground delayed attack much to the disadvantage of the French, in the battle the attack on Hougomont absorbed too many troops and the Guard Cavalry being drawn into the *mélée* Napoléon had nothing to check the Prussian horse. The cause of all this was that 1814 had destroyed the self-confidence of the French generals.

(6) On June 15 the Allies not getting the promised information from the traitor Fouché were in reality surprised; otherwise they would have massed on Quatre Bras and Ligny. Napoléon must have attacked them there, he could not have passed them by, *e.g.* in 1800 Kray massed at Ulm arrested Moreau's advance into

Bavaria for six weeks, in 1809 Berthier by scattering his troops allowed the Archduke Charles to advance with ease. Wellington indeed would have evacuated Quatre Bras but for the Dutch general's disobedience, and his concentration was so slow that he could not help Blücher at Ligny.

(7) When two allied armies acting from divergent bases, against an enemy on single line, manage to combine on the battle-field, the blow of one of them is nearly sure to be fatal; compare Ney at Bautzen, 1813, and the Crown Prince at Königgrätz, 1866.

(8) Imperial Guard under Drouot (vice Mortier, sick) included the Old Guard, under Friant, 4,000 in eight battalions; the Middle Guard, under Morand, 4,000 in eight battalions; the Young Guard, under Duhesme, 4,000 in eight battalions; and 4,000 Cavalry under Guyot and Lefèvre-Desnouettes: 96 guns under General Devaux. Total numbers, 18,400. The three Guards had twelve, eight, and four years' service respectively.

(9) The failure to detect the Prussian line of retreat after Ligny was perhaps due to Napoléon's fixed idea (based on all his experience since 1796) that the Prussians would retire on their own lines; the strategy of Wellington and Blücher was new to him. In all history there is no other such case of a large beaten army retiring in secrecy.

(10) Wellington always held that the French Emperor should have turned the British Right, and it was because he feared the Emperor's great manœuvring power in that direction that he placed at Hal the 17,000 men. A second reason was to cover a possible retreat on Ostend; and a third possible reason was the doubtful loyalty of the Dutch-Belgians left at Hal. Wellington's retreat would have been on Ostend, and in that event the troops at Hal and the Prussians would have been of material assistance. These reasons amply account for the retention of those troops at Hal till the 18th, but serious doubt has been expressed as to the wisdom of the Duke's not calling them up to the battle on the 18th.

1812-15

THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES

CAUSES.

THE United States objected to the British Orders in Council (issued in reply to the Continental blockade), disputes arose about the British right to search United States vessels for deserting sailors, the United States aimed at annexing Canada, and England impressed United States citizens as sailors. War was declared in 1812, the States then having only 24,000 troops.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

In 1812 General Hull with 2,500 United States troops invaded Upper Canada, crossing the Detroit to Sandwich, but General Brock, with 700 regulars and Canadian militia and 600 Indians, drove him back to Fort Detroit, on the United States side, where, on August 16, he surrendered with his whole force. A second invasion was in October carried out near Niagara by Wadsworth with 1,300 men, who, however, was totally defeated at Queenstown by 800 regulars and Canadian militia, helped by Indians.

Third Invasion of Canada: The United States vessels on Lakes Erie and Ontario obtained control, and their troops on the frontier rose to 15,000, namely, 10,000 under Dearborn opposite Lower Canada, and 5,000 militia under Smyth near Niagara. On November 28 Smyth with 500 men invaded Upper Canada by crossing the St. Lawrence between Chippewa and Fort Erie; he was repulsed with loss. Six days earlier Dearborn's attack on Lower Canada

was so foiled by the regulars and militia that he retired to Plattsburg. At sea the British were totally worsted by the United States all through this year.

CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

In 1813 the celebrated duel between the *Shannon* and the *Chesapeake* restored British naval confidence, and on land operations were conducted on a great scale.

Fourth Invasion of Canada: In January the United States General, Winchester, with 1,000 men crossed over to Frenchtown, but had to surrender to General Proctor with 500 regulars and Canadian militia and 600 Indians.

Fifth Invasion of Canada: In April an expedition of 1,700 men sailed from Sackett's Harbour in Lake Ontario and landed at Toronto, three miles from York, the capital of Upper Canada. The British forces numbered only 700 regular and Canadian militia and 100 Indians, and they could not prevent the enemy from capturing York; after doing some damage the enemy re-embarked for Sackett's Harbour. Meantime General Proctor with 900 regulars and Canadian militia and 1,200 Indians crossing Lake Erie attacked General Harrison near the rapids of the Miami without success, but managed to rout 800 men who were coming to reinforce Harrison.

At the end of May the British made by land and water an attempt on Sackett's Harbour. Prevost, in command, did all that was possible, but could not take the place. At the same time occurred the Sixth Invasion of Canada: 6,000 of the enemy carried Fort George at the western end of Lake Ontario and solidly established themselves near Queenstown. The invaders, however, suffered during June several disasters, including one night surprise. They retained Fort George, whilst on Lake Erie General Proctor delivered a fruitless assault on the United States Fort Sandusky, August 2.

The fate of the campaign really hung on the command of the Lakes. In Lake Champlain and in Lake Ontario the British held control, but on Lake Erie in September they were completely

routed, so that Proctor had to abandon Detroit and Amherstburg, and to retire eastwards on the river Thames, where on October 5 his force was utterly destroyed by General Harrison. Sir George Prevost at once raised the siege of Fort George, the besieging troops (1,500) retiring on to Burlington Heights. These operations had the result of severing the British from their Indian allies, except by the distant line of Fort Michilmackinac on Lake Huron.

Seventh Invasion of Canada: The United States concentrated 18,000 regulars and 10,000 militia: namely, Left wing on Lake Erie under Harrison (8,000); Centre at Sackett's Harbour under Wilkinson (10,000); Right wing near Lake Champlain under Hampton (10,000).

On October 21 Hampton crossed the frontier of Lower Canada, but was driven back by the Canadian militia and utterly demoralised. Meantime Wilkinson, from Sackett's Harbour sailing across Lake Ontario, skilfully feinted on Kingston and then passed away to Point Iroquois. He was there faced by 800 regulars and Canadian militia, who at Chrystler's Point, November 17, routed the 3,000 invaders that had disembarked. Wilkinson then retired into United States territory.

British troops at once moved westwards towards Fort George, which the United States general evacuated, burning the village of Newark, December 12. Colonel Murray, crossing the Niagara, surprised the United States Fort Niagara; Buffalo was taken and burnt, and the Indians were let loose. Sir George Prevost, however, regretted the necessity of thus avenging Newark.

This campaign was glorious to England, whose troops and ships were far inferior to her enemy's, and that too, on a frontier of 1,000 miles. The Canadian militia, though good in defensive warfare, were not suited to offensive operations.

CAMPAIGN OF 1814.

In 1814 the naval warfare continued with varying success. Early in the year the United States despatched a flotilla with 900

troops to capture Fort Michilmackinac on Lake Huron, but Colonel Robert McDowell with a garrison of 150 ably drove off the enemy. On land the British carried and dismantled Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario, and by sea blockaded Sackett's Harbour.

Eighth Invasion of Canada: 5,000 United States troops under Ripley passed from Buffalo into Canada in June, mastered Fort Erie and moved to Chippewa, where on June 5 General Riall attacked them with 1,500 regulars and 1,000 Canadian Militia and Indians. Riall was beaten, partly by the marksmanship of the Kentucky Rifles and partly by his own error of attacking in column; he then retired, abandoning Queenstown to General Brown, Ripley's successor. That officer then made an unsuccessful attempt on Fort George, and then retired on Chippewa, where his 5,000 men were defeated by Riall (who had then 3,000 troops) July 25, after a terrific contest. Brown retreated to Fort Erie, which the British besieged.

In August 3,500 men (with two guns) of Wellington's Army arrived from the south of France in Chesapeake Bay, under General Ross and Admiral Cockburn. Moving up the Patuxent river, they landed at Benedict, with the intention of striking at Washington. To defend the capital General Winder had 6,500 foot, 300 horse, and 600 sailors with 26 guns, and with these took post at Bladensburg on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac. In the battle there, August 24, the United States troops were totally defeated, and the British then occupied Washington, where they burnt the public buildings, re-embarking at Benedict on August 30. The destruction of the pacific or ornamental buildings was unjustifiable.

An expedition was then carried out up the Patapsco River against Baltimore, but without success; next came the expedition of Sir George Prevost against Plattsburg. Arrivals from the south of France had raised the regulars in Lower Canada to 12,000 and in Upper Canada to 4,000. Prevost collected 9,000 veterans and numerous guns, but the naval force on Lake Champlain was wretchedly equipped. On September 6 Prevost

approached Plattsburg, but on September 11 want of co-operation between the troops and the flotilla led to the defeat of the latter, and as a consequence to the retreat of Prevost's Army. To balance this disaster the United States troops soon afterwards evacuated Fort Erie, thus entirely withdrawing from any portion of Canada.

The sole remaining incident was the expedition against New Orleans: in December General Pakenham landed with 4,500 men. The defenders under General Jackson numbered 12,000, strongly entrenched, with the Mississippi on their right and a dense wood on their left, a ditch 4 ft. deep ran along the front, and flank bastions with heavy guns enfiladed the whole position. On the opposite bank of the Mississippi (there 800 yards broad) was placed a battery of 20 guns. Regular approach was impossible, therefore it was decided to ferry across the river during night 1,400 men under Colonel Thornton, who would carry the battery on the right bank, and to move two columns under Generals Gibbs and Keane against the entrenchments in front, January 8, 1815; force engaged numbered 6,000. Various circumstances caused the attack to miscarry—Thornton succeeded in carrying the battery, but his success was neutralised by unavoidable delay on his part, Gibbs' column met with very heavy fire, Pakenham, Gibbs, and Keane were shot down; finally General Lambert drew off the troops, and on January 27 re-embarked them. Soon after news arrived of the Treaty of Ghent, the terms being (1) Restitution of conquests, (2) No war-vessels to be kept on the Lakes, (3) Both Powers to stop any slave-trade. No reference was made to the Orders in Council or to the right of search. Thus the United States gained neither their real (Canada), nor their ostensible, object.

Tactical Comments on the Battle of New Orleans: (1) It was a night attack; (2) The fascines and scaling-ladders of the main column were left behind; (3) The best plan would have been for Pakenham to have crossed the river with his whole force on to the right bank, thus imitating Napoléon before the battle of Wagram; (4) Deadly effect of musket-fire from behind entrenchments.

GENERAL REMARKS.

In any war with the United States England should strike hard at first, concentrate large forces and control the Lakes; but Canada is not likely in any case to be conquered by the United States, unless the latter become a great Maritime Power.

APPENDIX

GREAT GENERALS OF THE REPUBLIC.

DESAIX, 1768-1800: A lieutenant when the Revolution broke out, he became a general of division at 26, and played a great part under Bonaparte in Egypt, and was the chief cause of the great victory of Marengo in Italy, where he met his death. His qualities were of the highest order, and his death a heavy blow to France. He and Kléber were, said Napoléon, the most talented of his officers.

HOCHE, 1768-1797: A sergeant when the Revolution broke out, he commanded an army at 25, and gained the title of the Pacificator of La Vendée by his able, yet humane suppression of the revolt in that royalist district. After an unsuccessful attempt on Ireland, 1796, he replaced Jourdan, 1797, in the command of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, with which he operated against the Austrian Kray. His character was noble and his reputation unsullied as his talents were great.

JOURDAN, 1762-1833: A commercial traveller when the Revolution broke out, he conducted several campaigns along the Rhine, especially against the Archduke Charles. Being a convinced Republican, he was, though created a Marshal, never employed in high command by Napoléon, and died as Governor of the Invalides.

MOREAU, 1763-1813: A law student when the Revolution broke out, he served in the revolutionary wars, and conducted operations against the Austrians on the Rhine in 1796 and in 1800, when he gained his great triumph of Hohenlinden. Involved in a conspiracy, he was exiled by Napoléon; he returned to Europe under the Czar, and at Dresden, 1813, fell mortally wounded. Too slow and cautious, no doubt, but excellent in retreat and careful to study the terrain.

KLÉBER, 1753-1800: An architect when the Revolution broke out, having previously served eight years in the Austrian Army, he shared in nearly all the wars of the period until 1800, when he was assassinated in Egypt.

MARSHALS OF THE EMPIRE.

AUGEREAU, Duke of Castiglione: Son of a mason; brave, but of moderate abilities.

BERNADOTTE, Prince of Ponte Corvo and King of Sweden: Once a private.

BERTHIER, Prince of Neuchâtel and Prince of Wagram: An admirable Chief of Staff, but inferior as an independent commander.

BESSIÈRES, Duke of Istria: Of distinguished ability and high character.

BRUNE.

DAVOUT, 1770-1823, Prince of Eckmühl and Duke of Auerstädt: A student with Napoléon at the Brienne School, he shared all his great campaigns, and defended Hamburg 1813-14. He commanded in Paris during 1815.

JOURDAN.

KELLERMANN, Duke of Valmy.

LANNES, 1769-1809, Duke of Montebello: Son of a stable boy, he served in most of Napoléon's campaigns, and was killed at Essling, 1809.

LÉFÈVRE, Duke of Dantzig.

MASSÉNA, 1758-1817, Duke of Rivoli and Prince of Essling: Once a ship boy, he was the *enfant chéri de la victoire* until his unfortunate contest with Wellington in the Peninsula, 1810-11.

MONCEY, Duke of Conegliano: Of very elevated character.

MORTIER, Duke of Treviso.

MURAT, 1771-1815, Grand Duke of Berg and King of Naples: Originally a waiter, he married Napoléon's sister Caroline, and was a distinguished cavalry leader, though he never could act in an independent command. He was executed by the Bourbon King of Naples.

NEY, 1769-1815, Duke of Elchingen and Prince of Moscow: Son of a cooper, he played a great part in all the wars of the period, and was shot by order of Louis XVIII. in 1815.

PÉRIGNON.

SÉRURIER.

SOULT, 1769-1852, Duke of Dalmatia: Born of humble parents, he was declared by Napoléon to be the first *manceuvrer* in Europe.

VICTOR, Duke of Belluno: Once a drummer-boy.

MACDONALD, Duke of Tarentum.

MARMONT, Duke of Ragusa.

ODINOT, Duke of Reggio: The modern Bayard.

SUCHET, Duke of Albufera: Once a private; he and Masséna were the ablest of the Marshals.

GOUVION ST. CYR.

PONIATOWSKI, the Pole. Besides **ARRIGHI**, **DUROC**, **GROUCHY**, **JUNOT**.

It is an error to suppose that these great leaders did not study—as a fact they all studied assiduously. It is an error to suppose that they rose into prominence as if by magic: Dumouriez, Lafayette, etc., who commanded in 1792, were generals before the Revolution; after them came generals like Bernadotte, Macdonald, Marmont, etc., who had been officers before the Revolution. It was only after three years of war that the generals from the ranks appeared conspicuous.

FAMOUS GENERALS OF THE ALLIES.

SIR JOHN MOORE, 1761-1809: took part in several military operations—*e.g.* in Egypt, etc.—and at Shorncliffe trained the famous Light Division.

BARCLAY DE TOLLY: Born 1755; a famous Russian general, not unlike Wellington.

BLÜCHER: Born 1742; served under Frederick the Great; not a general of the first order.

THE FOUR SUPREME GENERALS.

NAPOLÉON, 1769-1821.

The mightiest genius of two thousand years, whose hovering eagles cast a shadow over Europe, and who is thus described by Napier: "The greatest man of whom history makes mention, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman." He was supreme both in offensive and in defensive warfare; of unceasing industry and of untiring attention to details. Indeed, Julius Cæsar and Hannibal alone can be compared with the French Monarch. One of the most remarkable facts about Napoléon is the brief period in which he accomplished his great career. He died at 52: if one deducts 6 years' captivity and 16 years' boyhood, it leaves 30 years for a career embracing achievements that belittle those of a hundred ordinary men of affairs.

WELLINGTON, 1769-1852.

Educated at a school at Angers (as was Napoléon) he served under the Duke of York in the Netherlands; in India he won the battle of Assaye and in the Peninsula conducted brilliant operations, and finally defeated Napoléon himself at Waterloo. He afterwards entered politics and held the office of Premier for two years.

Parallel between Napoléon and Wellington: The one had brighter genius, the other superior judgment; the one combated with greater energy, the other with more perseverance. No campaign of Wellington's equals in energy and activity those of 1796 and 1814; none of Napoléon's approaches in foresight and wisdom that of 1810. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter; the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination.

Both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution; both intrepid, indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution; but whereas Napoléon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty; Napoléon careless of his word, Wellington inviolate in faith. No man ever surpassed the French Monarch in the clearness of his ideas, or the stretch of his glance into the depths of futurity, but he was often misled by the dazzling brilliancy of his own genius; the English Duke had a juster judgment and a greater power of discriminating error from truth.

SUWARROF.

Born 1730, he captured Ismail from the Turks, conquered Poland, and fought against Frederick the Great. He was highly educated, and spoke seven languages; he was the darling of his troops and, like Marlborough, never knew defeat.

THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES.

Born 1771, this prince proved himself the greatest of Austria's soldiers.

Parallel between the Archduke and Suwarrof: "Prince Charles," said Napoléon, "is a man of irreproachable conduct. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man, and that includes everything when said of a prince." Inferior to Napoléon in genius, to Suwarrof in daring, he was superior to either in cautious combination, scientific foresight, and the power of repairing disaster. His strategy in 1796 in Germany was equal to that of Napoléon in Italy; in 1809 he would, but for the neglect of his orders by the Archduke John, have crushed his great opponent at Wagram.

The Archduke had more science, Suwarrof more daring; the former was superior in combination, the latter in execution; the former cautious and unwearied, the latter vehement and impassioned. In tactics the Muscovite was unrivalled, in strategy the Austrian.

FRENCH MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, 1789-1814.

In 1791 the land forces of France were—an active army of 150,000, an auxiliary army of 100,000, and a National Guard of all citizens under 50. The enlistment was voluntary. The system was not found satisfactory, and in 1792 the Executive was empowered to compel military service; at the same time Horse Artillery were introduced. During 1792 and 1793 France owed her salvation to the old royal troops, for the new levies were entirely undisciplined, but from 1794 those levies had become under the pressure of war a model of devotion. Commissions were no longer confined to the nobility, and in 1793 the drastic measures of Carnot resulted in the creation of the *levée en masse*, which enabled 1,000,000 men to be placed in the field, and in 1794 and 1795 that great administrator thoroughly organised these immense forces, introducing divisions, adding sapper battalions, and establishing several military schools. In 1798 a recruiting law enacted that in case of invasion every man was liable to serve, but that ordinarily the army was to be recruited by voluntary enlistment and by conscription, this latter mode applying to all between 21 and 25.

In 1800 Bonaparte introduced Corps d'Armée and when Emperor founded the famous Imperial Guard, which numbered in 1805 15,000, and in 1815 18,000. He organised the Cavalry in corps, and augmented the Artillery to compensate for the declining efficiency of the Infantry. The whole work connected with

transporting the Artillery and with supply and hospitals was removed from civilians and transferred to special military departments. Various technical military colleges were founded, the Legion of Honour instituted, and the rank of Marshal restored.

The number of men under arms was in 1794 one million, in 1801 340,000, in 1805 600,000, in 1813 1,000,000—*i.e.* one-fortieth of the population, the proper proportion being one-hundredth.

THE FRONTIER OF FRANCE in 1789, 1797, 1811, 1814, 1815.

From 1789 to 1815 the French frontier underwent most extraordinary changes. In 1790 the old provinces of France were split up into 83 departments; in 1811 the Empire comprised 130 departments, besides 24 departments of the Kingdom of Italy, and the Illyrian Provinces. In 1815 France, reduced to her limits of 1790, contained only 83 departments.

(A) 1789-1804. In 1791 were annexed Avignon, Venaissin, and Orange; in 1792 Savoy and Nice; in 1795 the Treaties of Bâle, in 1797 the Treaty of Campo Formio, and in 1801 the Treaty of Lunéville gave France the left bank of the Rhine; in 1797-98 were annexed Montbéliard, Mülhausen, Porentruy, and Geneva—thus France attained her natural frontiers. In 1802 Piedmont was annexed.

(B) 1804-11. In 1805 the Kingdom of Italy was created, including Lombardy, Venetia, the Papal Marches and Legations (1808), and Italian Tyrol (1810); in 1805 were annexed Genoa, in 1808 Tuscany, Parma, Piacenza, Guastalla, in 1809 the Illyrian Provinces, in 1810 the rest of the Papal States, and the Valais and Holland, and in 1811 the sea coast of Westphalia, Oldenburg, and the Hanseatic Towns (Lübeck, Bremen, Hamburg).

(C) 1811-15. By the First Treaty of Paris (1814) France was reduced to her limits of 1792, except that she retained Avignon, Venaissin, and Orange as well as Montbéliard, Mülhausen, and half Savoy. By the Second Treaty of Paris (1815) she lost half Savoy, Philippeville, Marienburg, Bouillon, Sarrelouis, Saarbrück, Landau, Porentruy.

MILITARY FORCES OF ENGLAND.

In 1792 there were 33,000 troops in England and 32,000 in India, but by 1796 the numbers stood at 206,000. In 1798 Volunteers were first raised. In 1799 the forces totalled 258,000 and in 1801 350,000, not counting 130,000 Sepoys. In 1804 the Additional Force Bill applied the principle of conscription, and in 1806 service for a limited period was first introduced; in that year the numbers stood at 270,000. In 1809 the Regulars and Militia numbered 290,000; in 1811 they amounted to 300,000, besides 340,000 local militia. In 1813 and 1814 the English land forces totalled 1,000,000.

MILITARY FORCES OF AUSTRIA.

In 1792 Austria had 240,000 foot, 35,000 horse and numerous gunners, but in Belgium (then an Austrian province) she had foolishly destroyed the great barrier fortresses that had faced France. By 1805 she had 740,000 men in arms, and in 1806 the Archduke Charles introduced many reforms, *e.g.* the Landwehr, and by 1814 the Austrian total rose to 970,000.

MILITARY FORCES OF RUSSIA.

In 1792 she had 200,000 troops, excluding the military colonies and the Cossacks of the Don; in 1805 the figure was 300,000.

MILITARY FORCES OF PRUSSIA.

In 1792 she had 160,000 men splendidly organised, with considerable reserves; the cavalry was unequalled in Europe. By 1806 she had 500,000, and her military system was improved by Stein and Scharnhorst (1807-10), *e.g.* the Landwehr and the Landsturm were introduced.

FORTRESSES.

Fortresses were once regarded as a nation's salvation, and even yet, in spite of the reaction against permanent works, strategists still attach importance to works stationed at peculiarly favourable points, and to large entrenched camps. The ancient belief in fortresses in the days of slow-moving and immobile armies was probably justified, but in modern times fortresses have lost favour because they are costly, soon become obsolete, consume many men, and imply the defensive.

Alison remarks on the great value of frontier fortresses in giving a defender time to organise his resistance and also a base for his counter-attacks, which was seen to be the case on the eastern frontier of France, as well as in 1796, when the fortresses of Piedmont first checked the French, but when gained by them formed a base for further advance. In the same year Mantua checked the invaders for six months. How different the issue, if Vienna had been fortified in 1805 and 1809, or Paris in 1814 and 1815, or Berlin in 1806, or Moscow in 1812! Napoléon considered that London should be fortified, and it was the lines of Torres Vedras that saved the Peninsula.

Are central fortresses better than frontier fortresses? A central entrenched camp is of immense value, and the worst of frontier fortresses is that as the defender retires he loses the services of the garrisons, *e.g.* in 1814 near 100,000 French veterans were wasted in German and Spanish fortresses; how much better would have been an entrenched camp round Paris! Frontier fortresses are useful against slight attacks, central fortresses against great invasions; and the best plan is a combination of the two.

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
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